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Chapter 1
The Big Picture
Electronic supplementary material: The online version of this chapter (https://doi.org/10.1007/ 
978-3-319-78160-0_1) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
Abstract The purpose of this book is to share some results and the data from four 
studies in which we used experimental procedures to manipulate key features of 
deliberative public engagement to study the impacts in the context of deliberations 
about nanotechnology. In this chapter, we discuss the purpose of this book, which is 
to advance science of public engagement, and the overarching question motivating 
our research: What public engagement methods work for what purposes and why? 
We also briefly review existing prior work related to our overarching goal and ques-
tion and introduce the contents of the rest of the book.
Keywords Science of public engagement · Deliberative engagement · Science and 
technology studies · Nanotechnology · Big data
1.1  Introduction
Some of us remember the time before widespread Internet access, when instead of 
watching YouTube or Facebooking, we watched a preset schedule of Saturday 
morning cartoons. One such cartoon, The Jetsons, featured a futuristic family that 
lived a seemingly amazing life—populated by then-imaginary inventions such as 
video phones, housecleaning robots, and flying cars.1 Now, of course, video 
phones are old news and have exceeded Jetson-inspired expectations: instead of 
mounting them on the wall, you can carry them in your pocket. Robots increas-
ingly Roomba our carpets, Robomow our lawns, and have begun to patrol our 
1 http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/50-years-of-the-jetsons-why-the-show-still- 
matters-43459669/
2shopping malls.2 And, as a final step toward the Jetsonian life, news outlets 
recently have been abuzz with commentary about the development of flying cars.3
At the same time as new technological developments bring futuristic dreams to 
life and widen imaginable opportunities, they also often result in unanticipated new 
problems. George Jetson had to grapple with pizza for breakfast when his food dis-
penser malfunctioned and with a robot co-worker that was trying to steal his job. 
Today, there is increasing interest in “robot-proof” jobs. Meanwhile, cyberbullying, 
sexting, and social isolation are examples of problems attributed to widespread 
smartphone use. Texting and driving has resulted in a troubling new reason for car 
crashes, encouraging authorities to consider the potential use of “textalyzer” tech-
nology to detect when drivers are illegally texting just before a crash.4 Others worry 
about the dramatic increase in data collected on everyday citizens, the potential rise 
of a pervasive surveillance society, use of big data to manipulate people, and the 
unknown effects of nanoparticles that can easily cross the blood-brain barrier.
Given the potential for negative—or at least controversial—effects of new tech-
nologies upon the societies in which various publics must live, what could be more 
democratic than promoting public involvement in decisions about those new tech-
nologies? Unless, of course, it turns out that public involvement, which can some-
times be costly, is ineffective, unnecessary, or actually makes things worse. Some 
have suggested this may be the case (e.g., Sunstein, 2000, 2002), but, for better or 
worse, public engagement with and about new technologies is happening all around 
us. Our interest in studying such public engagement—the topic of this book—is to 
learn how to design it for the better.
The research described in this book was funded by the National Science 
Foundation (NSF)5 and aimed to begin to fill current gaps in the research on public 
engagement by applying certain social, psychological, and behavioral theories and 
experimental procedures. As we describe in Chap. 2, our project included five stud-
ies, four of which we present in this book.6 The four studies described here involved 
more than 1000 college students as participants, and all four studies focused on the 
same topic and context. Thus the studies resulted in a wealth of quantitative and 
qualitative data collected at multiple time points and provide a unique opportunity 
to see which results replicate across studies.
Our work was motivated by a desire to better understand how, when, and why 
public engagement might work to achieve different purposes. It also reflects a 
largely untapped role that social scientists might play in the area of responsible 
2 http://www.npr.org/2017/04/26/525675196/robot-security-guards-coming-to-shopping-malls
3 http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/04/25/525540611/flying-cars-are-still-coming- 
should-we-believe-the-hype
4 http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/04/27/525729013/textalyzer-aims-to-curb- 
distracted-driving-but-what-about-privacy
5 Research and data dissemination is funded by NSF #0965465 and #1623805. Any opinions, find-
ings, and conclusions are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
National Science Foundation (NSF).
6 Study 1 data, our pilot data, was prioritized last for release and is currently not included in the full 
release of data. Researchers wishing to use our data are welcome to do so as long as they cite it 
appropriately.
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3research and innovation (Macnaghten, Kearnes, & Wynne, 2005). Prior scholars 
have noted that social scientists are needed to help in the design phase of the tech-
nology (Doubleday, 2007; Evans & Kotchetkova, 2009). By facilitating public 
engagement, social scientists can help technologists revise their work so that it not 
only “works” in a technical sense but also in social sense, so that it doesn’t, for 
example, suffer the polarized fate of genetically modified foods in Europe (Gaskell, 
Bauer, Durant, & Allum, 1999; Marris, 2015; Webler & Tuler, 2010).
However, our view is that social scientists are also needed to take the lead in 
theorizing, researching, and advancing the science of public engagement. The field 
could use some bona fide “public engagement psychologists,” as well as “public 
engagement political scientists” and “public engagement communication” research-
ers. Work in education might provide a model for the new field or set of fields we 
envision. Understanding and promoting positive educational outcomes are not the 
goal of a single field. Rather, diverse scholars are involved in advancing education- 
relevant goals, including those who study educational psychology, educational pol-
icy, and educational administration. There is a need for similarly diverse groups of 
scholars to work from different angles to focus specifically upon how to promote 
engagement-related outcomes in and across specific contexts.
In our studies we worked from a psychological perspective to begin to envision 
and demonstrate what a science of public engagement might look like. The aims of 
this book are to tell the story of our experience; share our measures, methods, and 
data; describe some of our findings; and ultimately (hopefully) provoke and inspire 
more studies advancing the science of public engagement. We hope our story will 
embolden and facilitate additional attempts to apply rigorous experimental proce-
dures to public engagement contexts and that our overviewed studies provide exem-
plars for future efforts. By providing links to our detailed methods, materials, and 
measures and reams of quantitative and qualitative data, we hope to foster addi-
tional analyses and findings and maybe also to provide materials useful for training 
others who aspire to be public engagement scientists. Indeed, our rich data likely 
have further insights to reveal to researchers with a variety of interests. The data also 
reveal, in sometimes humbling ways, the struggles we encountered in conducting 
our experiments. We hope lessons from our struggles can enhance future studies of 
public engagement strategies used in different contexts and for varied purposes.
In light of these aims, we use the rest of this chapter to provide a brief overview of 
the existing public engagement literature and gaps that motivated our research. We also 
discuss some social and psychological theories potentially applicable to the develop-
ment of science of public engagement, and provide an overview of the rest of the book.
1.2  Motivating Questions and Gaps
Public engagement is claimed to have numerous benefits (Fiorino, 1990). Proponents 
claim it is “the right thing to do” (Petts, 2008) and that it will result in better and more 
publicly acceptable policies. Those policies, they say, will take into account more 
viewpoints, while the engagement activities simultaneously improve citizenship 
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4capacities (Selin et al., 2016) and social capital (Webler, Kastenholz, & Renn, 1995). 
Imagine, if you will, George Jetson getting to have a say about the design of his robot 
co-workers. George might suggest a precautionary “no-job-stealing” algorithm be 
installed before the robot begins working. As a result of George’s engagement, not 
only does policy and technology development improve, but George himself learns 
about a new technology and its pros and cons, as well as learning about and gaining 
appreciation of others’ views and honing skills needed to express his own views—
ultimately improving our democracy, one George at a time.
Other more skeptical writers provide contrary claims that public engagement 
might actually have harmful effects. What if George Jetson and his human colleagues 
fail to imagine important effects of new technologies? How useful is their input then? 
What if the engagement incites polarization and conflict among participants instead 
of fomenting forward-moving consensus (Kahan, 2012; Schkade, Sunstein, & Hastie, 
2007; Sunstein, 2002)? George and his bottom-line-focused boss may have very dif-
ferent ideas about how the robot co-worker should be developed. Some writers also 
argue engagement may hand the powerful even more power (Benhabib, 2002; 
Hickerson & Gastil, 2008) or cause citizens to disengage rather than engage (Hibbing 
& Theiss-Morse, 2002). After all, if George finds inventors and regulators catering to 
his boss’s concerns rather than his, what reason does he have to engage in the future?
Despite the negative possibilities, a number of democracies seem to agree that the 
public should be engaged around technology and policy decisions. In the latter part of 
the twentieth century, the Netherlands began developing and using a procedure called 
constructive technology assessment (CTA) as a means to include more stakeholder 
perspectives and ensure that social values were taken into account earlier in technol-
ogy development (Rip & Robinson, 2013; Wilsdon & Willis, 2004). More recently, in 
the USA, public participation was touted as a key feature of the Obama Administration’s 
Open Government Initiative. Now, as Internet giants and other organizations increas-
ingly make online experimentation and other research a part of their everyday opera-
tions, international guidelines have been released, encouraging public deliberation 
aimed at defining the appropriate ethical boundaries for such big data social research.7
Calls and support for public engagement have become so widespread that some 
have claimed we are, for better or worse, in an “age of engagement” (Delgado, 
Kjølberg, & Wickson, 2011). Certainly we are in an age of calls for public engage-
ment, which suggests that public engagement, and what it really achieves, should be 
given more attention. What measurable good and/or harm does public engagement 
do? How, when, and why does it do so? Unfortunately, despite all the enthusiasm for 
public engagement, as well as some pointed doubts and criticisms, the empirical 
research on public engagement is still in its infancy. Especially few are the number 
of controlled experiments that might elucidate microprocesses and psychological 
factors that operate during public engagements and perhaps shed light on 
conflicting outcomes from prior work.
7 http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/research-ethics-and-new-forms-of- 
data-for-social-and-economic-research_5jln7vnpxs32-en
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of public engagement by considering the evidence base for some of the claims made 
about the benefits of public engagement. Very quickly, we realized that results from 
studies of public engagement were highly variable. Thorough academic reviews of 
such variable outcomes are provided by others (Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004; 
Mendelberg, 2002; Ryfe, 2005), and we do not repeat them here. However it is useful 
to consider an illustrative example, such as the outcomes of engagements around 
planning for potential influenza pandemics.
The mention of the word “pandemic” probably fills some people’s heads with 
visions of Ebola and SARS and others with the words “it won’t happen to me.” Both 
responses are or perhaps should be frightening. In this context, Garrett, Vawter, 
Prehn, DeBruin, and Gervais (2009, p. 18) “strongly urge government officials and 
policymakers to facilitate robust public engagement on key issues in pandemic eth-
ics,” arguing that “[i]nformed public perspectives can help improve pandemic poli-
cies, promote trust and enhance cooperation.”
Yet, an evaluation of six pandemic engagement projects conducted in the USA 
was much more cautious in its conclusions about the effectiveness of such engage-
ments (Public Policy Center, 2010). On the positive side, the report noted the 
engagement events did appear to result in overall changes in opinions about the 
types of social values that should be weighed during a pandemic. This suggests that 
the effort to engage and inform people had some effect, resulting in changes in atti-
tudes due to the engagement activities. Yet, on the negative side, agreement on the 
values underlying people’s opinions did not increase. Further, relating to the hoped- 
for “informed public perspectives,” the report noted that participant knowledge did 
generally increase, but also that, “given the relatively low post process scores across 
states, we cannot conclude that participants were well informed” as they gave their 
input (pp. 12–13). Results relating to the promotion of institutional trust were also 
mixed. Some of the evaluated projects showed increases in trust in some institu-
tions, others showed decreases in trust in some institutions, and still others showed 
mixed or no changes in trust.
Such varied results, which are common across studies of public engagement, 
give hope that public engagement can have positive effects but also underscore that 
positive impacts are not certain. Different outcomes can, will, and do occur under 
different conditions; but there is little clarity regarding which conditions, features, 
or contexts are responsible for the differences. This leads to a recognized problem 
in the public engagement literature: the lack of clarity around “how to enable effec-
tive involvement (i.e., which mechanism to use, and how) in any particular situa-
tion,” (Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p.  252) or, phrased another way, “which forms, 
features, and conditions of public engagement are optimal for what purposes and 
why” (PytlikZillig & Tomkins, 2011, p. 198). We were interested in such questions 
because they not only have implications for theory development, they also are 
essential for providing practitioners with direction for designing “effective” public 
engagement in different situations. Thus, in the next sections, we break down our 
overarching question into its component parts (what works, for what purposes, and 
why) and describe the state of the prior research pertaining to each.
1.2 Motivating Questions and Gaps
61.2.1  What Works? Delineating Important Public Engagement 
Types and Variables
Answering the question of “what works” requires defining what public engagement 
is or is not, as well as identifying different dimensions or types of engagement. 
Although some narrower definitions have been offered (Litva et  al., 2002), cur-
rently, just about any interaction with the public that is even tangentially policy- 
related seems to count as public engagement. Public engagement includes activities 
ranging from idea marketing and museum exhibits, to focus groups and national 
surveys, to community-based participatory research, to citizen juries and delibera-
tions (Rowe & Frewer, 2005).
Attempts to define and organize the myriad of public engagement activities have 
included placing them on a “ladder” to reflect the amount of power they afford pub-
lic, ranging from total citizen control to public manipulation (Arnstein, 1969; see 
also Pretty, 1995). Other suggested distinctions include purpose of the engagement 
(Glass, 1979; Rosener, 1975), structure of activities (Glass, 1979), public accept-
ability (Nelkin & Pollak, 1979), types of participants (Cornwall, 2008; Fung, 2006), 
and direction of information flow to and/or from the public (Rowe & Frewer, 2005). 
Some have also noted that variation occurs both between and within different types 
of public engagement. For example, Carman et al. (2013) focused only on “delib-
erative” engagement mechanisms and noted that these can vary in their recruitment 
methods, number of participants, use of face-to-face versus online modes of interac-
tion, use of different resources such as educational materials and accessible experts, 
and length and number of sessions.
Despite the considerable work done to organize and name all the variations, it’s 
still not really clear what factors, dimensions, or characteristics of public engage-
ment are most worthwhile to study. Almost two decades ago, Chess and Purcell 
(1999) noted that “typologies” of engagement mechanisms do not seem to consis-
tently correspond to different outcomes—casting doubt on how useful it is to simply 
compare different broad “types” of engagement (e.g., surveys vs. deliberations vs. 
focus groups). Later, Rowe and Frewer (2005) advised that researchers should pri-
oritize the study of design variables most likely, from a theoretical and empirical 
standpoint, to impact the effectiveness of the engagement activity. Of course, theo-
rizing about effectiveness also requires defining what counts as success (or as posi-
tive outcomes) when it comes to public engagement, a topic which we turn to next.
1.2.2  For What Purposes? Assessing Engagement 
Effectiveness and Success
The public engagement literature has also given quite a bit of attention to defining and 
organizing criteria and measures for the success of public engagements. Some of these 
criteria come from the arguments for or against public engagement, which then have 
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proposed two categories: fairness and competency criteria. Fairness of an 
engagement activity is judged by how acceptable the activity is to the public, its inclu-
siveness of affected stakeholders as participants, the extent to which processes are equi-
table and transparent, and so on. Competency of an engagement refers to how well and 
efficiently it achieves its purposes, whether those purposes are to educate and inform, 
to gather the full range of viewpoints on an issue, to build trust, or something else.
Rowe and colleagues (Rowe & Frewer, 2000; Rowe, Horlick-Jones, Walls, 
Poortinga, & Pidgeon, 2008) somewhat similarly categorized criteria for judging 
the success of public participation activities into acceptance criteria or process cri-
teria. Acceptance criteria include whether the participants are representative of the 
affected public and whether the event occurs early in decision-making, in a trans-
parent and unbiased manner. Process criteria include having well-defined tasks, 
highly accessible and appropriately thorough and unbiased resources, appropriately 
structured decision-making processes, and cost-effective methods.
In an attempt to align common effectiveness criteria with workflow processes 
associated with designing and implementing public engagements, PytlikZillig 
and Tomkins (2011) suggested that categories of information criteria (e.g., is the 
information balanced, complete, accurate) and representation criteria (e.g., are 
all relevant stakeholders included) are associated with preparing for the engage-
ment, process and acceptance criteria (e.g., are the appropriate processes imple-
mented effectively and found to be acceptable by participants) are associated 
with implementing the engagement, and outcome criteria (e.g., did the engage-
ment achieve its goals) are associated with the purposes and hope-for functions 
of the engagement.
While these classes of criteria provide useful overviews of everything about an 
engagement that might be judged and evaluated, there are at least a couple8 of prob-
lems with using the criteria classes to advance theory and research. Most important 
to the work we present in this book, the classes are too broad to readily lend them-
selves to the application and testing of specific theories. Each class of criteria con-
tains varied constructs, and each construct may need its own theoretical and 
empirical account. Very few evaluative frameworks have focused on tying specific 
engagement mechanisms to specific outcomes (but see Beierle, 1998’s evaluation 
framework based on social goals). Research and theory might be advanced more 
quickly if effectiveness components were identified and organized in a manner that 
allowed for the application of specific theories to specific processes and outcomes 
and contexts.
8 Due to our study design and space constraints, we will not be able to deal much with a second 
perhaps even more significant problem than discussed here, which is that most all of the outcome 
criteria are focused solely on the publics who are engaged and not on the experts or policymakers 
who also may be engaged or may have contracted the engagement. As researchers and practitioners 
increasingly seek out alternatives to “deficit models” of engagement, it is becoming more impor-
tant to attend, not only to how publics are impacted by engagements but how policymakers’, poli-
cies’, and technologists’ understandings, trust, and so on are also impacted (Eaton, Burnham, 
Hinrichs, & Selfa, 2017).
1.2 Motivating Questions and Gaps
81.2.3  In What Contexts and Why? From Comparison 
to Causation
The importance of context for public engagement has been extolled in the political 
science and STS (science, technology, and society) literatures (Delgado et al., 2011; 
Delli Carpini et al., 2004). In some ways, however, context seems to be a scapegoat 
for “inconsistent results.” That is, the argument goes like this: Context must matter, 
because studies that analyze, compare, and even pit one type of engagement against 
another, in various contexts, find inconsistent results. Indeed, some studies, mostly 
conducted in health policy contexts, have compared deliberation, education-only, 
and measurement-only control groups or survey, interview, or discussion proce-
dures. These studies often find greater change in knowledge and/or attitudes when 
deliberative methods are used instead of other methods (Abelson et  al., 2003; 
Barabas, 2004; Carman et  al., 2014; De Vries et  al., 2010; Kim et  al., 2011). 
However, other studies, such as Denver, Hands, and Jones’s (1995) study of delib-
erative poll participants in the UK, find no change in knowledge or attitudes, and yet 
others suggest deliberation may facilitate the biased strengthening of pre-existing 
attitudes (Kahan, 2012; Sunstein, 2002). Even within our single program of research, 
which used highly similar methods, measures, and participants, we found inconsis-
tent results from one study to another, as we describe in later chapters.
For the most part, it is still unclear whether the differences in results that come 
from diverse studies in the field are due to process differences such as variation in 
the operationalization of “deliberation” or whether studies are truly illustrating 
effects due to the context in which the processes are used or whether the effects are 
simply unstable and difficult to consistently achieve. Regardless, let’s assume con-
text does matter: “context” still doesn’t provide a very informative explanation for 
different results. Findings that effects vary across studies and contexts beg for an 
answer to the question: Why? And “why” questions in turn beg for analyses of 
“how” and the use of methods that can test causal processes.
Experimental studies of public engagement that use random assignment and con-
trol groups, especially those that connect features-processes-outcomes, are increas-
ing but still relatively rare (Carman et  al., 2013; Friess & Eilders, 2015). Such 
studies can, however, be very fruitful and enlightening. For example, relating to the 
knowledge increases commonly found during engagements, a deliberative experi-
ment by Muhlberger and Weber (2006) found that knowledge gains were more 
likely due to reading the materials, with no additional knowledge gains attributable 
to the deliberative discussion. In a later study, Esterling, Neblo, and Lazer (2011) 
used experimental methods to compare deliberative discussion that included online 
discussion with one’s political representatives, with an information-only group, or a 
true control group (receiving no information). In contrast to the Muhlberger and 
Weber study, their methods found deliberative discussion participants gained more 
knowledge than either the control or information-only groups. But they also showed 
the increased knowledge was likely due to seeking out policy-relevant information 
outside of the experiment. This suggests their participants were motivated to appear 
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a potential explanation for why the findings may have differed from the Muhlberger 
and Weber study, based on time allowed for exploration of information outside the 
context of the engagement activities.
Studies that connect features-processes-outcomes can help clarify why similar 
but different designs have varied effects and be used to build theories that help to 
predict and explain when public engagement will be effective for different purposes. 
As we detail in Chap. 2, the framework we used to guide our methods also aspired 
to make features-processes-outcomes connections while at the same time examin-
ing moderators of such connections which might inform theory development.
1.3  Advancing the Theoretical and Empirical Bases 
of a Science of Public Engagement
1.3.1  The Current State of Theory
In the above review, we have identified a number of frameworks and exemplar stud-
ies but virtually no overarching “theories” of public engagement. This is, in part, 
due to the already discussed problems the field has faced when it comes to concep-
tualizing the “what” and “for what purposes” of public engagement. As Rowe and 
Frewer (2005) noted, “Given the sheer number of mechanisms available for engag-
ing the public and also the confusion as to what each does and does not entail, and 
how each differs from the others, it is unsurprising that no significant theory has 
emerged as to what mechanism to use in what circumstance to enable effective 
engagement” (pp. 259–260). It is easy to extend Rowe and Frewer’s observation 
about public engagement mechanisms (see also Chess & Purcell, 1999) to public 
engagement outcomes: Given the diverse outcomes public engagement is expected 
to achieve, it is not surprising that no single theory has emerged to cover all of them.
This is not to say that public engagement research is atheoretical or that theories 
are not applied within public engagement research. In some ways, the problem is 
that there are many, many—perhaps too many—theories, and these theories are not 
yet well-organized in a manner that optimally serves the advancement of a science 
of public engagement. Theories applied to public engagement range from the rela-
tively encompassing perspective of deliberative democracy (see Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2004, for a review) to more narrow and specific theories such as Barabas’ 
(2004) theory of opinion updating during deliberative discussions. The theory of 
affective intelligence (Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000) also has been proposed 
and used to explain when individuals will engage versus disengage and how they 
will interact with political information under different conditions, including when 
they will engage in an open-minded versus defensive manner (MacKuen, Wolak, 
Keele, & Marcus, 2010). More broadly, agency theory (Muhlberger, 2005; 
Muhlberger & PytlikZillig, 2016) has been proposed as an overarching framework 
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that might guide research on public engagement, taking into account both individual 
and group level, rational and nonrational, and psychological and sociological forces 
on public attitudes and beliefs. However, perhaps due to a lack of coordination 
across the specific areas and domains in which public engagement takes place, for 
the most part, current theories have not been integrated into more broadly useful 
theories that advance science of public engagement per se. Such theories also have 
not been integrated with other social psychological and cognitive theories in a man-
ner that could help to advance those existing theories, or, in the case of the highly 
integrative agency theory, they have not been widely applied.
1.3.2  Moving Forward
How might we move forward to develop more useful and integrative theories of 
public engagement that more effectively advance a science of public engagement? 
In our prior work (PytlikZillig & Tomkins, 2011), we have suggested that it would 
be useful to (1) analyze public engagements by inventorying their commonly varied 
features and hoped for outcomes; (2) broadly consider a variety of existing theories 
from a wide number of fields ranging from psychology to political science, to com-
munication, and more; (3) narrow our focus and use experimental methods to care-
fully and systematically vary a subset of engagement features that (a) are purported 
as most important to achieving public engagement outcomes and (b) have strong 
connections to other existing theories; and (4), across multiple studies, systemati-
cally measure the impacts of those experimentally varied features on both the out-
comes and potential explanatory mediators while also exploring potential moderators 
of the effects. This is the approach we therefore applied in the present work.
1.4  Focus and Overview of the Rest of this Book
Earlier in this chapter, we provided an overview of the many features of public 
engagement and the many outcomes public engagements are expected to achieve. 
Of course no single research program could examine all such features and out-
comes. For our studies, we narrowed our focus to deliberative public engagements 
primarily because of the interests of our team members, each of whom had research 
and/or practical experience in contexts using deliberative methods.
Deliberation has been broadly defined as a type of thinking where people take in 
and weigh diverse information to form and justify their opinions (Gerber, Bächtiger, 
Fiket, Steenbergen, & Steiner, 2014; Gundersen, 1995; Lindeman, 2002). 
Democratic deliberative theory (Bohman, 2000; Chambers, 2003; Coleman & 
Gotze, 2001; Fishkin & Luskin, 2005; Gastil & Levine, 2005; Habermas, 1990) 
likewise purports that voters should first be thinkers and discussants who weigh the 
reasons for their choices. Thus, deliberative engagements are designed around the 
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idea that the best decisions are ones that are critically evaluated and well-reasoned, 
and deliberative engagement stresses the need to consider diverse perspectives and 
weigh evidence in terms of its quality and relevance.
Beyond the cognitive definition of deliberation, others have suggested additional 
criteria before an activity can be called “deliberative engagement.” For example, it 
is common to require the social criterion of discussion with others or formal pro-
cesses for creating rationales such as “problem analysis, criteria specification, and 
evaluation” (Gastil, 2000, p. 22). Thompson (2008) argues that deliberation requires 
the social criterion of some disagreement and decision criteria involving a collective 
decision that will bind all group members (see also Parker, 2003). Even so, 
Thompson notes that non-binding discussion, such as that occurs in many delibera-
tive polls (Fishkin & Luskin, 2005), may be seen as relevant preparation for demo-
cratic decisions, and studies of such processes therefore have relevance to 
understanding the effectiveness of deliberative methods.
Our research did not aim to compare “deliberation” to “non-deliberation,” so 
much as it aimed to focus on specific features of deliberative engagement and their 
effects, alone or in combination. For this purpose, it is less important that we define 
deliberation exactly than it is that we identify some of the features that arguably are 
part of deliberation, which can then be operationalized and subjected to experimen-
tal manipulation. To facilitate effective deliberation, it is commonly argued that 
deliberative engagements need to include features such as discussion, high-quality 
information, participants who engage in critical thinking during exposure to diverse 
opinions, and with the help of effective facilitation (Bohman, 2000; Chambers, 
2003; Coleman & Gotze, 2001; Fishkin & Luskin, 2005; Gastil & Levine, 2005; 
Habermas, 1990). We thus focused on varying these features in our studies. 
Meanwhile, some of the most commonly lauded and hoped-for outcomes of delib-
erative engagements include informed (knowledgeable) opinions, attitude changes, 
increased trust in institutions, and acceptance of resulting policies. These variables 
thus became some of our primary outcome variables. In Chap. 2 we describe how 
we operationalized such variables in our manipulations and measures, along with 
providing links to our materials and detailed method reports.
In Chaps. 3, 4, and 5, we provide examples of analyses focused on testing theo-
ries and exploring potentially important mediators and moderators that might 
advance various theories. The variables we focused upon are relevant to a wide 
number of theories from other fields that could be (but have yet to be) usefully tested 
in the context of public engagement—furthering both public engagement theory 
and the original theories. Such theories suggest a number of mechanisms or media-
tors by which features of engagement might impact outcomes. For example, theo-
ries and research from educational psychology are very relevant to public 
engagement learning outcomes. Yet certain constructs commonly examined in edu-
cational contexts, like individual differences in intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
(McGregor & Elliott, 2002; Midgley, 2014; Pintrich, 2004) or use of different 
modes or types of cognitive engagement (Chin & Brown, 2000; Dinsmore & 
Alexander, 2012), still are not commonly examined in the context of public engage-
ment. Furthermore, despite the emphasis of most public engagement activities on 
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“informed opinions,” little research has focused on what is meant by “informed.” 
Informedness indicated by subjective knowledge often has a relatively low correla-
tion with objective knowledge (Carlson, Vincent, Hardesty, & Bearden, 2008), and 
little theoretical (or empirical) guidance exists regarding whether engagement prac-
titioners should focus on one versus the other.
In Chap. 3, we explicitly examine different types of cognitive-affective engage-
ment as potential mediators of the effects of our experimental conditions upon 
changes in knowledge. We examine both how our conditions impacted these various 
types of engagement, as well as how different forms of engagement related to gains 
in subjective and objective knowledge. Our findings suggest self-reports of careful 
and conscientious engagement are especially important if the goal is to increase 
objective or subjective knowledge and that this conscientious engagement can be 
encouraged during deliberations via the instructions given to the participants.
Chapter 4 focuses on attitude formation and change and potential moderators of 
the effects of different engagement features on attitude outcomes. Like knowledge, 
attitudes toward the topics of the public engagement are commonly examined during 
public engagement evaluations. Typically such studies focus on whether individual 
attitudes change their attitudes or come to exhibit certain features like certainty or 
coherence (Gastil & Dillard, 1999). In addition, some studies examine attitudes at 
the group level, to determine the conditions under which attitudes held by a group of 
individuals show overall mean change, or come to consensus, exhibit polarization 
(Schkade et al., 2007), or move toward single-peakedness (Farrar et al., 2010). The 
literature on attitude formation and change is voluminous and includes reference to 
theories such as the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), theories of 
motivated cognition (Kunda, 1990), the elaboration likelihood model and the meta-
cognitive model (Petty & Brinol, 2010), and so on. These theories, although too 
often not explicitly mentioned, are relevant to prior studies of attitudes during public 
engagement, including prior experimental studies (e.g., see Baccaro, Bächtiger, & 
Deville, 2016). In Chap. 4, we discuss the application of such theories and explore 
whether our experimental conditions relate to attitude changes at the individual and 
group levels and to the observed variation in participant attitudes. By also examining 
moderators of some of our effects, we move toward determining the reliability of the 
relationships between our experimental manipulations and attitude outcomes.
In Chap. 5, we explore whether certain variables may operate via mediation and 
moderation processes simultaneously. We do this while discussing an undertheo-
rized and underinvestigated outcome: policy acceptance. Drawing from existing 
theories related to policy acceptance and support, procedural fairness, and legiti-
macy, we propose that certain engagement features or processes and perceptions of 
engagement processes may simultaneously impact mediating and moderating vari-
ables which, at times, may work against one another to hide main effects of the 
experimental condition. Using correlation and multiple regression analyses, we 
demonstrate that, despite the lack of main effects of our experimental conditions 
upon policy acceptance, our experimentally varied features of deliberative 
 engagement are impacting mediators and moderators in ways that have implications 
for advancing theory and practice.
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Finally, in Chap. 6, we summarize some of the key lessons that we learned from 
our efforts on these studies over the years. In our studies, we attempted to reach 
beyond evaluations of public engagement, to focus upon theory development, by 
creating methods, materials, and measures that draw broadly from a number of 
diverse and relevant theoretical perspectives. We discuss how successful these 
efforts were and some of the drawbacks and benefits of our approach. Hopefully, 
our frank assessments will spark continued conversations regarding other ways in 
which the development of theories of public engagement might take place and how 
empirical research on public engagement might be expanded in the future.
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Abstract In this chapter we provide an overview of the experimental methods used 
in our four research studies. We describe the context for our studies and describe our 
rationale for examining our research questions in the context of the college student 
classroom. Then we compare and contrast the major features of our studies, includ-
ing the participants, timing, materials, measures, and procedures for each study, and 
provide explanations for certain changes made between studies. Finally, we provide 
information about how readers can find our more detailed materials and methods, 
which also accompany our data for Studies 2–4.
Keywords Framework for the study of engagement · Engagement features · 
College students · Future scientists · Ethical, legal and social issues
2.1  Connecting Features, Processes, and Outcomes 
During Deliberative Discussions
As noted in Chap. 1, when we began our studies, the relative lack of experimental 
research on public engagement led us to try to begin to fill that gap. Our consider-
ation of what approaches (public engagement features) work for what purposes 
(outcomes) and why (i.e., via what processes or mediators) resulted in a general 
framework and conceptual strategy we applied to present research (PytlikZillig & 
Tomkins, 2011). This strategy involves considering some of the features com-
monly used and recommended for public engagement and then broadly consider-
ing how a variety of social and psychological theories might clarify how, when, 
and why those features might lead to various outcomes. The broad and inclusive 
consideration of relevant theories drove the design of our experiments, in which 
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we attempted to experimentally vary several features, while measuring and assess-
ing a larger number of potential outcomes, mediators, and moderators. By con-
ducting similar but varied procedures in highly similar samples over time, we 
were able to examine which findings are robust and which vary even within the 
context of our relatively narrow inquiry: engaging science students in delibera-
tions about nanotechnology.
Our detailed methods, including all measures and materials for each study, 
accompany the data sets that are available in the supplemental files to this book. 
Note that our Study 1 was conducted as a pilot in which we tested the incorporation 
of our experimental methods into the classroom setting. Several of our methods and 
measures were changed based on feedback from students at the end of that first 
semester. Due to the different nature of Study 1, and the need to focus our resources 
on sharing our best data, we do not include much discussion of Study 1 in this book, 
and we are not presenting Study 1 data here.
In this chapter, we first describe the contexts and methodological features that were 
constant across the remainder of the studies (Studies 2–5) and explain why we believe 
studies in the college student context are important. We then summarize key differences 
and similarities between studies in experimental conditions and outcome measures, 
along with providing some of the rationale for the changes we made across studies.
2.2  Our Context: Future Scientists Deliberating 
About Nanotechnology over Time
It is important to study theories relevant to public engagement in the specific con-
text of deliberation around science and technology development and policy. 
Empirical findings from the lab or even from one deliberative discussion to another 
do not always easily generalize. Science, technology, and society (STS) scholars 
generally agree that public engagement should be context sensitive (Delgado, 
Kjølberg, & Wickson, 2011), making it important to examine the impact of design 
factors within specific, concrete contexts. As part of our strategy for connecting 
features, processes, and outcomes, we held context as constant as possible across 
our experiments. While our approach necessarily limits the generalizability of 
results, it provides a solid foundation for establishing the existence of internally 
valid and robust results within our chosen context, before extending to others. As 
the reader will see in Chaps. 3, 4, and 5, even with all the controls we employed, 
finding consistent effects was, nonetheless, no small feat. The contextual features 
held constant in our studies include the type of participants involved, the topics of 
deliberation, and the use of a longitudinal, repeated measures design.
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2.2.1  Participants: College Students in the College Science 
Classroom
To facilitate our use of experimental methods, we worked within the constraints of 
the college classroom, by engaging consecutive semesters of students enrolled in a 
freshman-level biology for science majors course at the University of 
Nebraska- Lincoln (UNL). Table  2.1 describes the basic demographics of the 
students in each of our studies. As shown, an estimated 85–90% of the students who 
began the course participated in the study each semester. Those not participating 
may have either dropped out of the course or not consented to let us use their data. 
Across all studies, participants involved slightly more females than males and had an 
average age of 19–20 years. Students in Study 5, however, were slightly older and 
more varied in age. In each study, 70–90% of the students were in their first 2 years 
of college, and around 70–80% were science majors. About 40–50% of the students 
reported an affiliation with the Republican party, and the remainder of the students 
were approximately equally likely to affiliate as Democrats or as Independent/
Others, except in Study 2, in which there were proportionally more Independent/
Others. The fall semesters generally involved larger numbers of students than the 
spring semesters and a greater proportion of students in their first year of college.
There are at least three reasons why we believe this context is worthy of study. 
First, as noted by McAvoy and Hess (2013, p. 19), classrooms are “one of the most 
promising sites for teaching the skills and values necessary for deliberative demo-
cratic life.” US college students have often just achieved voting age, and most are 
just beginning a fuller participation in democracy. It is an arguably worthwhile 
endeavor to include more deliberative democracy in the classroom, and experiments 
in such contexts will facilitate understanding of optimal ways to do just that. Second, 
within the realm of STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) 
education, there has been a movement toward creating curricula that result in more 
Table 2.1 Descriptive comparison of participants across studies
Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 Study 5
Total N participants in data set 198 316 205 317
Estimated % females (based on self-reports) 53% 56% 57% 52%
Average (standard deviation) age in years 19 (2) 19 (2) 19 (2) 20 (3)
Age range 17–30 17–40 17–36 16–46
First year in college (%) 58% 40% 60% 43%
Second year in college (%) 28% 40% 27% 29%
Third year in college (%) 10% 15% 10% 19%
Fourth year in college or beyond (%) 4% 5% 4% 7%
Science majors 76% 79% 79% 68%
Republican 41% 45% 47% 46%
Democrat 24% 27% 28% 24%
Independent/other 35% 28% 26% 22%
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well-rounded graduates who are not only experts in their fields but also able to work 
with interdisciplinary teams and think about the implications of the technologies 
that they may work with or develop and refine. Within biology education at UNL, 
discussion of a “New Biology” that focuses on interdisciplinary problem-solving 
and the application of science to solving societal problems makes our work appli-
cable to the goals of that movement (Labov, Reid, & Yamamoto, 2010; National 
Research Council, 2009). As noted by the National Research Council’s 2009 publi-
cation of “New Biology for the 21st Century: Ensuring the United States Leads the 
Coming Biology Revolution” (p. 10):
Science and technology alone, of course, cannot solve all of our food, energy, environmental, 
and health problems. Political, social, economic, and many other factors have major roles to 
play in both setting and meeting goals in these areas. Indeed, increased collaboration between 
life scientists and social scientists is another exciting interface that has much to contribute to 
developing and implementing practical solutions.
Thus, work like ours is useful for introducing future scientists to the social science 
that is likely to impact the practical usefulness of their work as it intersects with the 
public and a variety of public viewpoints. Third, a very practical reason for our 
study of public engagement within the college classroom context is that it allowed 
us the use of experimental methods such as random assignment to conditions, 
increasing the internal validity of our findings in that context.
2.2.2  Discussion Topics: Nano-Biological Technologies 
and Human Enhancement
In each study, the deliberative activities focused on emerging and potential nano-
technologies. Because the activities took place in a biology course, we focused on 
technologies that involved biological or health applications, such as the use of nano-
technology for creating new nanomedicines or for human enhancement. We chose 
nanotechnology as a topic of deliberation because, at the time of our studies, gov-
ernments were calling for and sometimes requiring public engagement around nan-
otechnology. For example, in 2003, the US twenty-first Century Nanotechnology 
Research and Development Act (P.L. 108–153) required public input and outreach 
as part of ensuring “that ethical, legal, environmental, and other appropriate societal 
concerns…are considered during the development of nanotechnology.” Abroad, a 
government-commissioned report on nanotechnology by the Royal Society and 
Royal Academy of Engineering argued for widespread and early public involve-
ment during nanotechnology development (Royal Society/RAE, 2004).
Table 2.2 shows some of the features of the background documents that varied 
between studies. The focus of the Study 2 document was nanogenomics. Between 
Study 2 and 3, the topics of the background document were expanded to discuss 
nanotechnology in general, as well as nanogenomics and nanomedicine, and the ethi-
cal, legal and social issues (ELSI) surrounding these technologies. In addition, 
between Study 3 and 4, revisions were made in response to student feedback that the 
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document seemed biased positively toward nanotechnology, to include additional 
information and resources relevant to risks related to nanotechnology. Some changes 
were also made to the format of the documents and their integration with the experi-
mentally varied prompts. In Study 2 the background information was a stand-alone, 
downloadable PDF document, and the prompts for engagement were presented sepa-
rately. In the other studies, the information was presented as web page text with click-
able links, and prompts for student responses were embedded in the information, with 
students instructed to stop and answer each prompt before continuing to read the next 
web page. Students were given a link to a downloadable PDF at the end of their read-
ing assignment to refer to throughout the rest of the engagement activities.
2.2.3  Repeated Measures Longitudinal Design
Each of the studies also involved repeated measures administered over approximately 
4–14 weeks of the semester. Table 2.3 shows the timing sequence of activities for 
each study. As shown, most of the study activities were organized into assignments 
for the students to complete. The assignments were required of all students, and stu-
dent work was graded for completion and at times for effort or quality. Generally 
speaking, however, if students completed the work, they were given full credit. All 
students were required to complete and turn in the assignments. Students were given 
Table 2.2 Comparison of background documents across studies
Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 Study 5
Topics Nanogenomics
  how it is used
  where it is 
heading
  what people are 
saying
References and 
links to other 
materials
Nanotechnology
Nanomedicine
Nanogenomics
ELSI-relevant topics
References and links 
to other materials
Same as study 3 but 
included additional 
information about the 
risks of 
nanotechnology
Same as study 4 
but only in NIF 
structure form, 
and strong and 
weak versions 
created
Approx. 
words*
2500 4500 4900 4900
Structure Topical Topical and NIF 
(pro-con) versions
Same as study 3 NIF (pro-con)
Prompts Prompts separate 
from reading
Prompts embedded 
in reading
Same as study 3 Same as studies 
3 and 4
Formats PDF with clickable 
links and printed 
copies available 
during A3 in class
Online A2 reading 
with printed copies 
available in class 
during A3
Same as study 3 Same as studies 
3 and 4
Notes: ELSI refers to ethical, legal, and social issues. Prompts for deeper engagement used along 
with the background readings are described in the text
*The NIF (National Issues Forum)-formatted materials tended to be a bit longer due to repeating 
some of the claims for each of the opposing (pro-con) perspectives
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two opportunities to provide or withhold research consent: prior to assignment 1 and 
during assignment 4. Final consent decisions made in assignment 4 were honored. If 
a student did not complete assignment 4, then their consent decision for assignment 
1 was honored. If a student did not complete either assignment 1 or 4, their data was 
omitted from the study.
Assignment 1 (A1) was assigned as homework for students to complete outside of 
class. This homework included reading an introduction describing public engage-
Table 2.3 Timing and common content of study activities (assignments)
Study, course, 
dates, and 
time
Study 2
Spring 2011
Study 3
Fall 2011
Study 4
Spring 
2012
Study 5
Fall 2012
January to May
14 weeks
August to 
December
12 weeks
January 
to May
4 weeks
August to 
December
7 weeks
A1* Mid-January Late- 
August
Mid- 
March
Late-Sept
Explained the study and obtained informed consent. Assessed variables such as 
demographics, individual differences in trust, interest in politics, political 
self-efficacy, motivation for engaging in politics, deliberative citizenship, and 
knowledge about nanotechnology
Lecture Early-April Early-Nov Early- 
April
Early-Nov
One hour lecture reviewing evidence of science being a reflection and part of 
society, discussing reasons why science should be regulated, and considering 
how science should be regulated and the role of public input
Recitation Introduction to science and technology at the intersection of nanotechnology 
and biology. Assign A2 to be due by next recitation. Short introduction or video 
on nanotechnology
A2 Early-April Early-Nov Early- 
April
Early-Nov
Readings about nanotechnology and nanogenomics, nanomedicine, and various 
ethical, legal, and social perspectives on each. Measures of knowledge, 
attitudes, engagement, and evaluation of materials
A3 Mid-April Mid-Nov Mid- 
April
Mid-Nov
Deliberate on a number of imagined future scenarios illustrating ethical, legal, 
and social issues pertaining to the use of nanotechnologies. Complete measures 
of engagement and if relevant group process, as well as measures of attitudes
A4 Mid-April Mid-Nov Mid- 
April
Mid-Nov
Post-measures to assess changes in knowledge, attitudes, individual differences, 
and other evaluations
A5 Late-April
Study 2 included some additional measures that students could complete for 
extra credit. In this assignment we piloted new prompts and administered 
additional personality assessments. There was no A5 in the other studies
Notes: *A = activity or assignment, of which there were four. One difference between studies 
included the timing of A1. A1 was administered at the beginning of the semester for Studies 2 and 
3 and thus up to 10 weeks prior to the other activities. A1 was conducted nearer in time (within 
1–2 weeks prior) to the other activities for Studies 4 and 5
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ment and why it is important and which gave an overview of the public engagement 
activities that would take place as part of the course. As part of A1, students also were 
asked to complete measures of demographics, their attitudes toward and knowledge 
of nanotechnology, trust, and other individual differences. The time that elapsed 
between A1 and other activities did vary between studies, which may have affected 
whether and how much students were exposed to other sources of information 
between A1 and other assignments. In Studies 2 and 3, A1 was completed very early 
in the semester, up to 10 weeks prior to the rest of the activities. In Studies 4 and 5, 
A1 was completed approximately 1–2  weeks prior to the rest of the engagement 
activities. The remainder of the activities, however, were always completed near to 
the end of the semester, over the course of approximately 2–3 weeks.
Just prior to assignment 2 (A2), students were given a 50-min guest lecture 
during a regularly scheduled large-group meeting of their course. The lecture 
was delivered by a member of the research team and described the role of public 
engagement in science and research. Then, during the week following the large-
audience format lecture, students attended a small-group recitation. At that ses-
sion, a researcher and their regular recitation instructor introduced them to the 
public engagement activities that would be done as part of the course. This intro-
duction allowed students a chance to ask questions about the purposes of the 
activities and the assignment requirements. A video also was shown to introduce 
students to nanotechnology and its applications and to pique their interest. The 
video used for this purpose was a TED talk video available on YouTube. 
Assignment 2 (A2) was then also completed as homework on students’ own 
time. A2 included the readings about nanotechnology and the experimentally 
varied cognitive engagement prompts. In addition, students were asked to com-
plete measures of attitudes, knowledge, and engagement and to evaluate the 
reading materials.
Unlike the other assignments, assignment 3 (A3) was almost always completed 
during the students’ 1-h recitation.1 During A3, students were given brief descrip-
tions of imagined future scenarios and questions designed to prompt deliberation 
about ethical, legal, and social issues related to nanotechnology development. 
Table 2.4 lists the scenarios used across the different studies. These scenarios, which 
are available in the supplemental materials, were developed by the research team 
and/or inspired by or adapted from scenarios used by other teams conducting public 
1 In Study 3, there were more participants than usual, and we assigned a subgroup of students to 
pilot an online discussion condition. These students completed A3 online outside of class instead 
of in-class.
Table 2.4 Scenarios used as part of assignment 3 (A3) to prompt deliberation of ethical, legal, and 
social issues (ELSI)
Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 Study 5
Human memory Human memory Human memory Human memory
Cystic fibrosis Cystic fibrosis Cystic fibrosis Cystic fibrosis
Nutritious food Barless prisons Head injuries
Healthy chip Illness reduction
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engagements around nanotechnology (e.g., Hamlett, Cobb, and Guston, 2008).2 The 
students completed these deliberative activities during class, under different condi-
tions (e.g., working alone or while discussing with their peers) as discussed in the 
next section. Students also completed additional measures of attitudes and engage-
ment and when relevant completed measures of group processes.
Finally, immediately after finishing A3  in class, students were given a link to 
online assignment 4 (A4). As part of A4, students completed a variety of post- 
measures including reporting their final attitudes and completing knowledge assess-
ments. In the next sections, we give additional detail on the conditions varied as part 
of the assignments and the measures administered during each phase (assignment).
2.3  What Works? Experimentally Varied Deliberative 
Engagement Features
Table 2.5 compares the experimental manipulations that were used across studies. 
As shown, in all of the studies, we varied the presence or absence of explicit prompts 
to think critically. In studies 2–4, we experimentally manipulated the presence or 
absence of peer discussion. In Study 5, we varied the construction of discussion 
groups to represent homogeneous or diverse attitudes, the inclusion of passive or 
active facilitators, and the characteristics of the background information provided. 
We also varied an introductory opinion question about the assignments to see if the 
question might be impacting student perceptions of the assignment. While the full 
details are given in the detailed methodological reports, here we give an overview of 
the conditions and our rationale for examining them.
2.3.1  Importance of Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues (ELSI) 
Topics in Science Education
In our pilot Study 1 and in Study 2, we noticed a tendency for the science students 
who served as our participants to doubt whether the public participation activities 
were beneficial to them and should be part of their biology course. Part of the prob-
lem was, as students told us, the assignments were too long and boring, due to the 
many survey measures we had included. Another part of the problem, however, 
seemed to be an expectation that the activities themselves should not be part of a 
“basic biology” course. In response to these views, in Studies 3 and 4, prior to 
engaging in any of the deliberation activities, we asked all students the following 
open-ended question:
2 We were especially influenced by scenarios and information in the National Citizens’ Technology 
Forum (2007) Human Enhancement, Identity, and Biology: NCTF background materials.
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What do you think? In your opinion, how important is it that science students--including 
beginning science students such as you and your classmates--learn how to think about the 
ethical, legal and social issues (ELSI) pertaining to science? In 2-3 sentences, give your 
answer and a brief explanation of why you think as you do.
Interestingly, student open-ended responses to this question suggested largely posi-
tive views prior to engaging in the activities, which led us to wonder if we had 
changed student assessments of the activities by asking them their opinions in A1. 
Thus, in Study 5, rather than asking all students the ELSI importance question, we 
randomly assigned only one-half of all the students to answer the question. The 
other half of the students were not asked to reflect on the usefulness of the assign-
ment. They instead were asked to give initial answers regarding the development of 
nanotechnology and its regulation.
2.3.2  Characteristics of the Background Information
To ensure high-quality materials that were accurate with respect to their depiction of 
nanotechnology, nanoscientists on our team assisted in finding or recommending 
source materials and reviewed our final readings for accuracy and appropriateness. In 
Study 2, all students read the same background document which was organized 
Table 2.5 Experimentally varied engagement features in each study
Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 Study 5
Importance of 
ELSI 
consideration in 
science education 
(A1)
No students 
answered a 
question 
concerning their 
opinion of import
All students 
answered a 
question 
concerning their 
opinion of import
All students 
answered a 
question 
concerning their 
opinion of import
Question
Control 
question
Characteristics of 
background 
information (A2)
All topical Topical
NIF pro-con
Topical
NIF pro-con
NIF stronger
NIF weaker
Prompts for 
cognitive 
engagement (A2, 
A3)
Control
Critical thinking
Information 
organization
Control
Critical thinking
Control
Critical thinking
Control
Critical 
thinking
Peer discussion 
(A3)
Present
Absent
Present
Absent
Online*
Present
Absent
Homogeneous+
Homogeneous-
Heterogeneous
Discussion 
facilitation (A3)
All groups 
accompanied by 
active facilitation
All groups 
accompanied by 
active facilitation
All groups 
accompanied by 
active facilitation
Active
Passive
Note: Italicized text describes variables held constant within a study but which were varied in other 
studies. Non-italicized text describes the 2–3 experimental groups to which students were ran-
domly assigned in a between-group design, as described in the text
*The online groups of respondents were not randomly assigned to that condition and thus may not 
be equivalent to the students in the present/absent peer discussion conditions. The data for the 
online students is included in the Study 3 data set but may be treated a pilot data for comparing 
similar tasks undertaken accompanied by in-class, online, or no peer discussion
2.3 What Works? Experimentally Varied Deliberative Engagement Features
28
topically—that is, around topics such as the definitions of nanotechnology, nanoge-
nomics, and human enhancement, how nanogenomics is being used now and might be 
used in the future, and varying viewpoints on the benefits and risks associated with 
nanogenomics. At the end were links and references to additional information. In 
Study 2 we used prompts to encourage different approaches to engaging with the back-
ground document, including one condition that asked students to organize the material 
they were reading into different perspectives that vary in the extent to which they see 
nanotechnology as risky versus beneficial. Because our initial analyses suggested that 
the information organization condition did not seem to impact student learning or other 
outcomes, in Studies 3 and 4, we experimentally varied the organization of the docu-
ment itself, rather than prompting students to organize the information.
In Studies 3 and 4, we expanded the information provided and created two differ-
ent versions of the background document. Both versions of the background informa-
tion began with the same overview providing some definitions and examples of 
nanotechnology, nanogenomics, and nanomedicine. However, one version then pre-
sented the information related to ethical, legal, and social issues in a format similar 
to and inspired by the National Issues Forum (NIF-format). The other version 
included the same information but presented it in a topical format such as was used 
in Study 2. In the NIF-format materials, we identified explicitly opposing perspec-
tives (e.g., “human enhancement as forward progress” vs. “human enhancement as 
unnecessary risk”) and listed the action implications, evidence to support, pros and 
cons (trade-offs), and opposing points to each perspective. In the topical format, we 
did not explicitly identify opposing perspectives but instead discussed relevant topics 
that may impact people’s views on use of nanotechnologies for human enhancement 
purposes, such as “the costs of not pursuing available benefits,” “changing social 
concepts,” “right to autonomy,” and “unforeseen, unpredictable, unacceptable risks.” 
Study 4 materials were largely similar to Study 3 materials, except that we included 
additional information about the risks or drawbacks of nanotechnology development 
in response to student concerns that the materials were positively biased.
Finally, in Study 5 we used only the NIF-formatted document, but we altered that 
document to create a stronger and weaker version. In studies 3 and 4, we found relatively 
few effects of the NIF versus topically organized documents but found students in our 
critical thinking conditions (described in the next section) were more negative about the 
background information. The use of stronger and weaker background documents was 
intended to explore whether our critical thinking students were more attentive to quality 
of information or simply more critical. To create the weaker documents, we altered some 
of the content and wording to introduce bias toward nanotechnology and removed some 
of the references supporting certain statements in the document (see detailed Study 5 
methods in the supplementary files for comparison of the two versions).
2.3.3  Prompts for Cognitive Engagement
Readings about nanotechnology (given to students in A2 and referenced in A3) were 
accompanied by prompts to encourage deeper processing of the information. As 
discussed in more detail in Chap. 3, and in PytlikZillig, Hutchens, Muhlberger, and 
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Tomkins (2017), prior research has found that students can engage with reading 
materials in a variety of ways with different effects. For example, people may learn 
more if they are engaged in deep rather than surface-level processing, and some 
have found that the manner in which students take notes and organize the informa-
tion impacts learning (Dinsmore & Alexander, 2012; Robinson & Kiewra, 1995).
In Study 2 we included three types of prompts during A2. One type of prompt 
encouraged students to organize the information using matrix note-taking, a type of 
note-taking that emphasizes comparison and contrast and has been found to 
improve learning over outline format note-taking (Robinson & Kiewra, 1995). 
Another type of prompt asked students to practice and then apply critical thinking 
strategies (e.g., looking for bias and examining the quality of evidence that was 
available to support claims). Critical thinking prompts were hypothesized to be 
directly beneficial to the goals of deliberation, which emphasize weighing of evi-
dence. In addition, it was expected that the prompts would induce deeper process-
ing of the information which could have positive impacts on learning. The third 
type of prompt was designed as a control that would evoke engagement and require 
students to respond but would not necessarily evoke deep or strategic engagement. 
The control prompts, which we often reference as the “feedback” condition, asked 
students to provide feedback on the readings and list “insights, realizations, reac-
tions, or new things that you learned as a result of reading the background docu-
ment or exploring the additional resources in that document.”
As noted above, in Studies 3–5, we dropped the information organization (matrix 
note-taking) condition and focused only on the critical thinking and control prompts. 
In part this decision was made because the information organization condition appeared 
not to have much impact when compared to the control condition. In addition, beyond 
the classroom it seemed more feasible that we might be able to prompt people to think 
critically than to take notes in a certain way. At the end of Study 2, students were 
invited to engage in a fifth assignment during which we piloted some refinements to 
our prompts and administered additional personality measures. In Studies 3–5, we 
used refined critical thinking prompts in A2 that more gently nudged students to think 
critically, without asking them to practice thinking critically as was the procedure in 
Study 2. This change was implemented because our measures of cognitive-affective 
engagement suggested our Study 2 critical thinking prompts resulted in student disen-
gagement relative to the control prompts (PytlikZillig et al., 2017).
In addition, during Study 3, discussion facilitators who were leading groups 
of students in the critical thinking condition used discussion prompts that asked 
students to judge the quality of information shared and to be alert for sources of 
bias. In Study 4, we extended the critical thinking prompts to become part of the 
deliberative materials that all students received during A3. In Study 4 the critical 
thinking A3 prompts asked students to say what they thought about the scenario 
and included instructions reminding them of critical thinking skills that they 
could apply (e.g., citing sources and looking out for bias) as well as explicitly 
asking them to consider what someone with a different perspective might think 
about the issues. In the Study 4 A3 control condition, students were simply 
asked to write down their reactions to the scenarios, and no scaffolding of 
responses was provided. In addition, instead of explicitly asking what someone 
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of a different perspective might think, a follow-up question simply asked what 
other questions they had about the topics under discussion. In Study 5, however, 
the critical thinking prompts were not used during the A3 discussions, but 
instead active facilitators sought to promote brainstorming, analysis, and syn-
thesis of information and different perspectives, while passive facilitators merely 
read the discussion instructions and scenarios to the group.
2.3.4  Peer Discussion
In each of our Studies 2–4, we varied the presence versus absence of peer discussion 
during the in-class deliberative activities. We randomly assigned each student to 
discussion or non-discussion conditions. Students did not know whether they would 
be working alone or discussing issues with peers until immediately prior to A3. 
Students assigned to the discussion condition were then grouped with others who 
were in the same A2 condition (e.g., NIF vs. traditional, accompanied by critical 
thinking vs. control prompts). Students assigned to deliberate without peer discus-
sion were directed to a separate room to read through and work on their deliberative 
activities during the same class period as the discussions took place. Both the discus-
sion and non-discussion classrooms were monitored by a researcher or recitation 
instructor. All students, whether in the discussion condition or deliberating alone, 
had condition-appropriate background materials available to them either in hard 
copy form or via an online link. All students responded to the scenarios using online 
survey forms. A few copies of the survey forms were also available on paper in case 
of technical difficulties.
In general, more students enroll in the introductory biology course in the fall than 
in the spring, resulting in a larger sample sizes for those semesters. In fall of 2011 
(Study 3), we thus assigned a convenient subset of the students to complete their 
deliberation activities via asynchronous online discussion with their group mem-
bers. Because random assignment was not used to place these students in their 
 condition, their data was treated as pilot data for exploring the impacts of students 
discussing online instead of face to face.
In fall of 2012 (Study 5), all students deliberated in groups. In part the deci-
sion to have all students in groups was due to student reports of much greater 
enjoyment and engagement when deliberating with their peers rather than alone. 
In addition, the choice to have students in groups allowed us to vary a specific 
theory-relevant aspect of discussion: attitudinal homogeneity, which is discussed 
in greater detail in Chap. 4. Positive and negative attitudes toward nanotechnol-
ogy were determined by examining student responses to attitude questions 
answered at the end of A2. Once students were identified as tending to have rela-
tively positive or negative attitudes, two-thirds were randomly assigned to homo-
geneous (positive or negative) groups and one-third to mixed (heterogeneous) 
attitude groups.
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2.3.5  Active Facilitation During Discussion
In Studies 2–4, facilitators were used to lead group discussions during A3 due to 
recommendations made by many deliberative theorists and practitioners (Dillard, 
2013). The facilitators were students recruited from prior semesters of the course who 
had previously taken part in the deliberative activities. The facilitators were trained 
by project researchers and given facilitation guides to ensure the use of common 
methods, prompts, and follow-up questions. In Studies 3–4, the facilitators were also 
given prompts specific to the critical thinking or control conditions to build on the 
prompts used in A2. In Study 5 active facilitators were instead given a list of prompts 
that might support and encourage brainstorming ideas, analyzing and evaluating dif-
ferent perspectives, and synthesizing information. In Study 5, facilitators were trained 
in both active and passive methods of facilitation in order to investigate the impor-
tance of active facilitation. Passive facilitators were instructed only to read the sce-
narios and questions used in the deliberation. Active facilitators were instructed to 
use the full range of facilitation techniques and the prewritten prompts and follow-up 
questions to evoke student interaction and consideration of different viewpoints.
2.4  For What Deliberative Engagement Outcomes?
Examination of the purported possible benefits and drawbacks of deliberation led us 
to focus upon, operationalize, and measure outcomes (which could serve as dependent 
variables) that included knowledge gains, changes in attitudes toward the topic of 
discussion, development of democratic or deliberative attitudes and other civic capaci-
ties such as political motivation and self-efficacy, changes in trust in scientists and 
regulators, and acceptance of policy resulting from such engagements. Table 2.6 pro-
vides a list of the major constructs measured across each of our studies and the assign-
ments during which the measures were administered. Here, we give an overview of 
the outcome measures available for each study, but readers are referred to the supple-
mental materials for the specifics, including all items and how item wording may have 
been revised over time. In addition, here we focus on major measures used in at least 
two of the four reported studies. Additional measures and items are discussed in the 
supplemental materials (the detailed methods and materials accompanying this book).
2.4.1  Knowledge
Given the theoretical and empirical differences between subjective and objective 
knowledge (as discussed in greater detail in Chap. 3), in all studies, we assessed 
both subjective and objective knowledge with multiple items and nearly always at 
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Table 2.6 Major constructs assessed and measures administered in each study
Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 Study 5
Outcome measures
Knowledge
Objective knowledge (T/F and mult. choice) _2x__4 12x2_4 12x2_4 1_x2_4
Confidence in objective knowledge (rate) ______ _2x2_4 12x2_4 ______
Subjective knowledge (rate) _2x___ 12x2__ 12x2_4 1_x2_4
Subjective learning (rate) _____4 __x2_4 __x2_4 __x234
Attitudes toward nanotechnology
Risk-benefit (rate) 12x234 12x234 12x234 1_x234
Regulation-deregulation (rate) _2x234 12x234 12x234 1_x234
Values of nanotechnology (rating and/or 
percent)
1____4 1____4 1____4 _____4
Opinions about nanotechnology (rate) 1____4 1____4 1____4 _____4
Specific risk/benefits (likely x importance 
ratings)
1____4 1____4 1____4 _____4
Change mind (predict, rate, and/or explanation 
(OE))
_____4 1_x2_4 1_x234 1_x_34
Initial/final views about nanotechnology (OE) __x2_4 1____4 1____4 1*___4
Perceptions of actors
Knowledge of and experience with actors (rate) 1*___4* 1____4 1____4 ____4
Trustworthiness of nanoscientists (rate) 1*___4* 1____4 1____4 ____4
Trustworthiness of policymakers (rate) 1*___4* 1____4 1____4 ____4
Policy scenario
Policy acceptance/support (rate) _____4 _____4 _____4 _____4
Policy preference (rate) _____4 _____4 _____4 _____4
Perceptions of public engagement procedures 
(rate)
_____4 _____4 _____4 _____4
Motivational variables
Deliberative citizenship 1____4 1____4 1____4 1____4
Political efficacy 1____4 1____4 1____4 1____4
Political motivation (intrinsic, introjected, 
extrinsic)
1____4 1____4 1____4 1____4
Perceived value of public engagement
Value of this ELSI engagement module _____4 ______4 _____4 _____4
Overall value of ELSI engagements in college 
science (OE)
______ 1_____4 1____4 1*___4
Value of public engagement in general ______ _______ ______ _____4
Process measures
Cognitive/affective engagement (rate) __x23_ __x23_ __x23_ __x23_
Factors impacting attitudes/opinions (rate, some 
OE)
_____4 _____4 _____4 __x234
Group processes (individual ratings) ______ ______ ____3_ ____3_
Group processes (facilitator ratings) ____3_ ____3_ ____3_ ____3_
Perceived quality of background reading (rate) __x2*_ __x2__ __x2__ __x2__
(continued)
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multiple time points. Subjective knowledge was assessed with items such as “How 
familiar are you with nanotechnology?” and “How familiar are you with how nano-
technology is used in genetics research and development?” followed by five-point 
response scales ranging from “not at all familiar” to “extremely familiar.” When 
multiple items were used, Cronbach alphas for scales created by averaging across 
subjective knowledge items at a specific time point were >0.80.
Objective knowledge was assessed with multiple choice and true-false items 
based on information that was presented in the A2 reading. In Studies 3 and 4, some 
of the objective knowledge items were accompanied by confidence rating (“I am 
_____ confident in my answer” with response options ranging from “not at all” to 
“completely”). As noted in Chap. 3, we evaluated the adequacy of our knowledge 
questions by examining the patterns of responses exhibited by individuals over time 
(Chatterji, 2003). Items sensitive to changes in knowledge should be more likely 
answered incorrectly prior to information presentation and relatively more likely to 
be answered correctly after information presentation. For each question, we exam-
ined the proportion of students who answered the question incorrectly prior to the 
reading and correctly after the reading and compared that percentage to the percent 
of students showing different patterns. For example, large percentages of students 
answering the question wrongly before and after information presentation would 
indicate an item was perhaps too difficult to detect knowledge changes or might 
Table 2.6 (continued)
Perceived quality of assignment or module 
(rate)
__x234 __x234 __x234 __x234
Written questions and opinions (e.g., about 
scenarios) (OE)
____3_ ____3_ ____3_ ____3_
Data quality checks __x2_4 __x2_4 __x2_4 __x2_4
Participant characteristics
Demographics 1_____ 1_____ 1_____ 1_____
Political party and ideology 1_____ 1_____ 1_____ 1_____
Interest in politics 1____4 1_____ 1_____ 1_____
Trust in institutions generally 1_____ ______ ______ ______
Dispositional trust (GSS and/or IPIP) 1_____ 1_____ 1_____ 1_____
Subset of other Big 5 traits (IPIP) 5 
(NEOAC)
1 (O 
only)
1 (O 
only)
1 (O and 
C)
Need for cognition 1_____ 1_____ 1_____ 1_____
Right-wing authoritarianism 1_____ 1_____ ______ ______
Cultural cognition ______ ______ ______ 1_____
Note: OE indicates the measure is an open-ended text response. Numbers indicate whether the 
measure was administered during A1, A2, A3, and A4, respectively. A“2” preceding or following an 
x (“2x” or “x2”) indicates the measure occurred during A2 before (preceding) or after (following) 
the reading of the background information accompanied by prompts. *Stars indicate instances 
where measures were administered but data may be limited by random assignment of items to sub-
sets of students. When assessing the Big 5 traits using the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP), 
all Big 5 traits (neuroticism (N), extraversion (E), openness (O), agreeableness (A), and conscien-
tiousness (C)) were assessed in Study 2, but the indicated subsets were assessed in Studies 3–5
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indicate information was not adequately covered during information presentation 
and consideration. By examining the questions in this way, we were able to revise 
our knowledge questions over the first couple of studies. During each specific study, 
we chose items most likely to be sensitive to actual changes in student knowledge.
We also assessed student perceptions of their subjective learning during some 
of the assignments or for the module as a whole by asking questions such as “How 
much do you feel you learned about nanotechnology as a result of working on this 
assignment?” accompanied by a scale of five responses ranging from “nothing that 
I didn’t know before” to “a great deal.”
2.4.2  Attitudes Toward Nanotechnology
Attitudes toward nanotechnology were assessed in a number of ways, with certain 
questions asked during every assignment. As noted in Chap. 4, two rating questions 
were used over and over throughout the studies. One item asked about relative risks 
and benefits: e.g., “Based on what you know right now, do you think the risks of 
nano-biological research and development outweigh the benefits? Alternatively, do 
you think that the benefits outweigh the risks?” The risk benefits items were fol-
lowed by a multipoint scale ranging from “The risks greatly outweigh the benefits” 
to “The benefits greatly outweigh the risks.” Risk versus benefit items have been 
commonly used in prior research on public attitudes toward nanotechnology (e.g., 
see review by Satterfield, Kandlikar, Beaudrie, Conti, and Harthorn, 2009). The 
second item asked students about their perceptions of the need to regulate nano-
technology development. This item was often accompanied by a 100-point scale 
and read: “In your opinion, how much regulation is needed with respect to nano-
biological research and development? Move the slider to reflect your view. 0 means 
that you believe there should be NO regulation of nano-biological developments. 
100 means that you believe EVERY ASPECT of nano-biological research and 
development should be HIGHLY regulated.”
Beyond those two single-item measures, which are analyzed in detail in Chap. 4, 
we also assessed a number of other more specific attitudes. These measures were often 
assessed at pre and post (e.g., A1 or A2 and again in A4) but not as frequently assessed 
throughout the assignments. A number of opinion items were obtained or adapted 
from prior research (Hamlett & Cobb, 2006; Scheufele & Lewenstein, 2005). Examples 
of these items include “The government will effectively manage any risks associated 
with nanotechnology” and “There are serious ethical problems associated with not 
quickly developing nanotechnologies.” These items were typically accompanied by 
seven-point scale response scales ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.”
To assess different values associated with nanotechnology, participants also 
were presented with goals related to nanotechnology development and asked to 
assess their importance. Examples of these goals included “minimizing potential 
environmental risks” and “maximizing potential benefits for human enhancement.” 
Response options typically fell on a five-point scale ranging from “unimportant” to 
“extremely important.” In some studies, however, we also asked students to allot a 
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certain percentage of total funding available to the different goals by explaining as 
follows: “There are, of course, only a limited number of resources (time, effort, 
money) that can be spent on each of the things that you rated above. So, please con-
sider what percentage of the U.S. resources (i.e., total time, effort, and money) 
should be spent on each. Make sure that your percentages sum to 100%, and make 
sure that you give the items you rated the most important the greatest percentage of 
resources. What percentage of resources would you assign to each category?”
A number of more specific risks and potential risks and benefits were assessed 
using items taken or adapted from prior research on public attitudes toward nanotech-
nology (Cobb & Macoubrie, 2004; Lee, Scheufele, & Lewenstein, 2005). Examples of 
potential risks/benefits included nanotechnology leading to “The extension of human 
life expectancy” and “Pollution of the environment by nanomaterials.” Responses fell 
on two different scales. The first, concerning likelihood of the risks or benefits, was 
typically a five-point scale ranging from “not at all likely” to “extremely likely.” The 
second, concerning importance, was often in the form of a seven-point bipolar scale 
ranging from “very important to AVOID” to “very important to ACHIEVE,” with 
“NOT IMPORTANT to avoid or achieve” representing the midpoint.
In addition to assessing attitudes directly, we also asked students to report their 
subjective sense of being likely to change or of having changed their minds. During 
the later assignments, after certain of the attitude questions, students were asked 
closed-ended rating questions such as, “Overall, from the time you began these exer-
cises, until now, to what extent did you change your mind about the…question 
above?” followed by a five-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “a great deal.” 
Similarly, students were sometimes asked whether they changed their opinions about 
nanoscientists or policymakers. In Study 4 we also asked students to rate the extent to 
which they strengthened their original opinions. Beginning in Study 3, during A1, we 
also asked how likely students thought it was that they would change their views. In 
some of the studies, the rating questions are accompanied by open- ended questions 
asking students to explain how and why their opinions changed or might change.
Finally, for each of our studies, we asked students to answer open-ended opinion 
questions regarding their attitudes toward nanotechnology. In most studies students 
were asked to answer similar or the same questions at least two times during the study, 
during A1 or A2 and again at A4. Overarching open-ended questions typically asked 
students to describe the developments relating to nanotechnology that should be priori-
tized or avoided as well as the regulations they felt should or should not be imposed. 
The students were also asked to give reasons for their views and at times were explicitly 
asked to consider opposing views and how they would answer those opposing views.
2.4.3  Perceptions of Actors: Nanoscientists and Policymakers
We assessed perceptions of nanoscientists and policymakers in most of our studies, 
and often at two different time points. Questions included items pertaining to 
familiarity/certainty (e.g., “How much do you know about nanoscientists?” and “To 
what extent do you feel certain in your views about policymakers who regulate 
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nanotechnology?”). We also assessed confidence in and perceptions of trustworthi-
ness of nanoscientists and policymakers. For example, students were asked, “To what 
extent do you have confidence in nanoscientists to…” “do their jobs well,” “meet 
their professional responsibilities,” and “make decisions about the most important 
directions for future development [of nanotechnology].” Responses typically fell on 
a five-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “a great deal.” Following prior research 
on trustworthiness (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; PytlikZillig et al., 2016), we 
also often included items assessing specific trustworthiness and distrustworthiness 
components including whether participants feel nanoscientists and policymakers “are 
fair” or “…are primarily motivated by what will benefit them personally,” “…don’t 
really care about the long-term risks of their decisions,” and “…are dishonest.”
2.4.4  Policy Scenario: Policy Preference, Acceptance, 
and Support
At the end of the study during A4, we assessed policy preferences and acceptance/
support. As described in Chap. 5, we conceptualized policy acceptance/support as a 
willingness to accept, tolerate, and not resist a policy, even if only with reservations 
or for a time. In contrast, we conceptualized policy preference as reflecting one’s 
personally preferred policies: the extent to which people agree with, feel good 
about, and prefer a given policy.
We assessed policy preference by asking people to indicate the extent to which 
they were for or against a given policy. For example, participants were asked ques-
tions such as: “If legislation were being considered that would speed up nanoge-
nomics research and development in the area of human enhancement by increasing 
funding and decreasing restrictions... Would you be FOR or AGAINST such legisla-
tion?” followed by a seven-point scale ranging from “strongly AGAINST” to 
“strongly FOR.” In Studies 2–4 we randomly assigned students one of the two ver-
sions of the question, one asking about speeding up research and development and 
one asking about slowing it down. This was in order to find out if slowing down and 
speeding up policies were direct opposites or somehow different.
We assessed policy acceptance using an imagined scenario. In our study we 
were interested in whether salient public input processes could increase public 
acceptance, and thus we wrote a scenario that was designed to first make those pro-
cesses salient and then assess acceptance/support in light of those salient processes. 
In our scenario, the government purportedly listened to input from the public, and 
input was purportedly gathered according to the same procedures the student had 
experienced. Then the government made a decision that was consistent with the 
public input. In Studies 2–4, after describing the scenario we had designed, we 
assessd policy acceptance by asking participants if they agreed “The government 
made the right choices with regard to this issue,” “The government made the same 
choices you would have made,” and/or if “The government should have made dif-
ferent decisions about the issue” (reversed). In Study 5 we directly assessed policy 
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support/resistance in addition to acceptance by asking if participants agreed or 
disagreed that “I would support this decision made by the government [in the sce-
nario just read],” and “I would resist this decision made by the government” 
(reversed). In Study 5 we also included an acceptance item: “Because of the pro-
cesses used, I would accept this decision made by the government.”
Regarding the validity of assessing policy acceptance or support as separate from 
policy preferences, students were allowed to explain their answers, and some of 
their explanations did indicate that at least some students perceived the questions as 
different from one another. Specifically, the acceptance answers by at least some 
students took into account the results of the public engagement processes used to 
come to the decision. As an example, here is an explanation given by a student in 
Study 4 who also indicated a preference for pro-nanotechnology policies (express-
ing that he was “strongly against” slowing down research and increasing regula-
tion). Despite the pro-development preference this student indicated, he also agreed 
(not strongly, but also not slightly) that the government in the scenario made the 
same choices that he would have made by slowing down development of nanotech-
nology and increasing regulations. As an explanation he wrote:
If the majority of people feel that they're not ready for the technology then it's hard to 
change that. The government is supposedly the will of the people…If people of a nation- 
state [choose] not to participate in new technologies then that is the will of the country, the 
government should abide by that will….
2.4.5  Motivational Variables
We also assessed certain individual differences in motivation and attitudes or beliefs 
that, based on prior theory, might be expected to be affected by participation in delibera-
tive engagements. In each study, at both A1 and A4, we assessed attitudes toward delib-
erative engagements or deliberative citizenship using five items relating to the value of 
deliberation as an element of active citizenship. These included the statements “A good 
citizen should listen to people who disagree with them politically” and “A good citizen 
should be willing to justify their political views.” These items were taken from 
Muhlberger and Weber (2006), and when averaged into a scale, the scale internal con-
sistency as assessed with Cronbach alpha was always >0.75 in each of the four studies.
Political self-efficacy can also be impacted by engaging in political discussions 
with others. We assessed political self-efficacy at A1 and A4 in each study, using 
four to six items and resulting in a scale with Cronbach alphas >0.70 for each of the 
studies. Examples of these items include the statements “Sometimes politics and 
government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand 
what’s going on” which was reverse-scored, and “I consider myself well-qualified 
to participate in politics.” These statements were adapted from similar items used in 
the American National Election Study (2000).
Finally, drawing from self-determination theory which suggests that people’s 
motivations can become internalized over time and with various experiences, we 
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assessed three types of political motivation in both A1 and A4 in each study: intrinsic, 
introjected, and extrinsic. The items used for these measures were adapted from 
Koestner, Losier, Vallerand, and Carducci (1996) and Losier and Koestner (1999). To 
measure the extent to which a student felt motivated to be politically engaged by factors 
that are intrinsic to their concept of self, we used statements such as “I follow political 
and social issues because I want to learn more things” and “I follow political and social 
issues because I think it’s important.” The extent to which a student felt motivated to be 
politically engaged by factors they had internalized from outside sources (introjected 
motivation) was assessed with items such as “I follow political and social issues because 
it bothers me when I don’t.” The extent to which a student felt motivated to be politically 
engaged by external factors (extrinsic motivation) was assessed with one item such as “I 
follow political and social issues because that’s what I’m expected to do.” When multi-
ple item scales were used to assess these constructs, the Cronbach alphas were >0.70.
2.4.6  Evaluation of Public Engagement
We assessed student perceptions of public engagement and its usefulness in various 
ways. In our module evaluation questions, we often asked “Overall, to what extent was 
the public participation module a beneficial part of your learning in this course?” with 
responses to both on a five-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “a great deal.” In addi-
tion, to better understand perceptions of conducting ELSI engagement activities in the 
context of science courses, we asked students at different points, sometimes both before 
and after engaging in all of the module activities, to answer an open-ended question that 
read, “In your opinion, how important is it that science students--including beginning 
science students such as you and your classmates--learn how to think about the ethical, 
legal and social issues (ELSI) pertaining to science? In 2–3 sentences, give your answer 
and a brief explanation of why you think as you do.” Finally, to assess perceptions of the 
value of public engagement in general, in A4 of Study 5, we additionally asked “Some 
people feel that the government should primarily rely on expert opinions, not citizen 
opinions when making policy decisions. What do you think? In your opinion, how much 
weight should government give to citizen opinions (like you wrote above) when making 
decisions about the future of nanotechnological development and regulation?” This 
question was accompanied by a five-point response scale ranging from “None! The 
government shouldn’t be considering opinions of everyday people like me” to “A lot of 
weight! The government should take opinions like mine very seriously.”
2.5  How and Why: Mediators and Moderators
Having identified features and outcomes, the next challenge is to connect them via 
explanatory theories. What mechanisms might explain why certain public engage-
ment features might or might not connect to certain outcomes in certain contexts? 
And what moderators might impact different effects? One primary mechanism 
examined in our studies was “engagement”—or, rather, the varieties of ways that 
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people can engage (PytlikZillig et  al., 2013). Other process measures assessed 
group processes that took place in A3; student perceptions of the quality of the 
background readings, assignments, and public engagement module as a whole; 
whether and why (or why not) students felt they changed their mind on different 
opinion or attitude questions; and their open-ended responses to questions about the 
development and regulation of nanotechnology. Potential moderators that we 
assessed included participant characteristics such as their demographics, their polit-
ical ideology and party, and various personality traits such as openness, conscien-
tiousness, need for cognition, and dispositional trust.
2.5.1  Cognitive-Affective and Behavioral Engagement
It is interesting that although engagement is, in name, central to public engagement, 
engagement research does not often focus on the varieties of ways individuals might 
be engaging. How do people feel when they are engaging? Are they bored, inter-
ested, and annoyed? Maybe they are distracted by things happening on their 
Instagram feed. If they are fully engaged with the topic, are their minds open and 
listening to another person’s perspective they have not heard before, or are their 
minds busy plotting their rebuttals to earlier remarks?
As described elsewhere (PytlikZillig et  al., 2013), engagement is a varied and 
multifaceted state that includes the affective, cognitive, and behavioral experiences of 
individual participants at different points during the engagement activities. We drew 
from a number of theories in developing self-report engagement scales, including 
cognitive theories of deep and surface cognitive processing (Chin & Brown, 2000; 
Dinsmore & Alexander, 2012), and educational theories of metacognition and active 
learning strategies (McCormick, 2003; Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters, & Afflerbach, 
2006; Vermunt & Vermetten, 2004). Drawing from theories of emotion and affect, we 
incorporated items asking about anger and boredom (Fahlman, Mercer-Lynn, Flora, 
& Eastwood, 2013; Harmon-Jones, Schmeichel, Mennitt, & Harmon-Jones, 2011). 
Drawing from personality and social psychology, we devised measures of states of 
open-mindedness, creativity, closed-mindedness, conscientiousness, and social 
engagement (Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2012; Fleeson, 2001; PytlikZillig, 
2001). Then, in our studies, we asked participants to self-report how they had engaged 
during different activities—such as reading and responding to background readings 
in A1 or deliberating alone or with peers in A3. This allowed for the investigation of 
the roles of certain engagement “states” that are explicitly or implicitly referenced by 
numerous theories that could be applied in the contexts of public engagements.
To assess engagement, participants were asked to assess various statements, each 
beginning with the stem “During the assignment, I…” (e.g., “felt focused”). 
Responses fell on a five-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “a great deal.” Items 
were taken from/reported in PytlikZillig et al. (2013) and were intended to assess 
each of the eight different ways of engaging: active learning (e.g., “identified ques-
tions that I still had about the topics”), conscientious (e.g., “gave careful 
consideration to all of the options presented”), open-minded (e.g., “felt open to 
hearing new ideas about the topics”), social (e.g., “discussed my ideas about the 
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topics with others”), creative (e.g., “used my imagination”), disinterested (e.g., was 
impatient to get this over”), angry (e.g., “felt angry”), and closed-minded (e.g., “felt 
like my mind was already made up”). Finally, in addition to the items assessing 
states of engagement experience, we also at times asked students to self-report the 
amount of time that they spent on various portions of assignments.
2.5.2  Self-Reports of Influences on Attitudes
In addition to the questions about whether and how much attitudes changed (variables 
listed under outcomes), in some of the studies, we asked students to rate influences 
on their attitudes, at times including whether and how much a specific assignment 
influenced their specific opinions or attitudes about nanotechnology. In some studies, 
they rated how much certain factors (e.g., talking about the issue with others, back-
ground reading, views of people important to them) impacted the views that they 
expressed in the surveys. At times the rating questions were accompanied by open-
ended questions asking students to elaborate on why they changed their views.
2.5.3  Participant and Facilitator Perceptions of Group- 
Relevant Processes
Another set of process measures, used in Studies 4 and 5, asked student participants 
involved in discussions to reflect on their discussion experiences. Questions typi-
cally focused on perceptions of their group and group members and perceptions of 
their facilitator. In addition, some of our studies include ratings made by the facilita-
tors of the group processes.
Related to participant perceptions of their group and group members, some 
statements were relevant to identification with the group. Examples of these items 
include “I identified with my group during the discussion” and “I felt like an ‘out-
side’ member of my group,” reverse coded. Responses were on a seven-point scale 
ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Other questions measured 
group consensus such as “How much disagreement was there within your group at 
the beginning of discussion?” and “How much agreement was there within your 
group at the end of discussion?” Additional questions included “Overall, how do 
you feel about the other people in your group?” (seven-point scale from very nega-
tive to very positive) and “How satisfied were you with your small group discussion 
in class today?” (five-point scale from not at all satisfied to extremely satisfied). 
Some questions focused on individual group members. Participants were asked to 
identify each member of their group by first name and last initial. They were then 
asked questions referencing each individual. For example, “Before today’s discus-
sion, how familiar would you say you were with ________?” (with responses fall-
ing on a five- point scale ranging from “not at all familiar” to “extremely familiar”) 
and “Regarding the ethical scenarios you just discussed, how similar do you think 
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__________’s opinions are to your opinions?” Response options were comprised of 
five-point scales ranging from “not at all similar” to “extremely similar.”
Related to perceptions of their facilitator, participants in Study 5 were asked to 
indicate the extent of their agreement with statements regarding how active or pas-
sive their facilitator was. These statements all began with the phrase “The moderator 
of our group….” Examples of these items include “was very active in leading our 
group discussion” and “summarized what he/she heard the group saying.” Responses 
fell on a seven-point scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” 
These questions served as a check for our manipulation of facilitator activity.
In each of the studies, facilitator perceptions of group processes were assessed at 
the group level, with the questions being refined with each study. For example in Study 
2, facilitators gave their impressions regarding how interested participants were in the 
discussion questions and how much the students stayed on topic and discussed alterna-
tive perspectives. In Study 3 facilitators additionally gave impressions about whether 
students used critical thinking skills, such as providing and evaluating evidence for 
different perspectives. In Study 4, facilitators also reported some of the topics that 
came up in discussion, and in Study 5, they were asked to perform a self-check of how 
well they adhered to the active and passive conditions during their facilitation.
2.5.4  Assignment and Information Evaluations
After the most substantive of the assignments (A2 reading, A3 deliberation) and at 
times at the end of the entire set of public engagement activities (during A4), stu-
dents were asked to evaluate the quality of various components of the public engage-
ment. For example, they rated the quality of the background information by 
responding to statements beginning with the stem “The information provided in this 
assignment was…” and ending with phrases such as “unbalanced” and “fair in its 
presentation of the issues,” to assess perceptions of bias. They also rated the clarity 
or understandability of the background information and its quality in terms of accu-
racy and thoroughness. In addition to rating the background information, within 
specific studies, students were at times also asked to rate the quality of A2 as a 
whole or the usefulness and value of the entire public engagement “module” (set of 
activities) used in the course.
2.5.5  Written Reponses and Comments
Open-ended responses also were gathered from our students. In addition to the ones 
already described in previous sections of this chapter, student written responses to 
open-ended questions during the A3 deliberation are also available for merging with 
our data sets by request. The open-ended data include responses to the scenarios that 
they read in Studies 2–4 and a drafted and revised “law” for the regulation of nano-
technology that students were asked to write during A3 of Study 5. Often students 
also left open-ended comments at the end of a given assignment or study.
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2.5.6  Data Quality Checks
For the most part, our open-access data sets include all consented data regardless of 
quality. Exceptions are noted in our supplemental materials. In each of the studies, we 
included some assessments of data quality, including questions which overtly asked 
students if they completed the questions honestly (vs. randomly, without reading, or 
felt they should answer in a certain way that differed from their honest response). In 
Study 5 we also included, in some assignments, items explicitly asking participants to 
choose a certain response (e.g., directing them to choose “strongly agree”). Students 
failing to follow those instructions may have been answering the survey inattentively. 
In addition, it may be possible to ascertain random or inattentive responding by exam-
ining the pattern of responses to certain of our measures—such as whether students 
classified presumed potential negative outcomes as negative (e.g., pollution).
2.5.7  Demographics and Individual Differences
Other potential moderators assessed in our studies include measures of demograph-
ics and individual differences. In all studies, we assessed self-reports of demo-
graphics including age, gender, year in school, typical grades, and prior experience 
with ethics coursework. In Studies 2–4 we also asked for self-reports of both par-
ents’ highest level of education.
In all four studies, we also included multi-item measures of ideological identity, inter-
est in politics, dispositional trust, and need for cognition. In some but not all studies, we 
also assessed trust in institutions, cultural cognition, authoritarianism, and certain of the 
Big 5 traits of openness, agreeableness, emotional stability, extraversion, and conscien-
tiousness. The details of these additional measures are in our supplemental materials.
2.6  Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a large number of comparisons and details of varia-
tions between studies in order to give readers an overview that will allow them to 
assess whether our data may be useful for their own purposes, as well as to provide 
background on the measures we reference in our remaining chapters. Readers will 
find even more detail in the documentation that accompanies the data sets in the 
supplemental materials.
Next, to provide exemplars of how our data may be used to test various theories, 
we turn our attention to a much narrower set of variables that comprise some of the 
most desired outcomes of public engagement: increases in knowledge, changes in 
attitudes or opinions, and acceptance of policy decisions.
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Knowledge
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Abstract This chapter examines what is associated with increases in both objective 
and subjective knowledge about nanotechnology as the result of participating in a 
public engagement. The results are replicated and compared across three different 
public engagements, all using undergraduate students as participants. Knowledge is 
examined at four different time points, allowing researchers to understand when 
learning is most likely occurring. Results indicate that participants showed gains in 
knowledge over the course of the public engagement, with the biggest gains shown 
after reading the materials as compared to participating in the group discussions. 
The structure of the materials did not directly influence knowledge gain; however, 
there were indirect effects of encouraging critical thinking on knowledge via cogni-
tive engagement. These results highlight the importance of cognitive engagement to 
understand when learning occurs, as well as some of the opportunities that may 
exists for remote deliberations, given the importance of the reading materials over 
the discussion.
Keywords Cognitive engagement · Mediation · Subjective knowledge ·  
Objective knowledge · Critical thinking · Information organization
Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not to his own facts. – Daniel Patrick Moynihan
A common expectation among engagement scholars is that participating in pub-
lic engagements will lead to better-informed citizens (e.g., Gastil & Dillard, 1999; 
Selin et al., 2017). We want citizens to know about policies and technologies and 
then make decisions about them. We want citizens to have reactions that are 
informed by facts that experts can agree upon, rather than using “alternative facts.” 
Recent research on online rumors (e.g., Garrett, Weeks, & Neo, 2016) and boomer-
ang effects (e.g., Hart & Nisbet, 2012) (when persuasion attempts result in people 
adopting the opposite of what the persuasion was pointing toward) reinforces the 
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idea that simply being aware of a policy is not enough. This research suggests that 
rumors are prevalent in online contexts, and individuals will often cling to incorrect 
facts even after hearing that their information is incorrect. Knowledge is often at the 
forefront of discussions about the role that citizens should play in science policy 
discussions and was a crucial outcome examined in our own work. The research 
here deals with a few key questions: What situations will increase learning during 
public engagements? What features will help participants best understand the facts 
relevant to the policies and technologies under consideration? We address knowl-
edge in our studies by assessing what the student engagement participants learned 
over time, and what helped or hindered that learning.
3.1  Why Does Knowledge Matter?
A disappointing but well-known fact is that Americans are especially ill-informed 
about a variety of political issues. Late-night comics make a joke of this in the com-
mon “man-on-the-street” interviews that highlight how little the average person 
knows as the audience laughs along. A 2014 video created by a group of Texas Tech 
students went viral when it illustrated fellow students’ lack of knowledge of the 
name of their vice president and who won the Civil War.1 While we may laugh at our 
own expense, what people know does, at least theoretically, have important implica-
tions for their reactions to policy proposals. Democratic theorists assert that indi-
viduals need to be knowledgeable in order for them to participate effectively in the 
public sphere. Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996, pp. 5) state that “knowledge provides 
the raw material that allows citizens to use their virtues, skills, and passions in a way 
that is connected meaningfully to the empirical world.” Therefore, having knowl-
edge is an important qualification in order to self-govern and to have meaningful 
debates about various issues.
Unfortunately, knowledge is not equally distributed among citizens, and how 
that can be ameliorated is the topic of decades of research in political science and 
communication. At the core of research on knowledge in political and policy-related 
contexts is the assumption that inequalities in knowledge will lead to inequalities in 
participation and ultimately inequalities in the benefits that can be obtained from 
participation (Dutwin, 2003). Thus, in addition to raising knowledge levels, it would 
be valuable to help people to reach more equal levels of knowledge through public 
engagement activities.
Deliberative democratic theorists assert that the best decisions will be made for 
the greatest number of people when citizens are informed about all sides of an issue. 
We can trace this line of thinking back to John Stewart Mill and the “Marketplace 
of Ideas.” Essentially, Mill believed that, if we let the information be known, the 
best ideas will rise to the top (Mill, 1860). However, being aware of something is 
not the same as having knowledge. The current debate about fake news and the 
speed with which rumors can spread online highlight that difference (e.g., Allcott & 
1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yRZZpk_9k8E
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Gentzknow, 2017). Instead, the marketplace of ideas needs to inform us more 
 substantially—we need to fully understand what is happening rather than simply 
being aware that a policy or debate over policy exists. The purpose of public engage-
ments is to provide a variety of information and perspectives to individuals, with the 
hope that they leave more knowledgeable, and with clearer and more evidence- and 
fact- consistent beliefs (Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004).
We need to note that knowledge is sometimes viewed as an inappropriate focus 
in studies of engagement, because it is often associated with so-called deficit mod-
els used in science communication (e.g., Sturgis & Allum, 2004). These models 
propose that citizens do not believe in or value various scientific findings or do not 
behave in a way that is desired, simply because they do not have adequate knowl-
edge (or trust or empathy, etc.). In essence, deficit models assume an ignorant public 
and assert that everyone will agree once the problem of ignorance (or mistrust, etc.) 
is fixed. While there is some research to support this view (van der Linden, 
Leiserowitz, Feinberg, & Maibach, 2015), the vast majority of research paints a 
much more complex picture (Druckman & Bolsen, 2011; Sturgis & Allum, 2004). 
Some would argue that, even given the same set of facts, different individuals will 
come to different conclusions based on their own values and other considerations. 
Even those who critique the role of knowledge in producing other public engage-
ment outcomes, however, do not question that knowledge is beneficial for citizen 
engagement. That is, while knowledge may not always lead to changes in behavior 
or attitudes, we would argue that knowing more would be an indication of a success-
ful public engagement. In public engagement, deficit model thinking, or simply 
providing a set of facts that will remove ignorance and assure the “right” way of 
behaving, is not the focus. Discussion of pros and cons is often explicitly encour-
aged rather than asserting one way as preferred, and participants are encouraged to 
share their own perspectives.2 However, engagement scholars believe that partici-
pants do need to be working from the same set of facts, which can be provided at 
several stages throughout the engagement activities (Goodin & Niemeyer, 2003; 
Muhlberger & Weber, 2006).
3.2  How Can Public Engagements Foster Increases 
in Knowledge?
Prior research on participation in public engagements have found that participants 
feel like they know more (Powell & Kleinman, 2008) and in many cases actually do 
know more facts (Fishkin, 1997; Luskin, O’Flynn, Fishkin, & Russell, 2014) about 
the topic at hand after participating. The research that has explicitly examined when 
individuals are most likely to learn suggest that most of the learning from participat-
ing in public engagements happens while individuals are reading the information 
provided prior to deliberation, and the discussion itself does not add much 
2 https://www.nifi.org/
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additional information (Goodin & Niemeyer, 2003; Muhlberger & Weber, 2006). 
This research is the exception however, and most look at the impact of the entire 
public engagement experience. Much of the research and theory about everyday 
discussion would suggest that the discussion is essential in helping individuals crys-
tallize what they learn from other sources (Eveland & Hively, 2009; Mansbridge, 
1999; Sanders, 1997); however, the research supporting that fact in the presence of 
readings and discussion is rather scant.
There are a host of theories that can help explain why participating in public 
engagements would lead to an increase in knowledge, but they can generally be tied 
to two different perspectives. One perspective is simply that providing information 
will lead to an increase in knowledge, with the caveat that the information is attended 
to in some fashion. A wrinkle to this perspective in the public engagement literature 
focuses on how the material is being presented. For example, the National Issues 
Forum recommends that information be presented in a balanced, nonpartisan fash-
ion. The second perspective instead focuses on cognitive engagement with various 
aspects of the materials as the reason behind why individuals learn. Put simply, 
participating in an engagement will motivate you to think (or cognitively engage) 
with the concepts somehow, which in turn will foster learning. Along these lines, 
there is evidence that when participants know their input will matter, this increases 
motivation, and they are more likely to cognitively engage with the materials 
(Powell & Kleinman, 2008). However, the reasoning behind the “presentation of 
materials” arguments is directly tied to presenting the material in a way that will 
foster deeper or more effective cognitive engagement, so the two perspectives are 
not completely distinct. Over our series of studies, we examine both of these per-
spectives to try to better understand how best to foster increases in learning.
3.2.1  Informational Presentation
Public engagements will typically give participants some sort of information prior 
to coming together as a group. During this preliminary information presentation, 
which may be in the form of materials to be read in advance of the deliberative 
gathering or an initial information session during the gathering, the “facts” are 
stated in advance of the deliberative portion of the engagement. There is generally 
extensive care put into the creation of these documents to try to provide the nuance 
of various perspectives from a balanced, nonpartisan perspective. This is done so 
individuals will come to the deliberative engagement prepared to knowledgeably 
engage in the various sides of an issue. There are theoretical reasons to believe that 
how this information is presented can influence how citizens respond to that infor-
mation. In general, practitioners argue that at a minimum, the information needs to 
be presented in a balanced manner (Burkhalter, Gastil, & Kelshaw, 2002; 
Lukensmeyer & Torres, 2006). However, even while meeting that criterion, there 
are various ways in which that information might be structured.
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As noted in Chap. 2, we focused on two different informational presentation 
strategies that are typically used in public engagements. The format that we expected 
would have a positive impact on learning was a pro-con organization style. Such a 
style is typically used, for example, in the National Issues Forums. This strategy 
explicitly compares the various perspectives on the information that is being pre-
sented. The other presentation strategy was a topical organization that does not 
explicitly call out the different perspectives. Our expectation was the pro-con orga-
nization would facilitate learning based on prior educational research that has exam-
ined different note-taking styles. Scholars find that making comparisons while 
taking notes improves learning over simple linear methods (Robinson & Kiewra, 
1995). Furthermore, texts structured in a compare-contrast form tend to be associ-
ated with improved recall, compared to texts organized linearly or descriptively 
(Bohn-Gettler & Kendeou, 2014).
The second experimental manipulation relevant to knowledge, which also 
focused on the presentation of the materials, was the inclusion of prompts encourag-
ing participants to think critically. The justification for these prompts encouraging 
learning is tied to research in education that shows that students learn differently 
depending on their goals (Bohn-Gettler & Kendeou, 2014). Participants were sim-
ply asked either to provide feedback or to critically evaluate the material at several 
points throughout the reading. By encouraging students to use critical thinking 
skills, we expected that individuals would pay closer attention to the material and 
process the information more deeply, thereby facilitating learning. How individuals 
process information—or how they engage with the materials cognitively—is an 
important consideration in many literatures. This was also true for our own studies, 
and we assessed cognitive engagement several ways throughout our series of 
experiments.
3.2.2  Cognitive Engagement
The theoretical reasoning behind why a pro-con information organization or criti-
cal thinking prompts would facilitate learning all goes back to how individuals 
may process the material with which we present them. In essence, we were testing 
whether or not we could get participants to engage with our materials in a deeper 
and more effortful fashion. We also then explicitly measured the extent to which 
participants said they were engaged while participating. The need for individu-
als to process the information they are presented with in order to learn is central 
to several theories across a variety of fields. Communication scholars will often 
invoke the communication mediation model (Eveland, 2001; Shah et al., in press) 
which indicates that the extent to which individuals elaborate, which is engaging 
in additional thinking, or engage in perspective taking after being presented with 
information will influence how much they learn. In psychology, dual process mod-
els of attitude change—which have also been applied to learning—indicate that 
longer-lasting effects in attitudes occur when individuals systematically process 
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information (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Systematic 
 processing implies individuals are both motivated and able to expend cognitive 
effort processing information. The theories that we relied on most heavily when 
examining cognitive engagement are those that reside in education psychology. 
In particular, that research suggests that the greatest learning will occur when 
individuals use deep rather than surface-level processing strategies, which is more 
likely when they are motivated.
3.2.3  Forms of Cognitive Engagement
Research in areas such as cognitive and educational psychology find that one of 
the most important predictors of whether, how much, and how robustly people 
learn is how they engage with information. Much of this research has been con-
ducted in educational contexts and examines a variety of different types of study 
strategies, categorizing ways of studying new materials as involving surface-level 
versus deep cognitive processing, or as being strategic and conscientious. For 
our experiments here, we created eight scales designed to measure various facets 
of individual engagement (for an in-depth examination of the construction and 
validation of those scales, please see PytlikZillig et al., 2013). The eight types of 
engagement that we examined were active learning, conscientious, uninterested, 
creative, open-minded, close-minded, angry, and social (measures used to assess 
these are discussed in Chap. 2). Active learning and conscientious and unin-
terested engagement relate to participants’ motivations while engaging. Active 
learning engagement is assumed to occur when participants’ acknowledge that 
they are trying to deeply process the information with which they are presented. 
This deep processing is likely to be tied to increased knowledge. Conscientious 
engagement refers to an individual’s desire to be careful or thoughtful while 
examining information, which also would be associated with enhanced learning. 
Uninterested engagement is characterized by low motivation and boredom, which 
would likely impede learning. Creative, open- minded, and close-minded engage-
ment focus more on how individuals are participating. Creative engagement 
focuses on whether individuals are attempting to “think outside the box” and 
potentially use multiple and unexpected perspectives when participating. While 
this could increase learning, it is also possible that creative engagement could 
have a negative impact on learning due to the possibility of distraction by irrele-
vant or incorrect information. Open-minded and close-minded engagement assess 
the extent to which individuals are willing to be open versus closed to other’s 
opinions. Angry engagement examines participants’ negative emotional engage-
ment while participating, which may indicate that participants are engaging in 
defensive strategies and therefore are less likely to learn. Social engagement is 
designed to assess the extent to which a participant connected and interacted with 
others while participating.
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3.2.4  Need for Cognition
The last element we examined was an individual difference variable that is 
 frequently used when examining knowledge gain or learning—need for cognition 
(NFC). NFC is the general tendency to enjoy and use effortful cognitive processing 
strategies (Cacioppo et al., 1996). Persons with high NFC should be most likely to 
learn when participating in public engagements. Such people have been identified 
as especially likely to participate in deliberations, be more resistant to the argu-
ments of others, and have more influence (Delli Carpini et al., 2004). In our case, 
we were more interested in various features that could increase knowledge across 
the board once we accounted for differences in NFC. Essentially, we wondered if 
we could level the cognitive playing field with our various informational presenta-
tion strategies.
3.3  What Do We Mean by Knowledge?
Given our purpose here is to understand increases in knowledge, it is also relevant 
to discuss what we mean by knowledge, as knowledge can be variously defined. 
Throughout our studies, we examined both objective and subjective knowledge. It 
should be noted that integration (Neuman, 1981) or structural knowledge (Eveland 
& Hively, 2009) is another important facet of knowledge, but one that is typically 
ignored in research on public deliberations. Objective knowledge is probably what 
most would think about when hearing the term knowledge—being able to correctly 
identify explicit pieces of information—that is, facts. Factual knowledge is used 
extensively in communication and political science literatures when trying to assess 
what people know about various topics. Within this definition of knowledge, it is 
assumed that information can be either correct or false. Consequently, the more cor-
rect pieces of information people are able to access, the more knowledgeable they 
are. In public engagement contexts, this would be assessed by measuring how much 
participants know about the topic at hand prior to participating in the engagement, 
and again following participation, or in our case at multiple time points throughout 
the engagement. Beginning with Study 3, we asked knowledge questions at four 
different time points, at the beginning of the semester (A1), just prior to receiving 
the reading material (pre-A2), just after reading (post-A2), and in the final assess-
ment at the end of semester (A4). Participants’ knowledge was not re-assessed 
immediately following the discussion activities (A3), so any additional learning 
from the discussion activities we would assume to see in the final assessment.
Objective knowledge is most often assessed by asking participants either true- 
false or multiple-choice questions. The literature on the extent to which individuals 
show large gains in knowledge during public engagements and via these measures 
is mixed at best. The majority does not show sharp increases in knowledge; how-
ever, there is some research that has found objective knowledge increases over time. 
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The form of knowledge that is more consistently found to be improved via 
 participation in public engagements is subjective knowledge—how much individu-
als feel they know.
3.4  What Did They Learn?
Before we go into what improved participants’ learning, it’s worth noting that we 
had to continually refine our objective knowledge measures. For us, measuring sub-
jective knowledge was relatively straightforward, and we used similar items 
throughout all five studies (see Chap. 2 for details). To create the objective knowl-
edge measures, in Study 3, we created items based on information that was provided 
in a document participants were asked to read and then examined pre-post engage-
ment statistics for each knowledge question in order to identify the questions that 
were most sensitive to detecting pre-post changes. While refining our knowledge 
questions, we learned a lot about what participants did not learn. For instance, one 
question we had that performed poorly was a “select all that apply” question about 
what were current areas of nanogenomic research and development. Of the five 
options, two options showed high levels of correct responses that did not vary. The 
other three options had very low correct responses initially and got worse over time. 
True-false questions also posed problems, both in that some showed very high lev-
els of knowledge at pre-exposure and also some questions that participants contin-
ued to do poorly on even after completing the reading and the discussions. We 
determined that these questions were either too intuitive in the case of questions 
where individuals knew the answer before the public engagement activities or were 
too difficult to ascertain from the readings in cases where we did not see any 
improvements over time.
Looking at the means in Table 3.1, we see that our measures did detect knowl-
edge changes. Using both objective and subjective measures, we consistently see 
increased knowledge scores over the course of the public engagement. The increases 
are most pronounced when examined just after the readings, but the knowledge 
gains persist when comparing the end of the semester to the initial or pre-reading 
measures. These increases in knowledge over time are statistically significant. The 
knowledge means were tested with repeated measures ANOVA, and in all cases, the 
later knowledge measures were significantly greater than the initial, pre-reading 
measures. In a few cases, there was a decrease in knowledge from just after the read-
ing and the end of the semester, but that should not be surprising. Some loss of 
memory for facts over several weeks is to be expected. But even with that decrease, 
participants knew significantly more at the end of the semester than they knew at the 
beginning of the semester.
This suggests that there were some long-term objective effects of participating in 
this public engagement. That is, the public engagement as a whole did lead to citi-
zens who were more knowledgeable about nanotechnology. This is also true for 
subjective knowledge. Our participants consistently reported that they felt they 
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knew significantly more as the semester went on, with the most prominent effects 
observed after the reading. When we did have both post reading and end of the 
semester measures, we did not see significant increases between those time points. 
The group discussion occurred between the reading and the end of the semester, 
which suggests that reading the materials, rather than engaging in discussion with 
other participants, had the most profound effects on what they objectively knew and 
felt that they knew.
Knowing that the majority of the observed learning is occurring after the reading 
as opposed to after the discussion is critical from a theoretical perspective. When the 
learning happens in public engagements is frequently not explicitly addressed. 
Instead most scholars look at the effects of the engagement as a whole, regardless of 
what aspect most contirubuted to learning. Our findings here are consistent with 
others that show reading appears to have a stronger impact on  learning (e.g., 
Table 3.1 Knowledge means
Objective knowledge
Initial measure 
(A1)
Pre-reading 
(pre-A2)
Post-reading 
(post-A2)
End of the semester 
(A4)
Study 2 0.46 (0.24) 0.69 (0.16)*
Study 3
Multiple 
choice
0.53(0.21) 0.57(0.19) 0.71(0.19)*
T/F set A 0.76(0.20) 0.79(0.17) 0.73(0.21)*
T/F set B 0.56(0.17) 0.62(0.19) 0.61(0.19)*
Study 4
Multiple 
choice
0.49(0.23) 0.63(0.24) 0.60(0.22)*
T/F set A 0.65(0.33) 0.70(0.13) 0.79(0.12) 0.81(0.30)*
T/F set B 0.66(0.16) 0.74(0.17)
Composite 0.54(0.20) 0.68(0.15) 0.72(0.14) 0.67(0.20)*
Study 5
Multiple 
choice
0.55(0.29) 0.79(0.28) 0.69(0.27)*
T/F 0.72(0.18) 0.82(0.19) 0.83(0.14)*
Composite 0.68(0.16) 0.81(0.17) 0.81(0.13)*
Subjective knowledge
Initial measure Pre-reading Post-reading End of the semester
Study 3 1.67 (0.74) 2.06(0.79) 3.12(0.60)*
Study 4 1.62(0.69) 1.94(0.67) 3.00(0.60) 3.00(0.60)*
Study 5 1.64(0.72) 3.06(0.56)*
Note: Cell entries are means and standard errors in parentheses. The objective measure can be 
interpreted as a percentage of correct responses
*Indicates that the measure is statistically different from the measure obtained either in A1 or pre- 
A2, depending on when first measurement was, which reflects learning that would have occurred 
over the course of the semester. Post-reading scores (post-A2) would demonstrate learning that 
occurred during the reading, and A4 scores would capture learning from both the reading and the 
discussions
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Muhlberger & Weber, 2006). Focusing on reading rather than  discussion opens 
up a lot of possibilities when it comes to the ease of implementing engagement 
activities. It suggests that what is most important is the time to thoughtfully process 
new information; therefore remote deliberations, such as Becker and Slaton’s 
teledemocracy (2000), are possibilities.
Next, we examine the effects of information presentation on how much our par-
ticipants learned or felt they learned. How we presented the information had mini-
mal to no effect on how much the participants learned. Critical thinking prompts 
were used in all four studies, and in all cases, the prompts did not result in higher 
objective or subjective knowledge. In Studies 3 and 4, the information organization 
manipulation was used, and pro-con versus topical organizational strategies also did 
not have an impact on objective or subjective knowledge. The interaction between 
information presentation and critical thinking prompts was also not predictive. 
These findings could be interpreted as optimistic or encouraging to practitioners. It 
appears to suggest that if the information presented meets some minimal delibera-
tive expectations (e.g., we strove to use balanced information, although less bal-
anced information in Study 5 did not appear to decrease learning), we do not need 
to spend much time or effort on how to best structure the arguments or further 
encourage deep processing. It appears that participants learn at similar rates regard-
less of the information presentation, and they do still learn during the public engage-
ment event. Whether these strategies matter for other outcomes will be addressed in 
subsequent chapters, but from a knowledge perspective, simply providing relatively 
clear and balanced information is enough within this context. Our subjects and con-
text are unique, but this provides an optimistic starting point for future studies.
We now turn to examining whether or not the extent to which participants were 
engaged with the materials influenced how much they learned, or felt that they 
learned, by the end of the public engagement event. Table 3.2 shows all significant 
relationships obtained between our engagement scales and the end of the study 
measures of knowledge. As you can see, the relationship between the various 
engagement scales and knowledge was much more apparent when examining sub-
jective knowledge. There were fewer and less consistent relationships between 
objective knowledge and the various forms of engagement, though a couple mea-
sures proved more consistent. In general, it appears that individuals do learn, and 
how they engage with materials effects the extent to which they felt they have 
learned, but less so how much they objectively learn.
Looking first at objective knowledge, conscientious and open-minded engage-
ment were positive predictors of learning, both significantly predicting learning in 
three of the nine different measures of knowledge. Disinterested and angry engage-
ment were negatively related to learning. Disinterested engagement was a negative 
predictor of four of the nine measures of knowledge, whereas angry engagement 
was a significant negative predictor in three of the nine measures of knowledge. 
Active learning, social engagement, creative engagement, and close-minded engage-
ment were never significantly associated with objective measures. On the whole, 
there is some evidence of engagement influencing learning, but not consistently.
Consistently across the three studies, conscientious engagement, active learning 
engagement, and creative engagement had a positive relationship with subjective 
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knowledge. That is, those who indicated they were paying closer, more conscientious 
attention, actively and metacognitively engaging with the materials and were thinking 
creatively about the issues were more likely to indicate that they learned more over the 
course of the deliberative event. Social and open-minded engagement also occasion-
ally had positive effects on reported subjective learning outcomes. The negative forms 
of engagement were not consistently associated with subjective knowledge. 
Disinterested and angry engagement were associated with less subjective knowledge 
in Study 3, but only disinterested engagement was related in Study 4. None of the 
negative engagement items were related to subjective knowledge in Study 5.
In summary, we can say that participants do learn and feel that they have learned, 
and how they report engaging with materials has a fairly consistent effect on how 
much they feel they have learned, but how we structured the materials does not have 
an effect on how they learn. This opens up the question of whether or not how we 
structure the materials influences how individuals engage. This may mean that rather 
than our experimental manipulations having a direct effect on knowledge, engagement 
could serve to mediate the effect of our experimental manipulations on knowledge.
3.5  What Mediates Knowledge?
Assessing the alternative information organizations used in Studies 3 and 4 indi-
cates that the pro-con versus topical organization is not associated with any of the 
forms of engagement. However, there is a fairly consistent pattern for the critical 
thinking prompts in Studies 3 and 4. As noted in Chap. 2, beginning in Study 3 we 
used prompts that were less didactic and more gentle to “nudge” participants in the 
Objective knowledge
Conscientious Openminded Active 
learning
Social Creative Disinterested Angry Closeminded
Study 3
Multiple
choice
Multiple
choice
Multiple
choice
+.144 -.175 -.136
T/F set A
T/F set B
Study 4
-.195
T/F +.147 -.144
Composite -.216
Study 5
T/F +.172 +.161 -.198
Composite +.138 +.161 -.203
Subjective knowledge
Conscientious Openminded Active 
Learning
Social Creative Disinterested Angry Closeminded
Study 3 +.282 +.239 +.272 +.159 +.294 -.240 -.143
Study 4 +.239 +.185 +.202 +.156 -.192
Study 5 +.202 +.312 +.233 +.201
Table 3.2 Knowledge and engagement
Note: Cell entries show the sign and value of any significant correlations between the type of 
knowledge and engagement measure. Engagement items in Study 2 were not identical to measures 
from Studies 3–5, and the full knowledge battery was not used until Study 3, which is why Studies 
3–5 are shown here
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direction of critical thinking. Across Studies 3 and 4, we find consistently that 
 conscientiousness, open-minded engagement, and active learning are positively 
associated with the critical thinking condition, while close-minded engagement is 
negatively associated with the critical thinking condition. This suggests that our 
critical thinking prompts resulted in more positive engagement with the pre- 
deliberation materials. Given the earlier presented findings indicating that positive 
engagement is associated with increases in knowledge, this suggests that the critical 
thinking condition has the potential to influence knowledge indirectly through 
increases in positive engagement and decreases in close-minded engagement. It 
should be noted, however, that the relationships between critical thinking and 
engagement observed in Studies 3 and 4 did not replicate with Study 5. There were 
no significant relationships between the critical thinking condition and the various 
forms of engagement in Study 5.
In order to further address the relationship between critical thinking and subjec-
tive knowledge, we employ a more stringent test of the relationships by using linear 
regression with controls and including all of the forms of engagement. The controls 
allow us to account for other variables that people might argue could account for the 
relationship between engagement and knowledge and include need for cognition, 
typical grades, gender, willingness to change their minds, and their prior familiarity 
with nanotechnology. Given that the relationship between engagement and subjec-
tive knowledge was the strongest, this is where we would expect to find significant 
relationships, which is indeed the case. These analyses indicate conscientious 
engagement positively predicts increases in subjective knowledge across Studies 3 
and 4, even when including various controls and simultaneously examining the 
effects of the other forms of engagement. The regression also indicates that the criti-
cal thinking condition did not have a direct effect on subjective knowledge once the 
controls and varieties of engagements were considered. These relationships taken 
together provide evidence that critical thinking prompts might increase learning 
through influencing how individuals engage with the materials.
To examine if critical thinking had an indirect effect on knowledge, parallel medi-
ation using Hayes (2013) PROCESS macro was utilized, and the conceptual figure is 
presented in Fig. 3.1. Parallel mediation via PROCESS allows all indirect relation-
ships to be simultaneously tested in order to determine which variables are exerting 
the strongest influence on our outcome of interest. The results of the process model 
in study three indicate that two forms of engagement serve as significant mediators 
of the effect of being in the critical thinking condition on increases in subjective 
knowledge. That is, different types of engagement serve as the conduit of the influ-
ence of critical thinking prompts on subjective knowledge. Controlling for the same 
set of variables used in the regression analyses, and considering the potential mediat-
ing effects of all forms of engagement, there is a significant indirect effect of being 
in the critical thinking condition on perceived knowledge through increased levels of 
conscientious engagement and decreased levels of close-minded engagement. That 
is, being in the critical thinking condition increases conscientious engagement and 
decreases close-minded engagement, which are subsequently associated with per-
ceived knowledge. In Study 4, conscientious engagement served as a significant 
mediator of the effect of being in the critical thinking condition and increasing per-
ceived knowledge (utilizing the same analysis strategy as Study 3). Again, being in 
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the critical thinking condition increased conscientious engagement, which in turn 
was associated with higher levels of perceived knowledge at the end of the semester. 
Again, the indirect effects were not observed for objective knowledge.
3.6  Summary and Conclusion
Returning to our motivating question posed in Chap. 1 (what works, for what pur-
poses, under what conditions, and why?), we were able to shed light on this question 
when it comes to addressing knowledge. In regard to addressing what works when it 
comes to knowledge, the combined influence of the public engagement activities 
appeared to have a positive effect. In particular, individuals both felt that they learned, 
in addition to showing objective increases in what they learned, after completing the 
readings that were provided. The structure of the readings was not found to be impor-
tant in and of itself. Simply reading, at least within the specific public engagement 
we had set up, was enough to lead to increases in knowledge of what nanotechnology 
is and what it can do. The impact of discussion, regardless of the various scenarios 
we put participants in (see Chap. 2 for details), was minimal to nonexistent.
Finding the readings to be more important in comparison to the discussion is 
consistent with other research, despite being counter to what would be expected 
from deliberative theory. However, this issue is perhaps addressed by our results 
showing that cognitively engaging with the materials was associated with knowledge 
Fig. 3.1 Conceptual figure for parallel mediation
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gains. Individuals who are more deeply processing the reading materials are 
essentially engaging in what deliberative scholars would desire, but doing it inter-
nally rather than with others. The benefits of discussion in deliberation are pre-
sumed to occur due to individuals thoughtfully considering issues and perspectives 
that are provided by other participants in the deliberation. By measuring how indi-
viduals were engaging with the content, we were able to determine that thoughtfully 
considering issues does in fact increase what individuals feel that they know, and 
this increase can happen in isolation rather than with others. Further study is needed 
to determine if this can occur out of a classroom setting or if these observed rela-
tionships are only found with students in classrooms.
The element of effectiveness (the “for what purposes” component of our moti-
vating question) that was examined in this chapter was learning, conceptualized and 
operationalized two different ways. Making distinctions between what participants 
felt they learned and objective measures of knowledge was shown to be important. 
Subjective learning, but not objective learning, showed some of the more interesting 
relationships. These two different measures of learning are clearly different from 
each other as they frequently did not correlate significantly, although the sign of the 
coefficients were always positive.
The context element (the “under what conditions” component of our motivating 
question) was crucial to understand what we actually discovered about learning in 
public engagements about nanotechnology. How we structured the reading did not 
directly contribute to whether participant learned or felt they learned. This suggests 
that how you present information does not matter at all when it comes to objective 
learning. However, the critical thinking prompts did prove to be important once we 
considered how participants engaged with the readings. We find that the critical 
thinking prompts in Studies 3 and 4 encourage deeper processing and discourage 
negative forms of engagement, which subsequently lead to an increase in subjective 
knowledge. Including mediators that speak to when different elements may be more 
successful allowed us to paint a much more nuanced picture of what is occurring 
during public engagement activities.
From a broader perspective, having three studies that contained the full knowl-
edge battery also allowed us to see what consistently worked or what consistently 
did not work. Looking at Table 3.2 paints a very clear picture of the importance of 
conscientious engagement—which is engaging in more thoughtful and deep pro-
cessing—across all measures of knowledge and across all studies. Given the so- 
called replication crisis plaguing the social sciences, ensuring that we understand 
and appreciate the robustness of our effects is going to be important. Multiple stud-
ies were able to confirm the importance of conscientiousness and also show areas 
where effects may not be as robust as expected. In Study 5, the indirect effects of the 
critical thinking condition on subjective learning was not found, contrary to Studies 
3 and 4. Study 5 had a different set of experimental manipulations in comparison to 
Studies 3 and 4, even though the critical thinking prompts remained the same. While 
we did not find direct or interactive effects of these various manipulations on learn-
ing or engagement, it is possible that these changes in the design of Study 5 changed 
the observed relationships. However, at this point, we have more findings than we 
have adequate theory to cover them.
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Abstract A key reason for conducting public engagements around science and 
innovation policies is to find out what the public thinks and feels about those poli-
cies and the innovations themselves. However, some scholars have suggested delib-
eration can create attitude polarization, which could be a barrier to effective group 
decision-making and social progress. Thus, it is important to know when, if, and 
why processes lead to polarization. In this chapter, we examine individuals’ atti-
tudes toward nanotechnology and describe whether and how they are impacted by 
the design of public engagement. We focus particularly on the degree to which 
individuals’ attitudes change and perhaps become more extreme, as a function of 
deliberation. We find that for the most part, the average of participants’ attitudes 
toward nanotechnological development shifted toward being slightly more cautious 
over the course of the semester during each study we conducted, although other 
significant patterns of attitude change were evident among individuals. The features 
of deliberation that most consistently influenced attitudes were critical thinking 
prompts and information formatting, such that encouraging critical thinking and 
presenting information in a way that presented multiple perspectives often led indi-
viduals to take on more cautious views toward nanotechnology. Other features com-
monly theorized as having important consequences for deliberation showed mostly 
no effects, and we found little evidence of attitude polarization, a phenomenon 
feared by many scholars who have remained skeptical of deliberation. However, the 
degree to which group dynamics during deliberative discussion (specifically, group 
homogeneity) influenced attitude change and polarization was moderated by the 
personality variable trait of openness. Those high in openness were the least likely 
to experience attitude extremitization (attitude change in the direction of becoming 
more extreme) in attitudinally heterogeneous groups but the most likely to experi-
ence attitude extremitization in attitudinally homogeneous groups.
Keywords Attitudes · Attitude change · Homogeneity · Heterogeneity · Benefits 
versus risks · Common ingroup identity model
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4.1  Introduction
One of the main reasons researchers and public officials may want to conduct public 
engagements is to discover what the public actually wants when it comes to science 
and innovation policy. For many, scientific discovery and technological develop-
ment may not necessarily seem like democratic ventures, but there are few scientific 
or technological advances that would have been possible without some degree of 
support from the public.
We need look no further than the case of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 
in the USA and Europe to see how vital public support is to an emerging technology. 
GMOs are organisms whose genetic material has been altered in some way via 
genetic engineering, and they have been around since the 1970s (although some 
have argued that selective breeding, which has existed since 12,000 BC, is a form of 
genetic engineering; see Kingsbury, 2009). The applications of GMOs include med-
ical research, the production of pharmaceutical drugs, development of biofuels, and 
plant and animal conservation, but the most controversial application of GMOs is in 
agriculture and food production. The scientific consensus is that GM foods are no 
more likely to cause harm to humans than other foods (e.g., Alessandro, Manzo, 
Veronesi, & Rosellini, 2013), and GM foods have provided nutrients for millions of 
people who otherwise would be severely malnourished (e.g., FAO). However, the 
public remains far more skeptical about GM foods than scientists in the USA and 
Europe (Funk & Rainie, 2015; Marris, Wynne, Simmons, & Weldon, 2001). This 
skepticism is surely driven in part by a lack of knowledge about what GMOs are, but 
it is also driven largely by individuals’ values and moral learnings (Kam & Estes, 
2016; Scott, Inbar, & Rozin, 2016). Further, some people’s opposition to the use of 
GMOs in food seems driven not by concern over the health effects of GMOs but 
instead by ideological concerns such as perceived overreach by the government or 
the possibility of monopoly by large corporations invested in GMOs (Dewey, 2017). 
Ultimately, public opposition to GM foods has had substantial policy implications. 
Twenty-eight countries in the European Union (EU), as well as 36 other countries, 
require GM foods to be labeled as such, and 19 countries in the EU have “opted out” 
of growing GM crops. The US Congress recently passed a law mandating that infor-
mation be made available regarding whether foods use GMOs (Charles, 2016). 
Laws mandating that GMO foods be labeled are not mere inconveniences for com-
panies developing and using GMOs. These laws may have a significant impact on 
the consumption of GM foods in developed countries as well as on the distribution 
of GM foods to underdeveloped countries (The Economist, 2014), and proposals to 
ban the production of GM foods continue to spring up across the USA (Karlamangla, 
2014).
Although the success of new technologies depends upon public acceptance and 
support (discussed further in Chap. 5), the lack of scientific knowledge and literacy 
among citizens (discussed in Chap. 3) makes it difficult for opinions to be devel-
oped and clearly expressed and for policymakers to decide how seriously to take 
public opinion in the first place. Even when citizens form opinions about science or 
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technology, the issues often become politicized, leading to attitude extremity and 
polarization (McCright & Dunlap, 2011; Kahan et al., 2012; Lewandowsky, Gignac, 
& Oberauer, 2013). Members of the public often lack the familiarity with new tech-
nologies needed to grasp both its benefits and its risks, and views toward regulations 
are often politicized, hijacked by political rhetoric, and defined in extremist terms. 
Extreme views, which are far from unrepresented in the contemporary USA (e.g., 
McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2006), can yield polarization even over otherwise 
non-political issues. With polarization comes gridlock, which can stifle scientific 
and technological development as well as prevent policymakers from implementing 
effective regulations. For these reasons, scientists, investors, and policymakers are 
wise to be concerned with finding ways to measure public opinion toward science 
and technology, guiding development in a way that takes into account public opin-
ion, and perhaps even developing engagement strategies that encourage citizens to 
adjust their attitudes based on new and accurate information.
As discussed in Chap. 1, scientists and policymakers have increasingly turned to 
public deliberations as a means of addressing a variety of concerns about demo-
cratic engagement, and among these concerns is the potential for polarization over 
controversial issues related to science and technology. The hope is that by getting 
citizens together, informing them, and having them hash out their differences, the 
public as a whole can come to a more enlightened, reasonable consensus and move 
forward accordingly. However, a substantial body of research in psychology, com-
munications, and political science suggests we should question whether this is 
really what we should expect when citizens deliberate. It may be the case, for 
instance, that certain features of deliberation lead people to take sides, to become 
more extreme in their original views, or conversely even to acquiesce to a less 
informed, suboptimal opinion in response to conformity pressures.
In this chapter, we explore the effects of various features of deliberation on atti-
tude change and polarization. The ways in which the features and context of a delib-
eration influence participants’ views of the issue at hand should be a central concern 
of researchers and policymakers interested in scientific and technological develop-
ment because these issues often have been shown to be easily politicized. Climate 
change, vaccinations, stem cell research, genetically modified organisms (GMOs), 
and even evolution are examples of science and technology issues that have been 
significantly impacted by public discourse, disagreement, and polarization. Properly 
designed public deliberation might represent an avenue for researchers and policy-
makers to avoid the pitfalls of a polarized public, but first we need to better under-
stand how different features of deliberation influence people’s attitudes.
The results of our analyses call into question some of the assumptions about the 
roles of various commonly used features of deliberation. The modal outcome of our 
experimental conditions is no effect on attitudes, although there are some cases in 
which we see indications of a pattern. The conditions that resulted in significant attitude 
change most often were those aimed at encouraging critical thinking in some way, but 
these effects were sporadic and did not occur in the majority of cases. These findings 
may be interpreted optimistically, because we did not find much evidence of adverse 
changes such as polarization or extremitization. However, we also did not find any 
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evidence of conditions leading to “positive” outcomes. Counter to what many 
deliberative theorists would suggest, discussing nanotechnology in groups did not pro-
duce any significant changes in aggregate attitudes compared to simply deliberating 
about the issue on one’s own, suggesting the positive impacts of discussion may be 
overstated.
4.2  The Effects of Deliberation: Unification or Polarization?
When is it that we should expect scientific and technological development to be 
welcomed with open arms versus shunned or even actively resisted with fear and 
skepticism? When should we expect deliberation to lead individuals to consensus 
versus polarization? What, if anything, should we expect to happen to people’s atti-
tudes when they are asked to deliberate about issues of science and technology? 
Over the last few decades, scholarship in psychology, communication, and political 
science has made some headway in shedding light on the answers to these questions. 
However, the conclusions of this scholarship have been somewhat mixed. Many of 
the large-scale deliberations conducted by scholars have shown substantial attitude 
changes via deliberation toward more well-informed opinions that resemble those of 
experts (e.g., Fishkin, Iyengar, & Luskin, 2005; Fishkin & Luskin, 1999; McLean 
et al. 2000), but it is often difficult to disentangle what exactly changed opinions, 
and quite different patterns of attitude change have been found in smaller- scale stud-
ies on the effects of group discussion. This suggests the relationship between delib-
eration and attitudes is more nuanced than simple analyses might imply. What we do 
know is that deliberations do not have a single, universal effect on people’s attitudes. 
Context matters (Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004), even if we do not yet fully 
understand why or how (Chap. 1). Below, we outline the existing theories and 
research that pertain to deliberation’s “good” or “bad” effects on people’s attitudes.
4.2.1  The Promises of Public Deliberation: Informed, 
Enlightened Consensus
The point of view that the possible benefits of deliberation outweigh the possible 
harms emanates predominantly from the theoretical arguments of deliberative theo-
rists. Dewey (1927) argued that without the communication offered through public 
deliberation, apathy and self-serving biases would leave the public divided as citi-
zens walled themselves off into disparate echo chambers. Although it is never argued 
that consensus will or should be the universal result of all deliberation, it is believed 
that exposure to new information and a diverse set of viewpoints through delibera-
tion will or should lead to some degree of open-mindedness and engagement with 
alternative perspectives (see also, Chambers, 2003; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; 
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Habermas, 1996; Fishkin & Luskin, 1999). At the least, according to some 
deliberative theorists, deliberation should lead people to come to terms with the idea 
that some level of disagreement is inevitable, and thus people will become more 
likely to tolerate opposing views (Cohen, 1998). In terms of individuals’ attitudes, 
then, many deliberative theorists would suggest that deliberation gives people the 
tools to incorporate alternative opinions into their own.
Some research has shown that deliberation—or at least the exposure to informa-
tion as part of the deliberation, as discussed in Chap. 3—increases factual knowl-
edge and, thereby, presumably informed opinions. Across the world, Fishkin and 
Luskin have implemented “Deliberative Polls™,” in which representative samples 
of the population are brought together to discuss public matters, question experts, 
and vote on critical issues. In the majority of cases, they have found evidence of 
increased knowledge and what seems to be well-informed consensus (Fishkin, 
Iyengar, & Luskin, 2005; McLean et al. 2000; see also, Price & Cappella, 2002). 
Other research suggests that participants may become more cooperative. Psychology 
research on small group discussions has demonstrated that face-to-face communica-
tion increases intragroup cooperation by allowing individuals to express their will-
ingness to cooperate, gauge others’ willingness to cooperate, and draw connections 
between their own interests and the group’s interest (e.g., Bornstein, 1992; Bouas & 
Komorita, 1996; Sally, 1995; see Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004) .
4.2.2  Deliberation’s Downfalls: Motivated Reasoning 
and Polarization
The calls for skepticism regarding the effects of deliberation on attitudes are 
grounded primarily in social psychological theories. Skeptics of deliberation point 
to several psychological phenomena that suggest deliberation may do more harm 
than good. One psychological mechanism that runs counter to deliberative ideals is 
motivated reasoning, wherein individuals search for information that confirms their 
pre-existing beliefs in order to mitigate the cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) 
that arises when information contradicts beliefs (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998; 
Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Luthgens, & Moscovici, 2000; Taber & Lodge, 2006). The con-
cern this raises is that when individuals are exposed to alternative viewpoints 
through deliberation, they will double down on their pre-deliberation opinions, thus 
becoming more extreme in their views. This effect has been found in some studies 
that involved group or interpersonal discussion, albeit not structured deliberations 
(Mutz, 2006; Tetlock & Kim, 1987).
Other possible effects of deliberation that could be thought of as deleterious have 
also been considered by skeptics of deliberation. For example, some have cited 
research on group conformity pressures to suggest that although deliberation may 
cause individuals’ attitudes within groups to move closer to one another, this 
 consensus may be suboptimal if it is simply a reflection of the majority’s 
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pre- deliberation opinions and not influenced by new and relevant information 
(Isenberg, 1986; Myers et al., 1980). The “consensus” reached through discussion 
may even be disingenuous as individuals wish simply to avoid conflict and maintain 
a positive image in the group (Davis et al., 1989). Further, as opinions within groups 
conform to one another, this may lead to greater divergence between groups. 
Empirical evidence exists showing these effects can occur in some instances (Insko 
et  al., 1993; Schkade, Sunstein, & Kahneman, 2000; see Muhlberger, Gonzalez, 
PytlikZillig, Hutchens, & Tomkins, 2017 for a summary of the different types of 
attitude change that may occur via deliberation).
4.3  What Works, for What Purposes, Under What 
Conditions, and Why?
In line with the framework set forth throughout this book, we proceed in this chap-
ter by considering what works to impact attitudes in deliberation and why. We 
tracked changes in students’ attitudes toward nanotechnology over the course of 
the semester and examined effects that our experimental manipulations had on 
these attitudes to understand what features had impacts on attitudes or attitude 
change and why.
4.3.1  For What Purposes?
We begin by considering the purposes for which the deliberative engagement is 
occurring, as this is a fairly subjective yet crucial decision that sets the tone for how 
a deliberation might be structured and how the data will be analyzed. In a broad 
sense, deliberative theorists have debated for decades whether and how attitudes 
“should” change as a function of deliberation, as described above.
Regardless of whether or not there is a desired direction for attitudes to shift via 
the deliberation, there are certain outcomes that are by and large seen as adverse. 
Most deliberations are not conducted with the goal of getting people to ignore 
alternative viewpoints and double down on their original opinions or getting peo-
ple to come to a consensus around an extreme viewpoint that is uninformed or 
problematic in some way. As such, it is usually desirable not only to estimate the 
degree to which “desirable” attitudinal processes have occurred but also the degree 
to which “undesirable” attitudinal process have occurred. In this chapter,1 we 
1 In a separate manuscript that uses the data from Study 5, we develop a statistical model for pars-
ing out the distinct types of attitude change and polarization, which may be of use to those con-
cerned about multiple possible outcomes of deliberation (Muhlberger, Gonzalez, PytlikZillig, 
Hutchens, & Tomkins, 2017). Although the model is easily estimable using OLS regression, the 
model remains somewhat involved, so we do not use it in this chapter.
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present results from basic analyses that straightforwardly examine changes in 
attitudes as well as attitude extremitization as a function of time and experimental 
condition.
4.3.2  What Works, Under What Conditions, and Why?
The experimental manipulations used in our studies were chosen broadly to reflect 
commonly varied features of deliberations and to examine their impacts on our 
primary dependent variables of interest (in this chapter, attitudes). A variety of 
experimental manipulations have been used in other research to examine how atti-
tudes change in response to deliberation or discussion occurring under different 
contexts. Perhaps most common are examinations of the effects of face-to-face dis-
cussion. As we have already described above, the outcomes of face-to-face discus-
sion have been shown to vary, ranging from increased cooperation to polarization. 
In Studies 2, 3, and 4, we manipulated whether students discussed their views 
toward nanotechnology in groups or simply reflected upon their views alone. In 
doing so, we were able to experimentally test the degree to which face-to-face dis-
cussion influenced students’ attitudes and, if so, how.
In our studies, we separated the time when students learned new information about 
nanotechnology from the time when they discussed nanotechnology in groups. As 
such, we were able to isolate, to some degree, one of the reasons why discussion has 
the effects that it does. Researchers disagree regarding whether the effects of group 
discussion on changes in people’s attitudes are due to social influence (e.g., conformity 
pressures), to learning new information, or some mix of these two factors. If the effects 
of group discussion on attitudes are due to social influence, we should expect attitudes 
to change after group discussion. This would suggest those organizing a deliberation 
should make sure to either enhance or diminish social interaction accordingly. 
However, if the effects are due simply to new information, attitude change should be 
concentrated after students learn new information, but not after group discussion. The 
implication would be that group discussion may not be necessary for attitude change.
The composition of attitudes that exist within discussion groups has been found to 
matter substantially as well, when it comes to predicting changes in attitudes. For 
example, if a majority opinion exists, opinions will tend to move toward that pre- 
existing majority opinion (Schkade, Sunstein, & Kahneman, 2000). But other aspects 
of the discussion, like the degree to which group norms place value on original or 
innovative arguments (Moscovici, 1985) or whether the discussion is aimed at reach-
ing a particular decision rather than simply having discussion for discussion’s sake 
(Smith, Tindale, & Dugoni, 1996), can determine the relative impact of minority opin-
ions (e.g., Bettencourt & Dorr, 1998; Maass & Clark, 1984; Moscovici & Mugny, 
1983; see also, Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004; Mendelberg, 2002). Further, 
Gaertner and Dovidio have shown under the framework of the common ingroup iden-
tity model that encouraging interaction between subgroups within a larger group can 
facilitate cooperation and reduce intergroup bias (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2014). 
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In Study 5, we varied a facet of attitude composition within groups that has been 
hypothesized to be central in some previous work (e.g., Mendelberg, 2002): attitudi-
nal homogeneity. Specifically, all students participated in group discussion during 
Assignment 3 in Study 5, and we manipulated whether or not the groups were com-
prised of like-minded individuals in terms of attitudes toward nanotechnology—i.e., 
some groups were attitudinally homogeneous, and others were attitudinally heteroge-
neous. By manipulating the attitudinal homogeneity of discussion groups, we were 
able to shed light on the conditions under which group discussion might lead to one 
outcome (e.g., increased consensus) versus another (e.g., increased polarization).
We also used individual-level personality variables to investigate potential mod-
erators of the effects we examined, to advance understanding of why or for whom 
attitudinal homogeneity within groups might matter. For example, it may be 
expected that individuals in attitudinally homogenous discussion groups are the 
most likely to become more extreme in their views after deliberation, due to homog-
enous discussion resulting in more closed-mindedness to other opinions that do not 
fit with the group’s view. If that is the case, the effect might diminish among indi-
viduals who are high on openness to experience (i.e., individuals who are more 
amenable to the idea of changing their views based on exposure to alternative per-
spectives). This would suggest certain personality variables like openness are 
important to track during deliberations.
Aside from the different ways in which group discussion can occur, variations in 
how deliberation occurs at the individual level have also been shown to influence 
attitude change. For example, analytical thinking plays an important role because 
although individuals who tend to think analytically are more likely to deliberate and 
make valid arguments (Cacioppo et al., 1996), they are also more likely to resist 
alternative views (Petty et al., 1995). When individuals are made to feel accountable 
in some way for their decisions, they are more likely to evaluate information objec-
tively and deliberate in an effortful manner (e.g., Tetlock & Kim, 1987). Finally, 
through the activation of particular emotional states, individuals can be encouraged 
to seek out new information and interaction with others (e.g., Marcus, Neuman, & 
MacKuen, 2000). These findings suggest that by changing the way individuals 
engage with and process information during a deliberation, it may be possible to 
change the way their attitudes are influenced. In all of our studies, we manipulated 
the degree to which students were encouraged to think critically throughout the 
study. These manipulations allowed us to investigate the role of deliberative, ana-
lytical thought in driving attitude change over the course of the semester.
4.4  Results
We describe our results regarding attitude change and polarization in two sections. 
In the first section below, we examine the trends in students’ attitudes toward nano-
technology over the course of the semester across each of the four studies. In the 
second section, we examine the effects of the experimental manipulations used in 
each study. We examine three types of attitude change: attitude shifts (taking into 
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account direction of change), absolute attitude change (attitude change regardless 
of direction), and attitude extremitization (attitude change in the direction of one’s 
prior attitudes). We are particularly interested in absolute change and extremitiza-
tion because these analyses give us some sense of the degree to which individuals 
are changing their minds and refining their opinions in general, as well as the degree 
to which attitude consensus versus polarization is occurring. The normative out-
comes desired by most deliberative theorists entail some degree of attitude change—
i.e., participants should be altering their attitudes based on new information learned 
during the deliberation; if their attitudes remain the same, then perhaps the expense 
of having a deliberation is wasted. However, if participants are simply becoming 
more extreme in their prior views, this would be counter to the ideals of most delib-
erative theorists—hence the importance of measuring extremitization.
We focus here on our broad measures of students’ attitudes toward nanotechnol-
ogy, as these measures are the most consistent across studies. Specifically, all stud-
ies contained an item measuring the degree to which students believed the benefits 
of nanotechnological development outweigh the risks or vice versa (using a Likert 
scale ranging from 1 to 5 or 1 to 7), as well as an item measuring how much regula-
tion or deregulation students believed there should be regarding nanotechnological 
development (measured on a sliding scale from 0 to 100). Various other, more spe-
cific attitude measures are available within each study (see Chap. 2 and 
Supplementary Materials) but are not analyzed here.
We keep our analyses simple. To examine attitude shifts over the course of the 
semester, we use paired sample t-tests. We use one-way ANOVAs to gauge whether 
mean differences between experimental conditions are significant. We transformed 
student responses to the two attitude items into six dependent variables: Mean atti-
tudes were simply the average score across individuals on each attitude item. Mean 
absolute change for each item was calculated as the mean absolute value of attitude 
change from the time of the manipulation to a given measure administered later (i.e., 
the average amount of attitude change regardless of direction). Finally, mean levels 
of extremitization, or movement in the direction of one’s prior attitudes, were calcu-
lated the same way as mean absolute change except that movement in the same direc-
tion as one’s prior attitude score (i.e., movement away from the midpoint of the 
scale) was positive and movement in the opposite direction of one’s prior attitude 
score (i.e., movement toward or even past the midpoint of the scale) was negative (for 
individuals whose prior attitudes were exactly at the midpoint of the scale, movement 
in either direction was coded as positive). Overall, significant interactions between 
conditions were rare in our data and fairly weak when they did exist. We therefore 
present main effects.
4.4.1  Attitude Change over Time
Figure 4.1 illustrates mean attitude scores over the course of the semester for each 
study for both of our primary attitude items. Across all studies, students started with 
fairly optimistic views toward the benefits versus risks of nanotechnology but also 
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Fig. 4.1 Attitude shifts over the semester. Greater values on the y-axis for “Risks-Benefits” indi-
cate greater valuation of the benefits over the risks of nanotechnological development; greater 
values on the y-axis for “Regulation Slider” indicate preferences for less regulation and more 
development of nanotechnology; for Assignment 1 in Study 2, the response options ranged only 
from 1 to 5 and so were rescaled to range from 1 to 7 such that 2, 3, 4, and 5 were recoded to 3, 4, 
5, and 7, respectively; the Regulation Slider item was not asked during Assignment 1 in Study 2
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generally favored regulation of nanotechnology rather than development (higher 
scores on the deregulation items indicate support for fewer regulations). Over the 
semester, significant changes in aggregate attitudes occurred but were modest. In all 
studies except Study 3, students generally became more cautious toward nanotech-
nology over the course of the semester, placing more weight on the risks (vs. bene-
fits) of nanotechnological development and becoming more supportive of regulation 
(vs. deregulation).
A closer look at the changes over time indicated that, although the overall pattern 
was toward caution, in most cases, students first moved toward regulation and then 
rebounded toward deregulation by exhibiting a statistically significant shift between 
the last two attitude measures.2 The shifts during the first few assignments and then 
the slight increase in a less cautious direction between the last two assignments 
could be interpreted as reflecting deliberative quality: as students learn more about 
nanotechnology, the allure of new technology may be somewhat eclipsed by new 
knowledge that there are risks involved. Then, as students have more time to think 
about the issues, they rebound a bit—taking on more moderate stances. However, 
the overall shift was still significant and toward feeling more cautious toward nano-
technology. Study 3 is the exception because students steadily became less cautious 
toward nanotechnology across all assignments. Nonetheless, across studies, aggre-
gate attitude changes were by no means drastic.
Despite these trends, looking at aggregate patterns can be misleading. It could be 
that substantial attitude changes occurred in individuals, but the changes canceled 
out on average across persons. As such, we look to Fig. 4.2 for an illustration of how 
the mean absolute change in attitudes varied across each semester. Even when 
examining absolute change, there was no case in which we saw evidence of drastic 
attitude change. In all cases, mean levels of absolute change were low. Differences 
between time points within semesters, though, tended to be statistically significant, 
suggesting some time points exhibited significantly more change than others. In 
general (except for absolute change regarding the deregulation item in Study 2 and 
the benefit item in Study 3), most of the attitude change that occurred tended to take 
place between the first two assignments—that is, prior to being given any informa-
tion about nanotechnology. This suggests that counter to what many deliberative 
theorists would consider “optimal,” the largest one-time attitude changes occurred 
between the time people were initially exposed to the topic (when they were asked 
questions about nanotechnology and told they would be informed about and discuss 
the topic later) and actual exposure (possibly reflecting self-seeking of information) 
rather than during the main deliberative activities. According to the results in Studies 
2 through 4 (except for the cases mentioned above), most participants changed their 
2 This pattern held for all cases except in Study 3 and in Study 2 with regard to the risks versus 
benefits of nanotechnology.
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Fig. 4.2 Mean absolute change in attitudes over the semester. Greater values on the y-axis indicate 
greater levels of attitude change from the prior Assignment (regardless of direction); for Assignment 
1 in Study 2, the response options ranged only from 1 to 5 and so were rescaled to range from 1 to 
7 such that 2, 3, 4, and 5 were recoded to 3, 4, 5, and 7, respectively; the Regulation Slider item 
was not asked during Assignment 1 in Study 2
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minds even before they were given detailed information about the topic or had the 
chance to discuss the topic with others in the context of our study.
Although the absolute change in attitudes during the deliberative activities was 
small, we would caution against too much pessimism for a number of reasons. 
First, although not overwhelming, the mean level of absolute change in attitudes 
across all time points and all studies is above zero, suggesting people are not 
entirely static in their opinions during the deliberative activities. Also, it is impor-
tant to note here that low levels of attitude change are not necessarily counter to 
deliberative ideals, as some have argued that what is important is the development 
of respect for alternative opinions rather than changing one’s own opinion (Cohen 
1998). Arguably more important is the degree to which extremitization—the most 
deleterious potential outcome of deliberation—did or did not occur in our data. 
We turn to that next.
Figure 4.3 shows mean levels of attitude extremitization across our studies. 
These values were computed by averaging the extent to which people changed their 
attitudes toward a more extreme view relative to their last reported attitude (result-
ing in positive values) or toward a more moderate or opposite view relative to their 
last reported attitude (resulting in negative values). Zero reflects no change in atti-
tude. Our data does not show substantial levels of attitude extremitization at any 
time point during any of our studies. Average levels of extremitization tended to 
hover around zero, suggesting that the extent to which individuals became moderate 
in their opinions was at about the same level as others became more extreme. When 
significant changes did occur in extremitization, it was such that students became 
more likely to moderate their opinions, not that they became more extreme. That is, 
there were several instances in which extremitization scores went from below zero 
at the beginning of the semester (indicating movement toward more moderate 
views) to approximately zero by the end of the semester (indicating no further 
movement).
Of course, it could still be the case that differences in attitudes, absolute change 
in attitudes, or extremitization varied by different conditions. As such, we turn to 
our analyses regarding the effects of our experimental conditions to obtain a clearer 
picture of how people’s attitudes changed in our data.
4.4.2  Encouraging Critical Thinking
A key factor in any public deliberation is the degree to which participants engage in 
critical thinking. On the one hand, effortful thought, scrutiny, and consideration of 
alternative viewpoints are often believed to be essential to successful deliberation, 
in part because critical thinking should (according to pro-deliberation theorists) lead 
people to think more objectively. In some cases, this might mean individuals become 
aware of the weaknesses of their own views and strengths of others’ views and 
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Fig. 4.3 Mean attitude extremitization over the semester. Greater values on the y-axis indicate 
greater levels of attitude change from the prior Assignment in the direction of being more extreme 
in the same direction as their attitudes in the prior Assignment (positive values indicate movement 
to a more extreme position and negative values indicate movement in the opposite direction; in 
cases where one’s previous attitudes were at the exact midpoint of the scale, movement in either 
direction is considered extremitization and thus receives positive values); for Assignment 1  in 
Study 2, the response options ranged only from 1 to 5 and so were rescaled to range from 1 to 7 
such that 2, 3, 4, and 5 were recoded to 3, 4, 5, and 7, respectively; the Regulation Slider item was 
not asked during Assignment 1 in Study 2
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subsequently moderate their opinions. In other cases, research as well as sheer logic 
may come down concretely on one side of an issue, and so critical thinking may lead 
people to a specific point of view, which may even lay at the “extreme” end of the 
attitudinal spectrum. This may be desirable if the goal of the deliberation is more 
informed opinions rather than moderate opinions.
On the other hand, some research suggests critical thinking might lead to 
increased polarization rather than consensus. The argument here is that instead of 
leading to cool, open-minded consideration of alternative viewpoints, critical think-
ing may involve rationalization of one’s previously held views and thus higher lev-
els of attitude extremity (e.g., Kahan et al., 2012).
Table 4.1 contains the results of our analyses examining the effects of critical 
thinking prompts on attitude change and polarization regarding both dependent 
variables. Results are shown across all four studies and across all assignments fol-
lowing the manipulation within each study. That is, for each study the table shows 
the mean attitude score, mean absolute change in attitudes, and mean attitude 
extremitization during each assignment subsequent to the first administration of the 
critical thinking or alternative conditions (the first administration of the critical 
thinking manipulation is Assignment 2 in all studies). Note that in Study 2, there 
was an additional experimental condition beyond just the critical thinking and feed-
back (control) conditions called the information organization condition (mentioned 
in Chap. 2).
We start by describing the results regarding absolute change in attitudes and 
attitude extremitization because those are the most related to our expectations from 
the existing literature. In terms of differences in absolute change in attitudes, the 
modal outcome was no significant differences between conditions (this was the case 
in 66 out of 72 or 92% of comparisons). However, when significant differences did 
exist, they were mostly consistent. In Study 4 during Assignment 2-Post and 
Assignment 3 (for both the benefit item and the deregulation item) and in Study 5 
during Assignment 4 (for just the deregulation item), being in the critical thinking 
condition was associated with less absolute change in attitudes. Thus, the majority 
of cases exhibited no significant differences between the critical thinking and feed-
back conditions, but when differences did arise, they suggested people were less 
likely to change their minds if exposed to the critical thinking prompts.
With regard to extremitization, the modal outcome was again no significant dif-
ferences between conditions (just as with absolute change, this was the case in 66 
out of 72 or 92% of comparisons). The majority of significant differences were 
evident in Study 3. Across all assignments in Study 3, being in the critical thinking 
condition was associated with attitude moderation (i.e., moving toward or past the 
midpoint on the scale) in terms of weighing the risks against the benefits of nano-
technological development, whereas being in the feedback (control) condition was 
associated with extremitization. There were a couple of marginal (p < 0.10) differ-
ences in the opposite direction in Study 4 (where those in the feedback condition 
moderated their opinions but those in the critical thinking condition did not), but the 
opposite effects were never as large as those found in Study 3, and critical thinkers 
never were found to become more extreme.
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When considering directional attitude change, for the most part, the critical 
thinking manipulations did not have an effect on attitude shifts in a particular 
direction. However, there are several instances of significant effects, and the 
direction of the effect is consistent in all cases but one. During Assignment 4  in 
Study 3, being in the critical thinking condition led to more negative attitudes 
toward  nanotechnology (believing the risks outweigh benefits) than being in the 
feedback condition. This same relationship was evident in Assignments 2 and 4 of 
Study 3. However, average attitudes toward regulation of nanotechnology were 
never affected by the critical thinking manipulations.
Overall, then, any effects of critical thinking were somewhat sporadic, but when 
there were differences, participants sometimes became more negative yet while 
showing less attitude movement in the critical thinking conditions. Results gener-
ally suggest the primary effect of our critical thinking prompts on attitude change 
and variation is potentially moderation of attitudes but, more often, no effect. 
Despite not suggesting a single, widespread effect of critical thinking, our findings 
are notable. Our findings suggest that critical thinking is not universally causing 
people to refine (change) their opinions as deliberative theory purports, but it is also 
not causing polarization or extremitization.
4.4.3  Information Format
The formatting of information read by participants in a deliberation may seem like 
a trivial matter when it comes to their attitudes toward the topics at hand, but sub-
stantial variation exists across public deliberations in how information is presented, 
if at all. Researchers and policymakers—especially those focused on science and 
technology issues—often seek not only to measure public opinion via deliberations 
but also to inform and potentially guide it. As such, it is particularly common during 
deliberations over science and technology issues for information to be provided to 
participants that gives them a basic understanding of the topic. A reasonable con-
cern for those who organize deliberations is how the ways in which they present 
information to participants might shift their opinions.
Throughout our studies, Assignment 2 served as a time for students to read back-
ground information about nanotechnology and nanogenomics, and in Studies 3 
through 5, we manipulated the information as described in Chap. 2. The manipula-
tions used in Studies 3 and 4 had to do with whether or not the risks and benefits of 
nanotechnological development were shown as alternative perspectives (pro-con 
condition) or simply in paragraph form without any clear division into opposing 
perspectives (topical condition). These differences in formatting have clear practical 
relevance, as the pro-con formatting was based off of the formatting used by the 
National Issues Forum, an organization whose specific aims include encouraging a 
shared understanding of issues across diverse views. It is often believed by many 
deliberation practitioners that by directly exposing people to opposing viewpoints, 
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they will see the potential weaknesses in their own views and strengths in others’ 
views, and this will improve the quality of deliberation (Gutmann & Thompson, 
1996, 2009; Habermas, 1989, 1996; Fishkin, 1991). However, it may also be 
possible that by explicitly presenting issues as split into groups of opposing views, 
the background information may be politicizing the issues and making it easier for 
participants to become polarized. Group distinctions may become more salient, 
which may diminish the potential for compromise (Bettencourt & Dorr, 1998).
As discussed in Chap. 2, Study 5 used the NIF format for all participants and 
implemented a weak versus strong background information manipulation, which var-
ied the degree to which sources and evidence were provided to back up arguments, the 
use of opinion-based claims, and the extent to which the information was balanced. 
This manipulation allowed us to test a fairly straightforward set of competing hypoth-
eses. On the one hand, it could be the case that overly positive information, despite 
being poorly supported and stated, led to more positive views toward nanotechnology. 
On the other hand, the overly positive information could lead to a backlash effect 
because of it being weakly supported, with participants becoming more cautious.
The results regarding information format in Studies 2 through 4 were sporadic. Some 
differences existed, but, for the most part, there was not a consistent effect of the informa-
tion format. The most consistent results regarding information format occurred with 
regard to attitude shifts during Study 5, when the information varied in terms of “strength.”
In Study 5, the strong information condition consistently led to greater concern 
about the risks of nanotechnology. A reasonable interpretation of this pattern of 
results might be that conditions in which people were exposed to more balanced and 
well-supported information led to greater concern regarding the risks of nanotech-
nology. This suggests the deliberative ideals of balanced, unbiased information may 
not necessarily yield polarization but may nonetheless lead individuals to view new 
technology more cautiously. However, none of these effects carried over to mean 
attitudes regarding deregulation. There were only small and inconsistent differences 
associated with mean absolute attitude change.
There are various other information formats that might have different effects on 
attitudes, and results may differ further depending on the topic. Here, the topic 
(nanotechnology) was fairly novel for most participants (see Chap. 3), and so it 
should be expected that the background information would have a substantial impact 
on how participants formed their opinions toward the matter. Several significant 
shifts were evident, and there were some differences by formatting condition that 
were somewhat telling. If anything, framing the issue in terms of opposing perspec-
tives rather than using a more topical approach to laying out benefits and risks had 
a conservatizing effect on attitudes in the aggregate. However, these effects were 
small. This leaves room for examining possible mediators or moderators of these 
effects or for studies looking at why attitudes toward a novel issue like nanotechnol-
ogy would not be substantially impacted by learning about the topic.
4.4 Results
80
4.4.4  The Effects of Group Discussion
Group discussion is a central feature of deliberations and is particularly relevant to 
expectations regarding attitude change and polarization. Indeed, various scholars in 
psychology, communications, and political science have studied the effects of group 
discussion on attitude change, some even focusing specifically on the implications 
for public deliberation. All in all, the results of empirical work on the topic are 
mixed and suggest a range of possible outcomes of group discussion during delib-
eration as described earlier.
In our first few studies, we sought simply to examine if attitudes differed as a 
function of whether or not students discussed the issues with a group or not. As 
such, in Studies 2 through 4, we randomly assigned some students to discuss ethical 
scenarios related to nanotechnological development in groups and others to con-
sider the ethical scenarios alone, on their own. In Study 3, some students were also 
placed in one of the two conditions using an online wiki forum, which we used 
simply as pilot data due to the lack of random assignment (see Chap. 2).
Surprisingly (given the extant literature on the subject), we found no significant 
effects on attitudes of being in a group versus being alone when considering the 
ethical scenarios except for a few marginal and contradictory differences. This 
could suggest that the primary attitude changes that occur during consideration of 
the ethical aspects of scientific and technological development are due mainly to 
thinking about the issues prior to discussion, rather than during discussion with oth-
ers. This would cast some doubt over claims about the power of social influence 
over people’s attitudes, at least when it comes to deliberation about science and 
technology. On the other hand, discussion with others may play a role in motivating 
people to read and consider new information in more ordinary contexts in which 
people cannot be told to sit and think about an issue.
4.4.5  The Features of Group Discussion: Homogeneity 
and Facilitator Activity
In Study 5, we wanted to delve into the features of group discussion that might 
affect attitudes and polarization. Although there were no significant differences 
between the alone and group conditions in Studies 2 through 4, group discussion is 
a central part of many public deliberations, and so we wanted to further explore if 
particular features of a group discussion affect participants’ attitudes. Therefore, in 
Study 5, all students discussed the ethical scenarios of Assignment 3 in groups. We 
manipulated two features of the discussion: the attitudinal homogeneity of the group 
and the activities of the discussion facilitators who were instructed to lead the group 
in an active or passive manner as noted in Chap. 2.
Manipulating the homogeneity of the group was directly inspired by the existing 
psychology literature on small group discussions. A central aspect of the scholarly 
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disagreement over whether or not deliberation will lead to consensus rather than 
polarization has to do with the psychological consequences of encountering view-
points that differ from one’s own. To put it simply, those optimistic about the effects 
of deliberation suggest that being exposed to alternative viewpoints will lead people 
to develop an appreciation for other opinions, thus yielding lower levels of 
variability in attitudes, whereas those less optimistic about the effects of 
deliberation suggest people will become resistant and double down on their original 
opinions, thus yielding increased polarization and variability. Homogeneity, alter-
natively, may lead group members to reinforce one another’s pre-existing opinions, 
or it may lead group members to realize the “one-sidedness” of their group’s opin-
ions and search for alternatives.
Surprisingly, across assignments, there were no cases in which attitudes, abso-
lute change, or extremitization differed significantly across discussion conditions. 
Prior research suggests that, at the least, attitudes should move around more in het-
erogeneous groups, either because individuals are attending to alternative view-
points and coming to more reasoned opinions or because individuals are doubling 
down on their original opinions (thus becoming more extreme in the direction of 
their original opinions). We found no evidence of extremitization or increased atti-
tude movement in general when individuals were in heterogeneous versus homoge-
neous groups. Optimistically speaking, this means that we find no evidence of what 
has been feared by many skeptics—that is, polarization via motivated reasoning and 
resistance to alternative views. Yet this also means that deliberative theorists’ hopes 
that exposure to alternative perspectives will lead people to acknowledge others’ 
opinions and change their minds also are unrealized in our data.
The manipulations regarding the role of discussion facilitators were driven more 
by practical concerns. There is substantial variation in whether or not public delibera-
tions utilize discussion facilitators, and among those that use facilitators, there is sub-
stantial variation in how those facilitators are instructed to guide discussion (if they 
are instructed at all). As such, we sought to shed light on the ramifications of an active 
facilitator relative to one who steps aside and lets participants guide the discussion.
In our data, we found no evidence of attitude differences between the passive and 
active facilitator conditions. Taking into account the null results regarding group 
homogeneity as well as the manipulations of whether or not students discussed the 
topics in a group at all, our findings regarding group discussion seem quite straight-
forward. We seem to be left with astonishingly little support for the hypotheses 
derived from existing literature.
4.4.6  A Potential Moderator of Homogeneity
Before we conclude that the dynamics of group discussion have no meaningful effects 
on attitudes, we briefly examine whether some aspect of personality might play a sig-
nificant moderating role. In line with the overarching framework of this book, we 
would like to emphasize that although we observed only minor evidence of attitude 
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change and extremitization in our data in the aggregate, and although most of the effects 
of the experimental conditions were either weak, inconsistent, or insignificant, it is pos-
sible that we may have missed something by averaging over participants. As such, we 
look at how personality—specifically, openness—might have played a role in driving 
our findings. We focus particularly on the potential moderating role of openness on the 
effects of group homogeneity on attitude change and extremitization in Study 5.
We utilized a variable reflecting trait openness to experience that we measured 
during Assignment 1 in Study 5 as the average of students’ responses to four items, 
each of which ranged from 1 to 7 (see Chap. 2 and supplemental materials). The 
variable was coded so that higher values indicated higher levels of openness to 
experience. We interacted this variable with the variable for the homogeneity condi-
tion to predict absolute attitude change as well as extremitization during Assignments 
3 and 4 in Study 5. The goal was to see if the effects of group homogeneity depended 
on individuals’ trait levels of openness to experience.
With regard to absolute attitude change, we found a significant interaction in the 
expected direction but only when the homogenous groups were positive toward nano-
technology. Specifically, we found that among students who scored low in openness, 
there was no significant difference in absolute attitude change between students who 
were in a heterogeneous group or in a homogeneous group. However, among students 
who scored high in openness, there was significantly more attitude change in heteroge-
neous groups than in positive homogeneous groups. Students with high openness in 
negative homogeneous groups showed a statistical trend in the same direction. In other 
words, the expectation from the existing literature—that group heterogeneity and 
exposure to alternative viewpoints would lead people to alter their opinions—was only 
supported among students high in openness. Importantly, though, this moderation was 
only evident with regard to risks versus benefits item assessed during Assignment 3.
With regard to attitude extremitization, interactions are significant when predicting 
responses to the deregulation item for both Assignments 3 and 4, but the interactions are 
not significant predicting the risks versus benefits item. The pattern of the interactions 
corroborates the role of openness as suggested above with regard to absolute attitude 
change. Among students low in openness, being in the heterogeneous condition is asso-
ciated with greater extremitization, but among students high in openness, being in the 
heterogeneous condition is associated with less extremitization than being in the homo-
geneous conditions (although, only significantly so in comparison to the negative 
homogeneous condition). Said differently, in the heterogeneous condition, openness is 
associated with lower levels of extremitization, whereas in the homogeneous condi-
tions, openness is associated with greater levels of extremitization. Individuals low in 
openness seem most likely to polarize in the face of alternative views, but it is those who 
are high in openness that seem most ready to “rally the wagons” and become more 
extreme in their views around like- minded others. This interaction is shown in Fig. 4.4.
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4.5  Conclusion: What We Have Learned and Where 
to Go from Here
Gauging, and at times shaping, public opinion is often a primary goal of public delib-
erations regarding scientific and technological development. Scientists and investors 
need to understand public opinion and the factors that impact it in order to know how 
to develop their research or technology in a publicly acceptable manner. Policymakers 
need to understand public opinion in order to know what regulations the public wants 
as well as how the public might react as development progresses. Further, 
researchers, investors, and policymakers may be interested in easing the fears of an 
apprehensive constituency or warning an overzealous public of the risks of a particu-
lar research program or technology. Finally, compared to opinion surveys that allow 
respondents to breeze through questions about exotic issues without serious consid-
eration, deliberation can offer an opportunity for scientists and policymakers to 
understand where public opinion might go as citizens are exposed to and learn more 
about new, frontline technologies and research areas. Public deliberations offer an 
ideal setting for researchers and policymakers to interact with the public in these 
Fig. 4.4 Interaction between group homogeneity and openness predicting attitude extremitiza-
tion. Greater values on the y-axis indicate greater levels of attitude change from the prior 
Assignment in the direction of being more extreme in the same direction as their attitudes in the 
prior Assignment (positive values indicate movement to a more extreme position and negative 
values indicate movement in the opposite direction; in cases where one’s previous attitudes were 
at the exact midpoint of the scale, movement in either direction is considered extremitization and 
thus receives positive values); the left panel reflects the heterogeneous condition, the middle panel 
reflects the negative homogeneous condition, and the right panel reflects the positive homogeneous 
condition; trait openness is represented on the x-axis
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ways. However, as we have discussed throughout this book, the particular features of 
a public deliberation can have substantial implications for how participants view 
scientific and technological progress. In this chapter, we presented a brief smattering 
of results aimed at shedding light on the main effects of particular features of delib-
eration on attitude change and polarization. These results are far from exhaustive of 
the ways in which features of public deliberation might affect attitudes, and we 
encourage researchers and policymakers to dive deeper using our data as well as 
additional studies.
In general, we saw that in our studies, participants’ attitudes toward nanotechnology 
varied somewhat over time but not greatly. In all but one study, students became more 
cautious about nanotechnology over time—but experienced a slight shift toward 
becoming more positive again by the end of the study. We did not identify any drastic 
attitude changes, but there were several manipulations that had notable impacts. 
Further, we may have missed something by averaging across the samples. Do some 
types of people change more than others? Are the effects of different features of delib-
eration universal across types of people? Indeed, we found that the various predictions 
from the existing literature regarding group dynamics in deliberative discussions were 
differentially supported depending on participants’ trait openness.
The manipulations we implemented across our studies all demonstrated some 
level of consistency in the direction of their effects, but significant differences were 
sporadic and modest. The most consistent findings seemed to be that critical think-
ing prompts and information structured in terms of alternative perspectives moved 
participants toward more heavily weighing the risks of nanotechnology and to some 
degree led to less attitude change but in a direction of becoming less extreme when 
change did occur. However, even these findings were not entirely consistent through-
out studies. This suggests that the features of deliberation we manipulated are 
indeed promising as potential subjects for further investigation, but it cannot be said 
that these features have large and ubiquitous effects on attitudes in the population 
studied. On the one hand, this means we have yet to uncover features of deliberation 
that consistently produce “positive” outcomes. On the other hand, it means the 
manipulations we implemented, which reflect commonly used features in promi-
nent deliberations, did not result in the adverse outcomes feared by skeptics. 
Furthermore, as we showed with our investigation of trait openness, there are likely 
various mediators and moderators of the effects of the features we looked at, which 
can be examined using our data or in future studies.
Attitude change and polarization are issues that public deliberation organizers 
cannot afford to ignore. Polarization and gridlock on scientific and technological 
issues can put a complete halt to development, as can widespread public skepticism. 
Yet too much enthusiasm can lead policymakers to forgo the careful consideration 
necessary to form effective regulations. Public deliberations offer researchers and 
policymakers an opportunity to nip these potential crises in the bud. However, a sci-
entific understanding of the effects of different features of deliberation is necessary 
in order to ensure that deliberation does not make things worse instead of better.
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Abstract This chapter focuses on the predictors of policy acceptance and upon 
elucidating the pathways through which different features of public engage-
ment might impact such acceptance—especially when a policy is not preferred. 
Examination of the relationships between experimentally varied features of 
engagement and policy acceptance suggests few, if any, main effects of different 
features. There is even less evidence that any of the engagement features change 
the relationship between policy preferences and policy acceptance. However, a 
more fine- grained analysis suggests a more nuanced story. There was evidence 
that certain features of engagement, such as promoting discussion or encourag-
ing critical thinking, impacted mediators and moderators such as conscientious 
engagement and negative perceptions of the information that was provided. These 
mediating or moderating variables, in turn, impacted policy acceptance and/or the 
relationship between policy preferences and policy acceptance—sometimes in a 
manner that suggested competing pathways were at work, cancelling one another 
out, and resulting in our apparent “null effects.” Our results also varied dependent 
upon whether the policy context was one of relative risk (promoting the develop-
ment of nanotechnology) or one of relative status quo (promoting slow develop-
ment and higher regulation of nanotechnology). Thus, our results suggest a fuller 
understanding of the impacts of engagement features on hoped-for outcomes (like 
policy acceptance) requires careful attention to causal pathways that operate in 
different policy contexts.
Keywords Policy acceptance · Policy preference · Policy resistance · Regulation · 
Process fairness · Process perceptions · Procedural justice
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5.1  Introduction
When President Trump indicated he might not accept the results of the 2016  election, 
the protests were loud and numerous. The USA prides itself on peaceful transitions 
of power, and, for some, Trump’s reluctance to say he would accept the election 
results if he lost was taken as a lack of loyalty and commitment to democracy. Real 
Americans, one could argue, accept the outcomes of our democratic processes, 
whether we like them or not, especially when it comes to transitions of power. In his 
defense, Trump claimed that the processes might not be democratic at all, but 
instead “rigged.” But perhaps most interestingly, when Trump won the election, the 
tables turned. After the election, Trump appeared less concerned about the possibil-
ity that the wrong processes had been used, and others, likely including some others 
who had accused Trump of disrespecting our democracy, were now more concerned 
that maybe the election was rigged after all.
It seems clear that people’s assessments of decision-making processes and out-
comes are intertwined, with such assessments likely having bidirectional influences 
upon each other. The dual influences of perceived processes and outcomes have 
long been recognized in the literatures examining distributive justice, which focuses 
on the fairness of outcomes, and procedural justice, which focuses on the fairness of 
the procedures leading to those outcomes (Cropanzano & Folger, 1991; Lind & 
Tyler, 1988). Trust likely also plays a role (Brockner, 1996). Those most likely to 
question Trump’s commitment to democracy appeared to be those who also trusted 
him the least. Likewise, Trump’s own portrayal of the reasons why he might not 
accept the election results questioned the trustworthiness of the processes (are they 
fair or rigged?), the media (are they honest and competent or corrupt and incompe-
tent?), and the Democratic and even Republican parties (do they care about the 
American public or only about their own interests?).
In a democracy such as the USA, processes are put into place with the intention 
and hope that the outcome will be accepted, even if (or especially if) not preferred, 
on the basis that appropriate processes were used. Acceptance might also depend on 
perceptions that the involved parties behaved trustworthily during the processes 
(i.e., in competent, caring, honest ways) (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995) and 
can be trusted to follow and respect any implied outcomes of such processes. The 
outcomes are not always “accepted” entirely, but one hope that underlies our democ-
racy is that the outcomes will be at least sufficiently accepted for a time—at least 
until the time that they are overturned, again, via the appropriate processes, as 
opposed to via violence.
The key words here are “acceptance” and “appropriate processes.” Instead of 
having wars to decide who has power and who gets to decide what rules are in place, 
democracies have set up other processes by which to decide such things. Ideally, the 
best ideas will win, and people who disagree with decisions made through the estab-
lished processes will nonetheless accept—or at least tolerate and abide by such 
decisions—at least for a time, that is, until the time such that the decision is changed 
by additional rounds of appropriate processes.
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But what are appropriate processes? More central to the purposes of our studies, 
are there certain public engagement processes that can be used during decisions 
about policies, in order to increase public acceptance of decisions and the policies 
arising from such processes? Are there processes that might even reduce the impact 
of one’s policy preferences on policy acceptance, so that those who do not receive 
their preferred outcome are nonetheless willing to accept the outcome? Meanwhile, 
do any public engagement processes actually make things worse? Are there pro-
cesses that decrease the likelihood that people will accept policies that are not pre-
ferred? And in either case, what accounts for the linkages between various public 
engagement processes and policy acceptance?
In this chapter, we examine variables that predict acceptance or support of nano-
technology policies across one or more of our four studies. In so doing, we also 
examine whether our experimental manipulations impact some theorized mediators 
and moderators, such as process fairness, conscientious engagement, and trustwor-
thiness perceptions. Furthermore, given the importance of accepting polices even 
when they are not preferred, we explore factors that might alter the relationship 
between “policy preferences” and “policy acceptance,” by increasing or decreasing 
their dependence upon each other. As we give an overview of our results, we point 
to some findings that seem predictable and understandable. Other findings, how-
ever, may leave the reader (as well as we writers) uncomfortably searching for 
explanations. We hope this spurs more research and not just frustration. But before 
we get to that, let us first provide some theoretical context.
5.2  A Rough Draft Theory of Policy Preference, Acceptance, 
and Support
5.2.1  For What? Definitions and Relationships Between Some 
Key Variables
The outcome of greatest interest to this chapter is policy acceptance and support. 
While it may not always be important to make such fine-grained distinctions, 
because of our interest in whether certain public engagement processes might 
increase the acceptance or support of policies even when they are not preferred, we 
need to distinguish between such constructs. Currently, there is a noted lack of 
existing theory distinguishing and connecting policy preferences, acceptance, and 
support (Dreyer, Polis, & Jenkins, 2017). We draw from the little that we could find 
(e.g., see also Rau, Schweizer-Ries, & Hildebrandt, 2012), as well as literatures that 
we perceive might be related (i.e., the literatures relating to legitimacy and proce-
dural fairness) to develop our theoretical approach.
Our view of the relationships between constructs is illustrated in Fig. 5.1, which 
shows policy preference ranging from low to high along the horizontal dimension. 
We define policy preference as an evaluative attitude of preferring, liking, agreeing 
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with, and being “for” a given policy. Our construct of preference is similar to 
 constructs suggested by Schade and Schlag (2003) and Dreyer and colleagues’ 
(Dreyer & Walker, 2013). Notably, these authors used terms like acceptance and 
acceptability for their similar constructs—whereas we argue that “preference” is a 
better term and that acceptance should be viewed as distinct from preference.
We use the term policy acceptance to refer to judgments and evaluations about the 
policy being in place. As we asked our participants in Studies 2–4, do you agree that 
the government made the right decision [by adopting the policy]? Acceptance is 
expected to be strongly affected by policy preferences but also affected by other fac-
tors such as processes used to make the policy. One could, for example, express 
acceptance of a policy (or some political outcome, like a presidency, to return to our 
earlier example) that one does not prefer. This could happen perhaps due to an assess-
ment that the policy decision (or decision about who is in power) was arrived at fairly.
Although it is less important to our current analyses to distinguish between pol-
icy acceptance and support, we do so because it is important theoretically, and in 
case later it helps to make sense of some of our more puzzling results. Prior authors 
have distinguished policy support as reflecting behaviors, while constructs like pol-
icy preference or acceptance reflect attitudes (Batel, Devine-Wright, & Tangeland, 
2013; Dreyer, Teisl, & McCoy, 2015). Policy support (and its opposite, policy resis-
tance) is viewed as a behavioral expression of attitudes toward the policy. Therefore, 
models of policy acceptance and support generally view policy acceptance and non-
acceptance attitudes as perquisite to policy support and resistance behaviors.
Regarding the relationships between these constructs, as shown in Fig. 5.1, we 
theorize that policy acceptance, nonacceptance, and policy support and resistance 
usually occur in different zones of the policy preference dimension. Acceptance and 
support are expected to be more likely at higher levels of policy preference. 
Nonacceptance and resistance are expected to occur at lower levels of policy 
 preference. And like Dreyer and colleagues, we theorize that the boundary between 
acceptance and nonacceptance will occur at more moderate levels of policy prefer-
ence (i.e., closer to neutral) than active support and resistance.
Fig. 5.1 An illustration of the relationships conceptualized among policy preference attitudes 
(horizontal light-colored yellow line), acceptance/nonacceptance (double vertical blue border and 
zones to right and left of each), and support/resistance (subzones within the red nonacceptance and 
green acceptance zones, which begin at the point of the single vertical borders and extend to the 
extremes)
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5.2.2  What Works and How? Prior Research and Theory 
Concerning Factors Impacting Policy Acceptance 
and Support
In the past, and usually without carefully distinguishing between the constructs we 
just reviewed, a number of factors have been found to impact policy preference, 
acceptance, and support across a range of policy types. Although we do not test all 
of these relationships in the analyses presented in this chapter, the small black 
arrows shown in Fig. 5.1 reflect our current educated guesses as to examples of 
certain variables that may act more directly on each construct as defined here. For 
example, perceived fairness and effectiveness of a policy are commonly found to 
predict attitudes toward and willingness to support a policy (Drews & van den 
Bergh, 2016; Dreyer & Walker, 2013). Because the perceptions are appraisals 
directly relevant to the policies themselves, it is likely they most strongly correlate 
with and affect preferences for those policies.
As another example, Dreyer et al. (2015) note that whether or not people behave 
in a supportive way will be influenced by how much effort a behavior is required. 
They argue it takes less effort to form an attitude than to act upon it and that policy 
acceptance is usually necessary for policy support (Dreyer et al., 2017). Consistent 
with their thinking about effort, recent political mobilization efforts use technology 
to change the amount of effort required to engage in support/resistance (e.g., send-
ing a letter to one’s representative) by creating pre-written letters and forms already 
addressed to the appropriate representative that can be sent in less than a minute 
with just a few clicks of buttons on web-based forms.
Especially relevant to our studies, deliberative and participatory engagement has 
been hypothesized to increase policy acceptance via, potentially, two specific mech-
anisms. First, the activities might inform people (as was supported by the knowl-
edge increases noted in Chap. 3), and new information might change people’s 
attitudes (as was supported by attitude changes at the individual level, reported in 
Chap. 4). End attitudes toward topics, in turn, tend to correlate with people’s policy 
preferences about those topics in predictable ways. In our data, for example, simple 
correlations between the extents to which perceived benefits outweighed the risks of 
nanotechnology, and to which they preferred the policy that speeded up nanotech-
nology development or did not prefer the policy that slowed it down, ranged from 
about 0.45 to 0.55. If people’s attitudes are changed in such a way that they come to 
an attitudinal consensus, then most people may support the eventually chosen pol-
icy (Drews & van den Bergh, 2016). Unfortunately, this last linkage is not found in 
our data; recall that our results in Chap. 4 did not reveal that any of our methods 
resulted in a great deal of consensus that might in turn result in high policy accep-
tance in one experimental condition or another.
A second mechanism is that effective participatory engagement might increase 
positive perceptions of how the policy decisions were made. These positive percep-
tions might increase the perceived legitimacy of the policies themselves, which are 
then viewed as more acceptable to people. Thus, the boundary between acceptance 
and nonacceptance (in Fig. 5.1 this is represented by vertical double bars, in between 
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which is policy tolerance) might not happen at the neutral point of one’s preferences 
and might be found at a higher or lower point or even found to shift along the dimen-
sion of preferences, due to other factors. Consistent with this thinking, Wallner 
(2008) describes the role of policy legitimacy in policy failure. Waller argues that, 
beyond policy characteristics (such as ineffectiveness, inefficiency, and poor perfor-
mance), policies can fail because the public or affected stakeholders do not find 
them legitimate.
In addition to having a main effect on policy acceptance, positive process percep-
tions might also operate through another mechanism: by reducing the effect of other 
variables that otherwise would reduce acceptance or support—such as negative pol-
icy preferences. Evidence for such interactions (e.g., process perception x policy 
preference interaction effects upon policy acceptance/support) comes from research 
on procedural and distributive justice (e.g., Tyler & Huo, 2002). To our knowledge, 
prior research has not examined such interactions in the context of studies of policy 
acceptance. However, quite a lot of research related to procedural and distributive 
justice seems relevant and may generalize. Such studies examine when and why, for 
example, people are willing to accept outcomes that they do not favor, such as losing 
in an arbitration or less-than adequate severance pay in an employment layoff. 
Brockner (1996) provided a list of 20 studies that found the relationship between 
outcome preferences and expressions of acceptance (which included things like 
expressions of satisfaction and organizational commitment) was moderated (i.e., 
reduced) by introducing decision-making and implementation procedures that were 
perceived as fair, respectful, transparent, inclusive, and so on. Brockner (1996) argues 
that the reason why such procedural justice factors have the moderating impact of 
reducing the influence of preferences on acceptance is because they produce trust in 
the persons making the decisions. In the context of our study, we might see this rela-
tionship if our measures of procedural perceptions predicted trust in policymakers 
which in turn moderated the relationship between policy preference and acceptance.
On the negative side, however, some have hypothesized that public engagement 
might reduce policy acceptance rather than increase it. The arguments for the poten-
tial negative impacts of public engagement on acceptance and support are somewhat 
similar to those discussed in Chap. 4. If, during the engagements, people bolster 
their belief in and the evidence for their opinions, the effect may be greater resis-
tance to policies among those who disagree with the policy, than if they had not 
engaged. Indeed, prior research suggests that people who put more effort into their 
decisions—something that deliberative engagements seek to promote—can create 
more coherent attitudes which include feeling more favorable toward their choice 
and less favorable to alternatives (Anderson, DeTour, & PytlikZillig, 2015; Goodwin 
& Wu, 1984; Svenson & Jakobsson, 2010). Thus, by increasing people’s certainty 
about their attitudes and preferences, it may be that deliberations simply make it 
easier for people who are for the policy to accept it while making it harder for those 
who are against the policy to accept it. In other words, such processes might increase 
the influence of preferences on policy acceptance/support by making those prefer-
ences more coherent.
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To summarize, and to make explicit the connections between our deliberative 
features and prior literature and theory, we are hypothesizing two competing pro-
cesses that may affect policy acceptance/support in our studies. These processes are 
conceptually illustrated in Fig. 5.2. One process is hypothesized to operate through 
perceptions of the processes as being fair and competent (see Fig.  5.2a). Public 
engagement features that increase these perceptions would thus also increase policy 
acceptance/support and may also decrease the relationship between policy prefer-
ences and acceptance/support. For example, each of our manipulations (peer discus-
sion, active facilitation, strong information, and so on) might be viewed as more fair 
or competent and thus increase positive perceptions of the deliberative processes. In 
addition, factors that affect people’s perceptions of the background information—
critical thinking prompts, use of strong versus weak information, and use of NIF- 
formatted materials—may also impact information evaluations, which we would 
expect to influence process perceptions, because the information was part of the 
process. Of course, given that process perceptions were assessed after participants 
learned about the policy decision outcome, we would expect that their preferences 
for or against the policy would impact their perceptions of processes too. If process 
perceptions are impacted positively by these various factors, we would expect those 
positive perceptions then could directly increase acceptance/support of the policies 
and/or indirectly increase acceptance/support by increasing trust in policymakers, 
as well as by reducing the relationship between preferences and acceptance/support 
(moderation effect shown with a dotted line).
The second process (see Fig. 5.2b) is hypothesized to operate through creating 
stronger and more coherent attitudes toward the topics (nanotechnology) and poli-
cies under discussion. For example, prompting people to think in an effortful and 
conscientious manner might not only increase knowledge as suggested by Chap. 3 
findings but also increase how certain people are about their resulting attitudes. Use 
of peer discussion and active facilitation might also increase such deliberative 
efforts. Use of strong information that is optimally formatted (e.g., using NIF orga-
nization) might improve people’s perceptions of the information upon which their 
decisions are based and thus further increase their confidence in their attitudes. 
Confidence in one’s attitudes would then increase the strength of the relationship 
between one’s preferences and policy acceptance/support. However, because we did 
not directly assess people’s certainty in their attitudes, we could only look at the 
potential moderating impacts of deliberative engagement and information evalua-
tions instead (moderating effects shown with dotted lines).
Importantly, these two competing processes might involve the same public 
engagement features. For example, strong information might increase positive pro-
cess perceptions and increase attitude certainty, resulting in both positive and nega-
tive effects on acceptance. Such mixed effects could hide any main effects of strong 
information on policy acceptance, making it important to examine the effects of our 
experimental manipulations, not only on the desired end but on the mediators by 
which they are thought to work.
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Fig. 5.2 Theoretical models relating our experimental manipulations and mediator/moderator vari-
ables to policy acceptance/support. (a) Process perceptions model. (b) Attitude coherence model
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5.3  The Current Study
The overarching research question we focus on in context of nanotechnology policy 
and the present analyses is: What factors—especially factors relating to features of 
public engagement—predict willingness to accept/support a policy decision, whether 
or not that policy decision is/was preferred? Because the variables available across 
studies varied, for the purposes of this chapter, we did not do formal path analyses to 
explore the relationships depicted in Fig. 5.2. Instead, using simple correlations and 
multiple regression analyses, we examined, across studies, three categories of results: 
(1) whether our experimental manipulations, overall, appear to impact policy accep-
tance/support and/or the degree to which policy preference relates to policy accep-
tance/support, (2) whether our experimental manipulations impacted various 
potential mediators that might have effects on policy acceptance/support, and (3) 
whether our potential mediators did indeed predict policy acceptance/support and/or 
moderate the impact of policy preference on policy acceptance.
5.3.1  The Policy Scenarios
We were especially interested in how participants viewed the use of public input in 
their decision-making processes leading up to the policy choice. Thus, as noted in 
Chap. 2, our method for measuring policy preferences and acceptance also pur-
posely increased the salience of the public engagement processes used just prior to 
asking questions tapping policy acceptance/support and policy preferences. 
Specifically, in each of our studies, after all of the engagement activities, a scenario 
asked the participants to imagine that the very processes to which they had been 
exposed (which, of course, varied by experimental condition) were used to gather 
public input and that public input was then used to make a policy decision. In the 
scenario, the government’s decision—to either invest more in nanotechnology 
development and decrease regulations (pro-development of nanotechnology) or 
invest less in development and increase regulations (pro-regulation of nanotechnol-
ogy)—was always portrayed to be consistent with the public input obtained from 
the engagement activities. Furthermore, the scenario was randomly assigned so that 
participants had roughly equal chances of receiving a scenario that did or did not 
match their preferences.
5.3.2  Key Variables
While many details of our measures and manipulations are given in Chap. 2 and in 
our detailed methodological reports, here we review those variables most impor-
tant to this chapter. Following the scenario, we assessed our dependent variable, 
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which we call policy acceptance/support, because we treat acceptance and  support 
the same (without distinction) across our models and in our results. However, it 
may be important to note that acceptance/support was assessed in a manner more 
closely matching the conceptualization of policy acceptance in Studies 2–4, where 
we asked participants whether they agreed the government made the right choice 
and if they agreed that the government made the same choice they would have 
made. In Study 5, our acceptance/support variable more closely reflected policy 
support, as we directly asked about willingness to support versus resist the poli-
cies as well as whether they accepted the decision due to the processes used to 
come to the decision.
Immediately after the scenario, we also asked about perceptions of the processes 
used to make the policy decision, including how fair and competent1 the process 
was. The scenarios stressed that the public input methods used in the scenario were 
the same ones used with the survey respondent. Thus, we expected different process 
perceptions might occur as a result of students having been in different experimen-
tal conditions.
Finally, in each of our studies, our measure of policy preference was comprised 
of a single item. In Studies 2–4, separate from but immediately after the scenario 
was administered and a few questions about the scenario were answered, partici-
pants were randomly assigned to one of two versions of the policy preference item: 
“If legislation were being considered that would slow down (speed up) nanogenom-
ics research and development in the area of human enhancement by decreasing 
(increasing) funding and increasing (decreasing) restrictions...Would you be FOR 
or AGAINST such legislation?” Responses fell on a six-point scale ranging from 
“strongly AGAINST” to “strongly FOR” with no neutral point. Items were recoded 
to reflect whether or not the participants preferred the policy randomly assigned to 
them in the scenario.2 Thus “pro-slow” development of nanotechnology persons 
were identified as those who were for slowing down the research and development 
(or against speeding it up) and “pro-fast” if they were for speeding it up (or against 
slowing it down). In Study 5, the policy preference item was not separate from the 
scenario but instead referenced the scenario and read: “If the legislation above [in 
the scenario] were really under consideration by the government...Would you be 
FOR or AGAINST such legislation?” It was followed by the same six-point scale 
used in Studies 2–4.3
Other variables in our model were also assessed. We used participants’ aver-
age reported “conscientious” engagement across all of the times measured, to 
1 In Studies 2–4 perceived process competence was estimated by asking participants if they felt the 
government should have used a different process. A factor analysis suggested this item fit with the 
competence scale in Study 5 along with the item asking if they felt the process was incompetent.
2 Although these are not equivalent questions, we use them as rough approximations for prefer-
ences. The use of these two questions was designed to allow for an exploration of question framing 
effects which we do not delve into here.
3 This, of course, differs from the prior studies in that it likely creates some additional carryover 
between the scenario and the respondents’ expression of policy preferences.
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 operationalize effortful, deliberative engagement. We used this variable because, as 
noted in Chap. 2, it was most reliably related to participants feeling as though they 
had gained knowledge from the activities. The conscientious engagement measure 
was available for all four studies. We used three negative valence scales assessing 
participant perceptions of the background materials as biased, unclear, and untrust-
worthy (i.e., not accurate, not thorough). These three scales were available in Studies 
3, 4, and 5; Study 2 had only two of the scales (biased and untrustworthy scales). 
Trust in policymakers was variably assessed across studies, with only Studies 3 and 
4 providing measures of perceived trustworthiness and perceived untrustworthiness 
of policymakers across all participants. In Study 3, we additionally measured per-
ceptions of policymaker’s ability and motivation to take into account ethical, legal, 
and social issues when considering the policies that they were making.
5.4  Analyses and Results
As previously noted, we broke our broad research question about “what works and 
how” into three smaller questions: (1) Do our experimental manipulations, overall, 
impact policy acceptance/support and/or the degree to which policy preference 
relates to policy acceptance/support? Although little evidence was found for the 
main or moderating impacts of our experimental manipulations on acceptance/sup-
port, given that we had theorized competing processes might be in play, we next 
conducted analyses to explore: (2) Do our experimental manipulations impact the 
various potential mediators illustrated in Fig. 5.2 which may have effects on policy 
acceptance/support? Finally, our analyses explored: (3) Do the mediators predict 
policy acceptance/support and/or moderate the impact of policy preference on pol-
icy acceptance? To answer these questions, we both examined the correlations 
among our variables and results from multiple regression analyses.
5.4.1  Simple Correlations
Table 5.1 shows the simple correlations between each of our dummy-coded experi-
mental conditions and the other variables in the study. Table 5.2 displays the corre-
lations between other major measured variables, showing the individual correlations 
for each relevant study below the diagonal and the average of those simple correla-
tions above the diagonal.
In Table 5.2, the largest average correlations occurred as might be expected: (1) 
among similar sets of variables (e.g., the average correlations involving the per-
ceptions of information ranged |r| = 0.38–0.56; the ones involving perceptions of 
process fairness and incompetence ranged from −0.41 to −0.55 for an average of 
−0.48 across studies), (2) between policy preference and policy acceptance (aver-
age r across studies = 0.54), and (3) among perceptions of the process (fairness 
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and  competence) and policy acceptance (average |r|s = 0.50–0.59). There were also 
moderately strong relationships between policy preferences and process percep-
tions (average |r|s  >  0.30). This was expected because process perceptions were 
measured after people learned about the policy outcome (which had been randomly 
assigned). This means those who received outcomes matching their preferences 
rated the process as more fair and competent than those who received outcomes not 
matching their preferences.
Other correlations are also interesting to note. Consistent with Fig. 5.2, percep-
tions of the information modestly predict process perceptions. Perceptions of infor-
mation bias (see Table  5.2, variable 10) had the strongest relationships with 
perceptions of the process as fair and competent (variables 8, 9) (average |r|s = 0.14–
0.15). Perceived trustworthiness of policymakers also sometimes positively corre-
lated with policy acceptance as expected, although the correlations were not 
consistently statistically significant.
Diverging from the predictions illustrated in Fig. 5.2a, process perceptions did 
not correlate with perceptions of the trustworthiness of policymakers (average 
rs < 0.08, and none of the correlations for any of the studies were statistically sig-
nificant). In part, this may be because participants were asked to rate policymakers 
in general, not the policymakers in the scenario. However, and somewhat unexpect-
edly, negative perceptions of the background documents (assessed during A2) were 
related to negative perceptions of policymakers (measured at A4). In addition, 
although hypothesized only as a potential moderator (see Fig. 5.2b), deliberative 
conscientious engagement (assessed across multiple assignments) was moderately 
positively related to perceptions of the information and the policymakers. That is, 
more conscientious engagement related to more positive perceptions of the infor-
mation and policymakers. In Studies 2 and 5, conscientious engagement also was 
marginally predictive of process fairness perceptions.
Finally, although not the focus of our analyses, Table 5.2 shows the randomly 
assigned scenario (0 = pro-regulation, 1 = pro-development, variable 6) correlated 
with policy acceptance/support. Generally speaking, participants were more accept-
ing and supportive of the policy scenario randomly assigned to them if it was pro- 
regulation rather than pro-development (rs = −0.11 to −0.29, with an average − 0.17 
correlation across studies).4
4 We also used multiple regression analyses to test the effect of scenario type after accounting for 
policy preferences and, if relevant, the interaction effect between preference and scenario type. The 
interaction effect was only significant in Study 4. In Study 4, the effect of policy preference on 
acceptance was stronger in the pro-development scenario and nonsignificant in the pro-regulation 
scenario. In Studies 2 and 3, the interaction effect was not significant, but did show the same pat-
tern, and in Study 3 the interaction (with the same pattern) sometimes became marginally signifi-
cant when other variables were controlled in our regression analyses. This suggests that, consistent 
with prior research on risks versus benefits, people in favor of nanotechnology development were 
more willing to forego benefits from nanotechnology (when they received the pro-regulation sce-
nario) than those against nanotechnology were to embrace the potential risks (when they received 
the pro-development scenario).
5.4  Analyses and Results
104
We discuss other simple correlations as we discuss our three research questions 
and main categories of results, which include consideration of multiple regression 
analyses as well.
5.4.2  (1) Do Our Experimental Manipulations Impact Policy 
Acceptance/Support or Moderate the Policy Preference- 
Acceptance/Support Relationship?
The simple main effects of each of our experimental conditions were almost always 
not significant for the full sample. One rare simple main effect found was in Study 
5, with active facilitation resulting in slightly greater policy acceptance (Table 5.1, 
r = 0.14, p < 0.05).
Using multiple regression procedures, we also examined the combined and inter-
active impacts of our manipulations on policy acceptance/support. Because our 
analyses so rarely revealed significant effects, we do not present the results in tables 
or figures. Only two statistically significant effects were found, both in Study 5. One 
was significant effect of group type, such that those in the negative homogenous 
groups were most accepting/supportive of whatever policies they received and those 
in the heterogeneous attitude groups were least accepting/supportive of the policies 
they received. Additional analyses and studies are needed to understand this result. 
It is possible of course that it is a chance finding. The second effect (also found in 
Study 5) was a significant facilitation by information interaction such that the active 
facilitator had a significantly positive impact on policy acceptance/support in the 
weak information condition only and the strong information had a significantly 
positive impact only when the facilitator was passive. Thus, it seemed that active 
facilitation compensated for the negative effects of weak information on policy 
acceptance/support and vice versa.
Relating to the second part of our research question, we tested for but found no 
significant interactions indicating our experimental manipulations had moderating 
effects on the relationship between policy preference and acceptance/support. That 
is, none of our experimental conditions appeared to significantly increase or 
decrease the extent to which policy preferences impacted policy acceptance.
5.4.3  (2) Do Our Experimental Manipulations Impact 
Potential Mediators?
Although our experimental manipulations rarely affected policy acceptance/
support, we next explored the possibility that the experimental manipulations 
might have indirect effects on policy acceptance/support via impacts on other 
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related factors, such as the process perception variables (e.g., process fairness 
and  competence) which as Table  5.2 shows are so strongly related to policy 
acceptance/support. Alternatively, our manipulations might impact information 
evaluations (which were also related to perceptions of policymakers) or impact 
conscientious engagement—each of which we had hypothesized might moder-
ate the relationship between policy preferences and acceptance/support. We also 
tested for potential experimental manipulation impacts on perceptions of policy-
maker trustworthiness perceptions.
For these analyses, we examined each potential mediator individually as a depen-
dent variable in separate analyses, for each study. We tested for the main and inter-
active effects of the relevant experimental manipulations in each study, always 
including all main effects simultaneously, but dropped any higher-order interactions 
that could be ruled out by not achieving at least marginal significance (p < 0.10). 
Also, when examining effects, we usually controlled for the effect of policy prefer-
ence and, when relevant, its interaction with the randomly assigned policy scenario 
and the main effect of the scenario. This is because, except for in the case of infor-
mation perceptions (which were measured during A2 after the first reading of the 
information) and conscientious engagement (which was measured throughout and 
averaged across activities), the other variables were assessed after people learned 
about the policy outcome and may have been affected by whether they received 
their preferred outcome. Below we describe our main findings regarding the com-
bined impacts of our experimental manipulations on the proposed mediators.5
Process Perceptions
Examination of the correlations in Table 5.1 revealed the experimental manipula-
tions did not have strong or reliable relationships with process perceptions. Multiple 
regression analyses regressing process perceptions on our experimental manipula-
tions simultaneously also indicated some effects, but not consistent ones. Perceptions 
of process fairness were only impacted by our manipulations in Study 5, such that 
strong information (compared to weak information) conditions were associated 
with higher ratings of process fairness while controlling for other manipulations. 
Meanwhile, ratings of process competence appeared to be affected (at least margin-
ally) by the critical thinking conditions in the majority of our studies (again, once 
other manipulation effects were controlled), but not in a consistent direction. That 
is, (and these results are consistent with the correlation results in Table  5.1), in 
Studies 2 and 3, there was a main effect such that critical thinking participants felt 
processes were less competent than control participants. Later we note that our criti-
cal thinkers, in general, seemed critical—and this finding is consistent with that 
trend. However, in Study 4 the effect of critical thinking was in the opposite direc-
tion. Likewise, in Study 3 use of NIF materials increased perceived competence 
(i.e., decreased incompetence perceptions), but in Study 4 use of NIF materials 
decreased competence perceptions (increased incompetence perceptions).
5 Due to space constraints, we do not present full results. However, syntax to generate full sets of 
the results is available from this book’s first author.
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Study 5 results might shed some light on the contradictory effects of critical 
 thinking because Study 5 data suggests the effect of critical thinking depends on other 
factors we varied (and which could have varied unintentionally between other stud-
ies). For example, being in a homogenous positive group resulted in a significantly 
more positive effect of critical thinking on judgments of process competence com-
pared to being in a homogenous negative group, in which case the effect was in the 
opposite (i.e., negative) direction. The effects of the critical thinking prompts also 
interacted with passive/active moderation and strength of information. The  pattern of 
the three-way interaction suggested that using one positive factor (critical thinking 
prompts, strong information, or active moderation) could modestly increase perceived 
competence of the processes relative to having none of those factors. Adding a second 
one did not help much at all; however, you could further increase the perceived com-
petence if all three were used. While further analyses are necessary to understand the 
contradictory effects found between studies, it is possible that our groups in Studies 3 
and 4 were more or less homogenous in composition. It is also possible that some of 
our moderators were more passive than intended. Either of these situations might 
have impacted the direction of the critical thinking effect in Studies 3 and 4.
Information Perceptions
In each of our studies we found consistent evidence that critical thinking prompts 
impacted information perceptions. Specifically, people prompted to think critically 
also rated the background documents more negatively on one or more of our scales. 
Such effects are apparent in the correlation results shown in Table 5.1, as well as in our 
multiple regression results. For example, our regression results found, in Study 2, peo-
ple in the critical thinking condition rated the background information as less accurate 
and thorough than those in the control condition. In Study 3, those in the critical think-
ing condition felt the information was more biased, less thorough/accurate, and less 
clear than those in the non-critical thinking condition.6 In Study 4, critical thinkers 
again rated the background documents as less clear and less accurate/thorough.
In Study 5, partly because we had begun to wonder if our critical thinkers were 
just, well, critical, we created strong and weak information conditions. We wanted 
to see if our participants were actually sensitized to differences in quality of infor-
mation rather than just rating everything about the background information more 
negative overall. We did, once again, find more negative evaluations of our materi-
als among the critical thinkers. And consistent with Table 5.1 results, use of strong 
rather than weak information did very little to change participants’ ratings of the 
information overall. However, in the case of ratings of bias in the background doc-
uments, there was—if we reduced our sample to those student participants who 
completed our post measures at A4 as well as our A2 measures—a statistically 
significant interaction between critical thinking prompts and information quality 
such that the critical thinkers were less negative about the strong information than 
the weak information. This gave us hope that we had actually induced critical 
thinking and not just negativity. Still, the fact that we needed to reduce the sample 
6 In Study 3 there were also marginal positive main effects of the NIF formatting of the materials 
on accurate/thorough and significant positive impact of NIF formatting on perceiving the docu-
ments as unbiased. However, these effects were not replicated in Study 4.
5 Policy Acceptance
107
to the more “participatory” or “engaged” students in the course (i.e., those who 
completed A2 and A4 measures) suggests participant individual differences need 
to be taken into account in studies of public engagement, to fully understand effects 
that are found or not found.7
Policymaker Trustworthiness
Policymaker trustworthiness was only measured across all participants in Studies 3 
and 4. The simple correlation results in Table 5.1 suggest very little impact of our 
manipulations on perceptions of policymaker trustworthiness or untrustworthiness. 
Only the use of NIF information in Study 4 appeared to be related, specifically, to 
increased distrust in policymakers. Multiple regression analyses further indicated 
that, in Study 4, the NIF-formatted materials were associated with increased percep-
tions of untrustworthiness overall and also related to lower perceptions of trustwor-
thiness when participants were in the critical thinking condition. However, in Study 
3, a different effect was found: There was an NIF-format by group discussion inter-
action effect such that, only when in a peer discussion group, the NIF-formatted 
materials (compared to topically formatted materials) related to increased reports of 
perceptions of the ELSI-specific trustworthiness of policymakers (i.e., trustworthi-
ness as related specifically to their taking into account ethical, legal, and social 
issues). Thus, overall, the results were inconsistent and inconclusive regarding the 
effects on trustworthiness.
Conscientious Engagement
Figure 5.2b suggested our experimental manipulations might also predict conscien-
tious engagement (and recall there was support for this in Chap. 3, for the critical 
thinking manipulation). When simply examining the average correlations across 
studies (Table 5.1), however, we see small and somewhat unreliable correlations 
between conscientious engagement and the critical thinking manipulation, but more 
robust correlations between use of peer discussion and conscientious engagement, 
in all three studies where peer discussion was varied. In Study 5 there was also a 
significant correlation between use of strong (vs. weak) information and conscien-
tious engagement.
Analyses regressing conscientious engagement on all of our experimen-
tal manipulations found that peer discussion increased reports of conscientious 
engagement in each study. However, the critical thinking manipulation was not 
consistently related. In Study 2, critical thinking prompts related to reduced con-
scientious engagement. Note that the reason we had revised our critical thinking 
prompts in Studies 3–5 was partly because of noticing the negative impact our 
critical thinking manipulations in Studies 1 and 2 had on engagement. In Studies 
3 and 4, critical thinking prompts sometimes increased conscientious engagement, 
as noted in Chap. 3.
7 Although active facilitation in Study 5 appeared to be positively related to perceptions of the 
information (as shown in Table 5.1), assignment to active (vs. passive) facilitation occurred after 
students had read and rated the background information. This suggests that our random assignment 
procedures were not entirely effective and inadvertently created a situation where those who saw 
the materials more positively (trustworthy and clear) ended up more likely to be assigned to the 
active moderation condition.
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Additional analyses revealed the positive effects of the critical thinking prompts 
were primarily found when other elements commonly associated with good delib-
eration practices were missing. In Study 4 there was evidence of an interaction such 
that critical thinking increased average reported conscientious engagement if one 
was not in a group for discussion and group discussion increased conscientious 
engagement if one was not in the critical thinking condition. Thus, it seemed that 
group discussion and critical thinking prompts again compensated for the lack of the 
other. In Study 5, there was a significant three-way interaction between information 
strength, active moderation, and critical thinking prompts, which is illustrated in 
Fig. 5.3. This interaction also suggested that certain positive elements could compen-
sate for the lack of other positive deliberative elements. Compared to having none of 
the features that are commonly associated high-quality deliberative events (i.e., no 
peer discussion, weak information, and control prompts rather than prompts to think 
critically), adding any one of those elements increased conscientious engagement 
(and the largest effect was seen by adding active facilitation). However, it never 
helped to add an element to a situation that already had an existing single element. In 
fact, adding critical thinking to either of the other elements seemed to reduce consci-
entious engagement. On the other hand, the highest levels of conscientious engage-
ment were achieved if you had all three of the elements.
5.4.4  (3) Do Our Mediators Impact Policy Acceptance/Support 
or Moderate the Preference-Acceptance/Support 
Relationship?
As a final step in evaluating the feasibility of the models illustrated in Fig. 5.2 across 
our studies, we tested for the impacts of our mediators on policy acceptance/support 
and tested also whether the mediators might moderate the policy preference effect 
Fig. 5.3 Illustration of the three-way interaction between information (weak vs. strong), facilita-
tion (passive vs. active), and deliberation prompts (control vs. critical thinking) when predicting 
conscientious engagement in Study 5. Note: Numbers indicate how conscientious engagement is 
affected by including one, two, or three elements commonly associated with high-quality delibera-
tive events
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on policy acceptance/support. For these analyses, we conducted multiple  regressions 
that always included a dummy code for the scenario type (pro-development or pro-
regulation), as well as the effect of policy preference, and the interaction between 
scenario type and policy preference if relevant. Note that, prior to testing the simple 
main effect of a mediator and its interaction with policy preference, we tested for 
and if possible ruled out additional interactions with scenario type (i.e., the two-way 
mediator x scenario interaction and the three-way mediator x policy preference x 
scenario interaction). This was because prior analyses, including the correlation 
between scenario and policy acceptance, suggested that some effects differed 
depending on whether participants received the pro-development or pro- regulation 
policy decision scenario. Whenever we found an interaction with scenario type, we 
report the two-way interactions (between the mediator and policy preference) sepa-
rately for each scenario type in Table 5.3.
Process Perceptions
Selected results from the regression analyses examining the impacts of our process 
perception variables predicting policy acceptance/support are shown in Table 5.3. 
As shown in the top section of Table 5.3, perceptions of process fairness and process 
competence consistently and positively related to (had main effects upon) policy 
acceptance in each study.
Process perceptions also often interacted with policy preferences to predict pol-
icy acceptance/support. Contrary to our expectations, when interactions emerged 
between policy preferences and process perceptions, the interactions were usually 
positive, indicating that perceptions of fairness and competence increased the extent 
to which policy preferences positively predicted acceptance. For example, Table 5.3 
shows that process fairness in Study 3 had a positive impact (B = 0.45) on policy 
acceptance for those in the pro-regulation condition at mean levels of policy prefer-
ence. The interaction between fairness and policy preference differed by scenario 
(see rightmost set of columns for the interactions). For those in the pro-development 
scenario condition, the relationship between process fairness and policy acceptance 
increased (grew stronger) as one’s positive preferences increased (by 0.16 for every 
1 SD of increase of preferences). Thus, unlike prior literature that has found proce-
dural justice perceptions to be especially important when people receive outcomes 
that they do not favor, our studies relatively consistently found that the process 
perceptions were most highly related to policy acceptance when people received 
outcomes that they did prefer.
We suspect we may have found this pattern because the process perceptions in 
our study were assessed immediately after people were informed, in the scenario, of 
the policy decision made by the government. This outcome knowledge (in light of 
their policy preferences) likely impacted their perceptions of the processes used to 
come to the decision. Indeed, policy preferences were always strongly related to 
ratings of process fairness and process incompetence (see Table 5.2). We may have 
gotten a different pattern of results if we had assessed process perceptions prior to 
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Table 5.3 Mediator variable main effects on policy acceptance/support and interactions with 
policy preference when predicting acceptance/support
Main effects Interactions with policy preferences
Mediating variable and 
study B SE p
partial 
Eta2 B SE p
partial 
Eta2
Process fairness 
perceptions
Fairness interactions with policy 
preferences
Study 2 0.63*** 0.07 0.000 0.356 NS
Study 3 (pro-reg, mean 
policy pref)
0.45*** 0.08 0.000 0.099 −0.04 0.07 0.574 0.001
Study 3 (pro-devel) 0.16* 0.08 0.041 0.016
Study 4 (mean policy 
pref)
0.54*** 0.06 0.000 0.299 0.11+ 0.06 0.072 0.017
Study 5 0.32*** 0.05 0.000 0.175 NS
Process competence 
main effect
Competence interactions with policy 
preferences
Study 2 0.46*** 0.07 0.000 0.217 NS
Study 3 (pro-reg) 0.37*** 0.08 0.000 0.074 NS
Study 3 (pro-devel) 0.15+ 0.08 0.063 0.013 NS
Study 4 (pro reg, mean 
policy pref)
0.60*** 0.08 0.000 0.220 0.06 0.07 0.370 0.004
Study 4 (pro-devel) 0.32** 0.10 0.001 0.057
Study 5 (pro reg, mean 
policy pref)
0.40*** 0.07 0.000 0.133 −0.32*** 0.08 0.000 0.067
Study 5 (pro-devel) −0.05 0.05 0.266 0.005
Biased information main 
effect
Biased information interactions with 
policy preferences
Study 2 (pro-reg, mean 
policy pref)
−0.18+ 0.09 0.053 0.024 −0.01 0.08 0.872 0.000
Study 2 (pro-devel) −0.32* 0.12 0.010 0.042
Study 3 −0.06 0.06 0.295 0.004 NS
Study 4 (pro-reg, mean 
policy pref)
−0.17 0.10 0.082 0.017 0.05 0.08 0.531 0.002
Study 4 (pro-devel) −0.20+ 0.11 0.076 0.017
Study 5 −0.07 0.05 0.175 0.008 NS
Untrustworthy 
information main effect
Untrustworthy information 
interactions with policy pref.
Study 2 (mean policy 
pref)
0.06 0.09 0.528 0.004 −0.19* 0.08 0.019 0.049
Study 3 −0.02 0.06 0.675 0.001 NS
Study 4 −0.29** 0.10 0.003 0.048 NS
Study 5 (mean policy 
pref)
−0.03 0.05 0.467 0.002 −0.19*** 0.05 0.000 0.061
Unclear information 
main effect
Unclear information interactions 
with policy preferences
Study 3 −0.08 0.06 0.197 0.006 NS
(continued)
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Table 5.3 (continued)
Main effects Interactions with policy preferences
Mediating variable and 
study B SE p
partial 
Eta2 B SE p
partial 
Eta2
Study 4 −0.03 0.07 0.638 0.001 NS
Study 5 (mean policy 
pref)
0.09+ 0.05 0.070 0.015 −0.18** 0.05 0.001 0.050
Policymaker 
trustworthiness main 
effect
Policymaker trustworthiness 
interactions with pol. pref.
Study 3 0.08 0.06 0.188 0.007 NS
Study 4 0.19** 0.07 0.007 0.038 NS
Policymaker 
untrustworthiness main 
effect
Policymaker untrustworthiness 
interact. with pol. pref.
Study 3 −0.02 0.06 0.725 0.000 NS
Study 4 (pro-reg, mean 
policy pref)
−0.05 0.10 0.586 0.002 0.19* 0.09 0.032 0.025
Study 4 (pro-devel) −0.08 0.11 0.435 0.003
Policymaker ELSI- 
trustworth. main effect
Policymaker ELSI-trustworth. 
interactions with pol. pref.
Study 3 0.20** 0.06 0.001 0.044 NS
Conscientious 
engagement main effect
Conscientious engagement 
interactions with pol. pref.
Study 2 −0.05 0.07 0.475 0.003 NS
Study 3 0.02 0.06 0.690 0.012 NS
Study 4 (mean policy 
pref)
−0.01 0.07 0.860 0.000 0.12+ 0.07 0.086 0.016
Study 5 (pro-reg, mean 
policy pref)
0.14* 0.06 0.029 0.021 0.04 0.06 0.482 0.002
Study 5 (pro-devel) 0.24** 0.07 0.001 0.046
Note: If the main effects or interactions were dependent upon scenario type (pro-development vs. 
pro-regulation of nanotechnology), then multiple main effects or interactions are shown. In the 
case of a variable x preference x scenario-type interaction, both variable x preference interactions 
are reported (separately for each scenario type), but only one main effect of the variable may be 
reported. This main effect, if computed in the context of higher-order interations, may be condi-
tional upon on other factors indicated in parens. NS is used to indicate when the interaction is not 
significant across both the pro- development and pro-regulation scenarios
+p < .10
*p < .05
**p < .01
***p < .001
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revealing the policy decision outcome.8 Future research including measures of 
 process perceptions prior to people learning about the policy outcomes is needed to 
clarify these patterns.
Information Perceptions
As shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, the impacts of perceptions of information qual-
ity did not consistently have main effects on policy acceptance/support, but 
when effects were found, seeing the information as deficient (biased, untrust-
worthy, or unclear) was more likely to decrease than increase policy acceptance. 
Information quality perceptions also often interacted with policy preferences to 
predict policy acceptance/support as shown in the right-hand side of Table 5.3. 
Whenever the interaction occurred, it was negative, indicating that perceiving the 
information as inadequate reduced the effect of policy preferences on acceptance/
support (and conversely, that positive quality perceptions relate to increased rela-
tionships between policy preferences and acceptance/support). As previously 
described and illustrated in Fig. 5.2, we thought that perceptions of high informa-
tion quality might either (1) weaken the relationship between policy preferences 
and acceptance due to increasing people’s procedural fairness assessments or (2) 
strengthen relationships between policy preferences and acceptance/support due 
to increasing attitude certainty related to their preferences. Even though we did 
not assess attitude certainty, the pattern we found more closely matches the sec-
ond account (Figure 5.2b). In future research it would be interesting to investigate 
whether our effects of information perceived as poor quality are indeed due to 
increased uncertainty about the preferences that participants formed during the 
activities. It is also noteworthy that three-way interactions with scenario 
type were again apparent in these analyses when examining the effect of percep-
tions of bias in the information. It was only in the pro-development scenario con-
dition that increased perceptions of bias (measured at A2) related to weakened 
relationships between policy preferences and acceptance/support (measured at 
A4) (see Table 5.3, right-hand side; Study 2 pro- development condition reveals 
a − 0.32 interaction effect, and Study 4 pro- development condition finds a − 0.20 
interaction effect). Note that in this case, information perceptions were assessed 
before learning about the outcome, making it not possible for people’s reaction 
to the outcome to impact their perceptions of the information. While it is not 
entirely clear why bias perceptions would only impact preference-acceptance 
relationships in the pro-development condition, the three- way interactions under-
score that not all policy decisions are equal and that accepting/supporting one 
policy might be very different than accepting/supporting a different or seemingly 
8 It is also worth noting that, although the three-way interaction effect was the same in all the stud-
ies where it was found, it was surprising that the patterns of two-way effects differed in Study 5 as 
shown in Table 5.3. Given the differences between the acceptance/support scales constructed for 
Study 5 compared to the other studies, we also conducted item-level analyses to conduct analyses 
using variables more comparable to those used in Studies 2–4. However, the same pattern of results 
was found as with the full scales. It is possible that differential effects were instead due to how 
closely tied the Study 5 acceptance/support scales were to the scenario.
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opposite policy. In our context, one policy decision (pro-development) might 
have been viewed as more risky than the other (pro- regulation) and thus activated 
risk aversion and a bias toward the status quo, which may have included greater 
consideration of aspects of the process that led to the decision (including quality 
of information considerations).
Perceptions of Policymaker Trustworthiness and Untrustworthiness
As previously noted, measures of perceptions of policymakers were only adminis-
tered to all students in Studies 3 and 4, making it more difficult to assess replication 
of effects or lack of effects. Nonetheless, Table 5.3 shows that, in both studies, there 
was at least one indication that perceived trustworthiness of policymakers has a 
positive main effect on policy acceptance/support. In Study 4 there was also an 
interaction such that perceptions of untrustworthiness increased the relationship 
between preferences and acceptance/support. In other words, people who perceive 
policymakers as untrustworthy appear to more strongly rely on their policy prefer-
ences to decide upon policy acceptance/support. Future research should investigate 
whether these patterns hold across additional replications. That is, are trustworthi-
ness perceptions most important for their main effects on policy acceptance? Are 
(low) untrustworthiness perceptions most important for accepting policies even 
when they are not preferred?
Conscientious Engagement
Finally, there was not much evidence that conscientious engagement had a main 
effect on policy acceptance/support, but there was evidence in both Studies 4 and 5 
that conscientious engagement impacts the policy preference-acceptance relation-
ship. In each case, the interaction was such that those who reported they engaged 
more conscientiously had stronger relationships between their reported policy pref-
erences and acceptance/support. This is consistent with the theorizing that went into 
Figure 5.2b, but future research will need to establish whether or not the reason for 
the pattern is due to increases in attitude certainty.
Once again, there was also evidence that conscientious engagement mattered 
most in the pro-development condition (in Study 5). Future research is needed to 
explain why this is so. It is possible that when people are more accepting overall of 
a policy (as was the case in the pro-regulation scenario), those factors such as atti-
tude certainty matter less.
5.5  Summary and Conclusions
In summary, our experimental manipulations rarely had direct impacts on policy 
acceptance/support, and never directly moderated the relationship between policy 
preferences and policy acceptance/support. However, public engagement features 
may still matter because sometimes our experimental manipulations did impact our 
5.5 Summary and Conclusions
114
proposed mediators which in turn impacted policy acceptance/support or moderated 
the relationship between policy preferences and acceptance.
One of our most robust findings was that critical thinking prompts increased 
 negative evaluations of the quality of information participants received. This is 
important because of the role of information evaluations in policy acceptance/sup-
port. That is, our analyses suggest that quality of information impacts two different 
and competing processes. As quality of information perceptions improve, process 
perceptions and perceptions of policymakers improve too, which can relate to 
increased policy acceptance.9 At the same time, as perceptions of information 
improve, the relationship between policy preference and acceptance also increases, 
decreasing the extent to which people who do not get their preferred outcome will 
be accepting or supportive. Because our analyses rarely found main effects of infor-
mation quality on policy acceptance, it is possible that these two processes cancel 
one another out.
There was also robust evidence that peer discussion increased reports of consci-
entious engagement. This could be important because conscientious engagement 
related to both improved perceptions of information quality and trust in policymak-
ers—both of which, as previously noted, tend to predict greater policy acceptance.10 
In addition, conscientious engagement had a moderating effect on the policy 
preference- acceptance relationship, increasing that relationship in a manner similar 
to how the perceived quality of information increased it.
Taken together, our results suggest that certain features of public engagement 
that strive to meet the “deliberative ideal” will result in less acceptance of non- 
preferred policies. Practitioners strive to use high-quality information in delibera-
tions and strive to have people engage by thinking carefully about the information—in 
a manner that is likely to increase their knowledge and their application of that 
knowledge to their opinions. This, however, does potentially result in people’s pref-
erences driving their support/acceptance of the policy to a greater degree than if 
they had not consumed high-quality information conscientiously.
Other effects of our experimental manipulations were less robust. Critical think-
ing prompts sometimes interacted with other factors to predict process percep-
tions. NIF-formatted materials sometimes interacted with other factors to predict 
trustworthiness of policymakers. Some effects were found in Study 5, but future 
research is needed to see if the effects replicate. If the findings do replicate, Study 
5 results suggest that certain design features can compensate for others (such as 
when active moderation compensated for weak background information and vice 
9 Of course, it is possible that all three perceptions (of information, the engagement processes, and 
policymakers) could be caused by a different variable, such as positive attitudes toward the topic 
(nanotechnology).
10 However, again, interest in the topic of nanotechnology could drive careful deliberation, positive 
attitudes toward the information, and trust in the policymakers. Additional analyses and experi-
mental research will be needed to tease apart sequences of causation.
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versa). If such compensatory effects are common in public engagement research, 
this may make it difficult to find effects in experiments but may also be encourag-
ing for practitioners. That is, as they strive to do many things “right,” it may be 
reassuring to know that not everything needs to be perfectly right to achieve ben-
efits from deliberative engagements.
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Abstract In the preceding chapters, we have presented the need for a science of 
public engagement, the reasons we focused on feature-process-outcome connec-
tions relating to deliberative engagement, and the basis for our targeting nanotech-
nology/synthetic biology as the policy area concentration of our research. In this 
chapter, we briefly summarize what we have learned and offer some suggestions for 
future studies that will further advance the science of engagement and deliberation. 
We also encourage the interested reader to access our data and other supplemental 
files in order to conduct additional analyses of the data we collected.
Keywords Biology · Deliberation · Engagement features · Genomics · 
Nanotechnology · Public engagement · Science and technology innovations · 
Science of public engagement · Synthetic biology
Anticipated advances in science led to the macabre creation of life portrayed in the 
nineteenth-century novel by Mary Shelly, Frankenstein, and to the fantastical tech-
nological advances depicted in the television cartoon series “The Jetsons.” These 
popular cultural representations illustrate how developments in science and technol-
ogy both excite and frighten society, often evoking the public’s interest in being 
involved in decisions about whether to permit, regulate, or squelch scientific and 
technological innovations. For example, the recent announcement of the long- 
awaited breakthrough in editing human genes to remedy genetic anomalies that lead 
to disease again raised the specter of designing babies and led to calls for public 
deliberation about these emerging technologies (e.g., Belluck, 2017).
As we noted in the first chapter, public engagements regarding science and tech-
nology innovations allow many in society to provide input about what is accept-
118
able and what is not (e.g., Delgado, Kjølberg, & Wickson, 2011). Such public 
 involvements also can infuse public values into technology development discussions 
and are essential for a healthy democracy (e.g., Rip & Robinson, 2013; Wilsdon & 
Willis, 2004). Public engagement with science can increase the public understand-
ing, appreciation, and opportunity to argue for or against acceptance of emerging 
science and technology advances (e.g., Gastil, 2017). There is, therefore, great hope 
for the value of public engagement.
In contrast to the great hope for engagement, there is a dearth of science about 
engagement. As we have argued previously (PytlikZillig & Tomkins, 2011), simply 
deploying listening sessions or other types of engagement with the public may not 
suffice: It is essential to ascertain what is a successful engagement, what works to 
ensure successful engagements, in what contexts, and why. As noted in Chap. 1, and 
as underscored by our own unwillingness to offer a hard-and-fast definition, the 
concept of “public engagement” itself is ill-defined. Currently, public engagement 
encompasses everything from opinion surveys to information campaigns, to interac-
tive museum exhibits, to citizen science, to voting behavior, and to deliberative 
discussion. The definition of “public” is also broad and wide ranging. Consider, for 
example, that public engagement through deliberation can involve dialogues among 
or between peers, policymakers, technologists, scientists, and many other stake-
holders. Furthermore, engagement methods and terminology used to describe those 
methods within studies of public engagement are widely varied; numerous dimen-
sions of public engagement have been proposed without much consensus on which 
dimensions are most important to future research agendas; potential differences and 
opportunities for engaging marginalized populations for the most part have not been 
the target of theory or extended empirical focus (but see Young, 2002); and current 
categories of public engagement effectiveness criteria do not easily lend themselves 
to suggesting theories that would advance understanding of how various forms of 
public engagement work for different purposes and aims.
Given all these challenges, whatever is an aspiring public engagement researcher to 
do? Our work provides but one example of an approach forward. For our research, we 
functionally operationalized our engagements as deliberations about a target (learning 
about and assessing nanotechnology/synthetic biology) using accessible and appro-
priately thorough written materials as part of a class to inform students’ decision-
making as part of specifically designed tasks (see Chap. 2). We hope in the future 
much of what we need to know about public engagements we will know because 
experimental methods and valid assessments reveal what works to ensure engage-
ments are successful according to clear criteria, under what circumstances, and why.
We hope that a science of public engagement will answer questions that go 
beyond our current data, such as whether, when, and why:
Face-to-face encounters are or are not preferable to online engagements.
Written materials are or are not a more effective way of providing background 
information than a brief video.
Engagement discussions are or are not more productive in small groups than in town 
hall formats.
Bringing people together in the real, versus the virtual, world enhances certain out-
comes and so on.
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In our series of studies, we were guided by affective, cognitive, and behavioral 
psychology to try to better understand the impacts of different features of engage-
ment: Specifically, we looked at aspects of cognitive engagement (critical thinking, 
information organization), characteristics of background information (pro versus 
con perspectives of the topic, stronger versus weaker information), whether there 
was discussion, and active versus passive facilitation of the discussions (Chap. 2). 
We examined these matters in the context of college students—future scientists!—
learning about the intersection of nanotechnology and genomics as part of an intro-
ductory biology course.
This sample consisted of participants who are comparatively bright and moti-
vated and from a Midwestern, public university, so they may not generalize pre-
cisely to others across the American population. We do not think our materials 
always “worked” as well as our materials have when we have engaged residents on 
city budgeting issues. That is, in the city budgeting engagement we had both objec-
tive and subjective indications that participants learned a great deal about the way a 
city’s finances worked and increased their trust in government after they engaged 
city officials about budgeting matters (Herian, Hamm, Tomkins, & PytlikZillig, 
2012; PytlikZillig, Tomkins, Herian, Hamm, & Abdel-Monem, 2012; Tomkins 
et al., 2012; Tomkins, PytlikZillig, Herian, Abdel-Monem, & Hamm, 2010). Yet the 
lessons we learned from students in a much more controlled, laboratory-like setting 
are important first steps for beginning to understand what to do (and what not to do), 
despite the limitations of our program of research.
For example, we found that reading information related to nanogenomics had a 
positive impact on both objective and subjective knowledge, but discussing the 
information with other students was not important for factual knowledge gain 
(Chap. 3). The ways in which information was presented to students also did not 
make a significant difference, nor did our prompts for critical thinking directly 
influence knowledge. How students engaged with the nanogenomic materials they 
were provided impacted subjective knowledge: Students felt they learned more 
when they were paying closer, more conscientious, attention, when actively and 
metacognitively engaged with the information they received, and when thinking 
imaginatively about the materials. Moreover, students who were prompted to think 
critically and be conscientious about the science information reported less close-
mindedness about the nanoscience as well as positive engagement with the materi-
als. As a result, we found that critical thinking did in fact impact subjective 
knowledge through these increases in positive engagement and decreases in nega-
tive engagement. In general, we can say that our deliberative engagements, on the 
whole, increased knowledge, but scholars should pay closer attention to how par-
ticipants cognitively engage to realize substantive knowledge gains.
Although an outcome often hoped for by deliberative theorists is increased atti-
tude consensus, a concern that deliberation might lead to attitude polarization has 
been claimed, most prominently by scholars such as Cass Sunstein (e.g., Sunstein, 
2000, 2002). Our analyses of the data (Chap. 4) revealed some degree of attitude 
change across studies but rarely in a matter that suggested polarization or extremiti-
zation of attitudes. There was some evidence of differences in extremitization when 
Conclusion and Future Directions
120
students engaged in critical thinking (versus when they did not), but these effects 
were not affected by whether the students engaged in discussions and usually sug-
gested students became more moderate when encouraged to think critically. Further, 
when we manipulated the homogeneity of attitudes within groups during discus-
sion, we did not find any differences in attitude change or extremitization in the 
aggregate, but we did find that this was somewhat dependent on individual-level 
openness. Specifically, we found some evidence that students low in openness were 
the most likely to exhibit extremitization in heterogeneous groups, and students’ 
high in openness were the most likely to exhibit extremitization in homogeneous 
groups. Our conclusion, partly reflecting others (for a review, see Delli Carpini, 
Cook, & Jacobs, 2004), is that attitude change via deliberation is dependent on con-
text as well as personality, but we did not detect evidence of polarization related to 
discussing the ethical and policy implications of nanoscience materials (see also 
Gastil, 2017; Gastil, Kahan, & Braman, 2006).
Finally, we examined the students’ policy acceptance, even when government 
selects a policy that is inconsistent with their own preferences (Chap. 5). Again, we 
did not find our experimental manipulations had many direct effects on this impor-
tant outcome nor did they directly moderate the relationships between policy prefer-
ences and acceptance/support. Nonetheless, sometimes our manipulations did 
impact potential mediators such as perceptions of the process and of the information 
used. These mediators and moderators ended up being important for advancing 
understanding of why our manipulations may not have had effects. For example, 
one robust finding was that critical thinking prompts led participants to perceive the 
information materials more negatively. Somewhat less robustly, critical thinking 
prompts also sometimes led to greater conscientious (careful, thorough) engage-
ment. Interestingly, this suggests multiple competing processes can be evoked by 
one feature of engagement: prompting critical thinking during deliberation evokes 
both conscientious engagement and negative assessments of the information pro-
vided. Note that for people to accept policies they do not prefer, it is required that 
the typically strong relationships between policy preferences and acceptance be 
reduced. Our analyses found conscientious engagement tended to strengthen the 
relationship between policy preferences and acceptance, while negative assess-
ments of the information materials were associated with weaker policy preference- 
acceptance relationships. This suggests the reason critical thinking prompts 
appeared to have no overall effect on the policy preference-acceptance relationship 
is because the prompts evoked both processes simultaneously. It also suggests that 
some of the features that engagement practitioners attempt to promote (conscien-
tious thinking and high-quality information) are likely to increase preference- 
acceptance relationships, thereby making it more difficult rather than less difficult 
for those who dislike policies to accept them.
Through our multi-year research program, we learned that although it is pos-
sible to emulate some of the control features of laboratory science, the classroom 
does not necessarily emulate real-world deliberations environments (for a particu-
larly interesting study of real-world deliberations, this in the legal system and the 
role of juries, see Gastil, Dees, Weiser, & Simmons, 2010). Research interests had 
to be subservient to the educational preferences, needs, and timings of the course 
6 Conclusion and Future Directions
121
 instructors, even if they were very flexible about our use of random assignment and 
the content of what we gave students. Students did receive participation grades for 
their involvement in our activities. They also could choose to withdraw their data 
from our analyses; however, the vast majority did not. Still, students distinguished 
between core course materials and the nanogenomic information we were providing 
them in recitation sections, and it was clear that nanogenomics was not as important 
to them as other biology they needed to know for the tests they were going to take. 
Nonetheless, we do think that there is promise in working with science teachers to 
learn about what works to increase engagement with science materials, to improve 
science communication to non-students, and especially to increase student interest 
in, skill for, and willingness to think through the ethical, legal, and social implica-
tions of the science they might practice and advance in the future.
In the future, the goals of deliberative engagements with science should be clearly 
articulated: Do we care about increases in science knowledge (Chap. 3), social 
conformity versus group polarization (Chap. 4), attitude change (Chap. 4), policy 
acceptance (Chap. 5), feelings of fairness and opportunities to be heard (Chap. 5), 
science-policy consensus, and so on? Which objectives should be prioritized, and 
why? What role should the reality of the costs involved in preparing and executing 
engagement activities play in decisions about their value for these outcomes?
As the numerous references in this book reflect, there is a lot of information 
already available and a lot of insights that already exist. Yet an overarching science 
of public engagement is not as well developed or coherent as the science of fairness 
or trust, or the science of attitude development and change, or the science of teach-
ing and learning, or the science of various other pertinent elements of deliberative 
engagements (communication, decision-making, group processes, information 
sharing, and so on).
So, given where we are today, how do we get to a more developed science of 
engagement? We believe there is great promise in conducting theory-driven, experi-
mental studies of public engagement utilizing randomized controls. We think that 
other social scientists can improve on what we did in our research. In our project, 
we focused on future scientists deliberating about nanotechnology and synthetic 
biology. Programs of research on these areas are still needed, as are other important 
areas of science and technology, such as workplace robotics and smart and con-
nected communities, new genetic engineering tools such as CRISPR technology, 
and so on. We believe deliberations are also important for outcomes we did not 
investigate in our studies, such as understanding and promoting justice and clarify-
ing values inherent in policy determinations of health care, education, finance and 
budgeting—really, virtually any public policy area.
For those who want to make use of our data set, we have provided our methods, 
materials, and measures, and substantial data as part of the supplemental materials. 
Additional analyses beyond those we have conducted certainly are warranted. We 
hope our materials will be useful for training of students and provide additional 
insights for public engagement researchers and practitioners. Much of our data also 
may contain insights we did not mine. Finally, we hope lessons from our research 
can enhance future studies of public engagement strategies used in different con-
texts and for varied purposes.
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The most critical takeaway we can offer is to encourage social scientists to 
undertake theory-driven programs of systematic research on public engagement 
matters. We believe our colleagues will further develop what we have started. This 
seems especially salient in the current sociopolitical context. As the world’s 
resources are increasingly depleted by an ever-growing human population, it is a 
near certainty that scarcity, unequal distributions of resources, and survival-relevant 
threats will increase the cognitive biases and psychological defenses used by key 
actors and the publics that follow them. This in turn will make a consensus around 
group efforts toward a sustainable future more and more difficult to obtain. Thus, it 
becomes increasingly important to promote the study of methods of public engage-
ment (including the engagement of expert, lay, policymaking, and other publics) 
and to examine their impacts on outcomes such as learning (which can lead to 
informed decisions and attitudes), well-calibrated trust among parties involved in 
the decisions, polarization and conflict reduction, and willingness to accept policy 
decisions even when those decisions may not be personally optimal or preferred.
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